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undici is vulnerable to CRLF Injection via upgrade option

CVSS 3.1 4.6 MEDIUMEUVD CVSS 3.1 4.6 CVSS 3.1 · ce714d77-add3-4f53-aff5-83d477b104bb · Secondary 4.6 MEDIUMCVSS_V3 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by undici 6.24.0Fixed by undici 7.24.0KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-1527

Published

ImpactWhen an application passes user-controlled input to the upgrade option of client.request(), an attacker can inject CRLF sequences (\r\n) to: * Inject arbitrary HTTP headers * Terminate the HTTP request prematurely and smuggle raw data to non-HTTP services (Redis, Memcached, Elasticsearch) The vulnerability exists because undici writes the upgrade value directly to the socket without validating for invalid header characters: // lib/dispatcher/client-h1.js:1121 if (upgrade) { header += `connection: upgrade\r\nupgrade: ${upgrade}\r\n` }

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euvd · EUVD-2026-11701

Published

ImpactWhen an application passes user-controlled input to the upgrade option of client.request(), an attacker can inject CRLF sequences (\r\n) to: * Inject arbitrary HTTP headers * Terminate the HTTP request prematurely and smuggle raw data to non-HTTP services (Redis, Memcached, Elasticsearch) The vulnerability exists because undici writes the upgrade value directly to the socket without validating for invalid header characters: // lib/dispatcher/client-h1.js:1121 if (upgrade) { header += `connection: upgrade\r\nupgrade: ${upgrade}\r\n` }

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-1527

Published

ImpactWhen an application passes user-controlled input to the upgrade option of client.request(), an attacker can inject CRLF sequences (\r\n) to: * Inject arbitrary HTTP headers * Terminate the HTTP request prematurely and smuggle raw data to non-HTTP services (Redis, Memcached, Elasticsearch) The vulnerability exists because undici writes the upgrade value directly to the socket without validating for invalid header characters: // lib/dispatcher/client-h1.js:1121 if (upgrade) { header += `connection: upgrade\r\nupgrade: ${upgrade}\r\n` }

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-4992-7rv2-5pvq

Published

### Impact When an application passes user-controlled input to the `upgrade` option of `client.request()`, an attacker can inject CRLF sequences (`\r\n`) to: 1. Inject arbitrary HTTP headers 2. Terminate the HTTP request prematurely and smuggle raw data to non-HTTP services (Redis, Memcached, Elasticsearch) The vulnerability exists because undici writes the `upgrade` value directly to the socket without validating for invalid header characters: ```javascript // lib/dispatcher/client-h1.js:1121 if (upgrade) { header += `connection: upgrade\r\nupgrade: ${upgrade}\r\n` } ``` ### Patches Patched in the undici version v7.24.0 and v6.24.0. Users should upgrade to this version or later. ### Workarounds Sanitize the `upgrade` option string before passing to undici: ```javascript function sanitizeUpgrade(value) { if (/[\r\n]/.test(value)) { throw new Error('Invalid upgrade value') } return value } client.request({ upgrade: sanitizeUpgrade(userInput) }) ```

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