Bitnami Sealed Secrets is vulnerable to a scope-widening attack during
the secret rotation (/v1/rotate) flow. The rotation handler derives the
sealing scope for the newly encrypted output from untrusted
spec.template.metadata.annotations present in the input SealedSecret.
By submitting a victim SealedSecret to the rotate endpoint with the
annotation sealedsecrets.bitnami.com/cluster-wide=true injected into the
template metadata, a remote attacker can obtain a rotated version of the
secret that is cluster-wide. This bypasses original "strict" or
"namespace-wide" constraints, allowing the attacker to retarget and unseal
the secret in any namespace or under any name to recover the plaintext
credentials.
Bitnami Sealed Secrets is vulnerable to a scope-widening attack during
the secret rotation (/v1/rotate) flow. The rotation handler derives the
sealing scope for the newly encrypted output from untrusted
spec.template.metadata.annotations present in the input SealedSecret.
By submitting a victim SealedSecret to the rotate endpoint with the
annotation sealedsecrets.bitnami.com/cluster-wide=true injected into the
template metadata, a remote attacker can obtain a rotated version of the
secret that is cluster-wide. This bypasses original "strict" or
"namespace-wide" constraints, allowing the attacker to retarget and unseal
the secret in any namespace or under any name to recover the plaintext
credentials.
Bitnami Sealed Secrets is vulnerable to a scope-widening attack during
the secret rotation (/v1/rotate) flow. The rotation handler derives the
sealing scope for the newly encrypted output from untrusted
spec.template.metadata.annotations present in the input SealedSecret.
By submitting a victim SealedSecret to the rotate endpoint with the
annotation sealedsecrets.bitnami.com/cluster-wide=true injected into the
template metadata, a remote attacker can obtain a rotated version of the
secret that is cluster-wide. This bypasses original "strict" or
"namespace-wide" constraints, allowing the attacker to retarget and unseal
the secret in any namespace or under any name to recover the plaintext
credentials.
This report shows a scope-widening issue in the rotate (re-encrypt) flow: the output scope can be derived from untrusted `spec.template.metadata.annotations` on the input sealed secret.
If a victim sealed secret is strict- or namespace-scoped, an attacker who can submit it to the rotate endpoint can set `sealedsecrets.bitnami.com/cluster-wide=true` in the template metadata and receive a rotated sealed secret that is cluster-wide, enabling retargeting (`metadata.name`/`metadata.namespace`) and unsealing to recover the victim plaintext.
## Relevant Links (Pinned)
- Rotate handler uses `NewSealedSecret(..., secret)` after unsealing: https://github.com/bitnami-labs/sealed-secrets/blob/946bc048f3407117c837da6e4300686522d4c4eb/pkg/controller/controller.go#L560-L606
- Scope derivation reads secret annotations (`SecretScope`): https://github.com/bitnami-labs/sealed-secrets/blob/946bc048f3407117c837da6e4300686522d4c4eb/pkg/apis/sealedsecrets/v1alpha1/sealedsecret_expansion.go#L112-L122
## Root Cause
The rotate flow unseals the input sealed secret to a `Secret`, then reseals using `NewSealedSecret(..., secret)`.
Because `SecretScope(secret)` is computed from secret annotations, and unsealing applies `spec.template` metadata onto the unsealed secret, an attacker can influence the scope of the rotated output by mutating template annotations on the rotate input.
## Attack Path
1. Attacker obtains a victim `SealedSecret` object (for example via read access to resources or logs) and can submit it to the controller rotate endpoint.
2. Attacker sets `spec.template.metadata.annotations.sealedsecrets.bitnami.com/cluster-wide=true` (and optionally retargets name/namespace fields).
3. Rotate returns a resealed, cluster-wide sealed secret that is no longer bound to the victim name/namespace.
4. Attacker unseals the rotated output in their chosen namespace/name to recover the victim plaintext.
## Proof of Concept
Setup + run:
```bash
unzip poc.zip -d poc
cd poc
make test
```
Canonical output (excerpt):
```
[CALLSITE_HIT]: pkg/apis/sealedsecrets/v1alpha1/sealedsecret_expansion.go:112 SecretScope
[PROOF_MARKER]: scope_widened=true rotated_scope=cluster-wide
```
Control output (excerpt):
```
[NC_MARKER]: scope_widened=false strict_scope_preserved=true
```
## Fix Accepted When
Rotate preserves the original sealing scope and does not allow scope widening based on untrusted template metadata; strict or namespace-wide inputs cannot produce cluster-wide outputs.
[poc.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/25080027/poc.zip)
[PR_DESCRIPTION.md](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/25080028/PR_DESCRIPTION.md)
[attack_scenario.md](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/25080029/attack_scenario.md)
Sealed Secrets for Kubernetes: Rotate API Allows Scope Widening from Strict/Namespace-Wide to Cluster-Wide via Untrusted Template Annotations in github.com/bitnami-labs/sealed-secrets
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Feb 26, 2026, 12:50:00 AM
dateUpdated: Feb 26, 2026, 3:58:32 PM
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-284
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-02-26T02:16:20.187
lastModified: 2026-06-17T10:20:18.457
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.