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Cosign provides code signing and transparency for containers and binaries. Prior to versions 2.6.2 and 3.0.4,…

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 5.5 MEDIUMCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary 5.5 MEDIUMCheck source for fixed versionsKEV status unknown

Historical advisory recorded 25 Oct 2026 05:17:32 UTC. Read the latest advisory.

nvd · CVE-2026-22703

Published

Cosign provides code signing and transparency for containers and binaries. Prior to versions 2.6.2 and 3.0.4, Cosign bundle can be crafted to successfully verify an artifact even if the embedded Rekor entry does not reference the artifact's digest, signature or public key. When verifying a Rekor entry, Cosign verifies the Rekor entry signature, and also compares the artifact's digest, the user's public key from either a Fulcio certificate or provided by the user, and the artifact signature to the Rekor entry contents. Without these comparisons, Cosign would accept any response from Rekor as valid. A malicious actor that has compromised a user's identity or signing key could construct a valid Cosign bundle by including any arbitrary Rekor entry, thus preventing the user from being able to audit the signing event. This issue has been patched in versions 2.6.2 and 3.0.4.

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

nvd · CVE-2026-22703

Published

Cosign provides code signing and transparency for containers and binaries. Prior to versions 2.6.2 and 3.0.4, Cosign bundle can be crafted to successfully verify an artifact even if the embedded Rekor entry does not reference the artifact's…

Cosign provides code signing and transparency for containers and binaries. Prior to versions 2.6.2 and 3.0.4, Cosign bundle can be crafted to successfully verify an artifact even if the embedded Rekor entry does not reference the artifact's digest, signature or public key. When verifying a Rekor entry, Cosign verifies the Rekor entry signature, and also compares the artifact's digest, the user's public key from either a Fulcio certificate or provided by the user, and the artifact signature to the Rekor entry contents. Without these comparisons, Cosign would accept any response from Rekor as valid. A malicious actor that has compromised a user's identity or signing key could construct a valid Cosign bundle by including any arbitrary Rekor entry, thus preventing the user from being able to audit the signing event. This issue has been patched in versions 2.6.2 and 3.0.4.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Analyzed

Weakness classifications: CWE-345

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-01-10T07:16:03.030

lastModified: 2026-06-17T10:20:15.880

1 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:sigstore:cosign:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

Source published
10 Jan 2026 07:16:03 UTC
Source modified
17 Jun 2026 10:20:15 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 05:17:32 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 5.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary · 5.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

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