IesEngine stream-mode MAC forgery via length-dependent KDF split

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

Exposure of the message authentication key through the encryption keystream in the stream mode of IesEngine (an IesEngine constructed without a block cipher) in Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. bc-csharp before 2.7.0 allows a remote attacker who has observed one encrypted message with known plaintext to forge shorter messages of their choosing that the recipient accepts as authentic, via a crafted ciphertext and MAC tag, because the MAC key was taken from the key derivation output directly after a keystream as long as the message, while the derivation input depends only on the static key pair and fixed parameters. The keystream revealed by that one message therefore contains the MAC key for every sufficiently shorter message.

Source published

2 Oct 2026 06:55:36 UTC

Source modified

2 Oct 2026 17:55:04 UTC

Observed here

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

Source terms

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CVSS 4.0 · 8.2 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N