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sched/mmcid: Don't assume CID is CPU owned on mode switch

CVSS 3.1 7.8 HIGHCheck source for fixed versionsKEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-23225

Published

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched/mmcid: Don't assume CID is CPU owned on mode switch Shinichiro reported a KASAN UAF, which is actually an out of bounds access in the MMCID management code. CPU0 CPU1 T1 runs in userspace T0: fork(T4) -> Switch to per CPU CID mode fixup() set MM_CID_TRANSIT on T1/CPU1 T4 exit() T3 exit() T2 exit() T1 exit() switch to per task mode ---> Out of bounds access. As T1 has not scheduled after T0 set the TRANSIT bit, it exits with the TRANSIT bit set. sched_mm_cid_remove_user() clears the TRANSIT bit in the task and drops the CID, but it does not touch the per CPU storage. That's functionally correct because a CID is only owned by the CPU when the ONCPU bit is set, which is mutually exclusive with the TRANSIT flag. Now sched_mm_cid_exit() assumes that the CID is CPU owned because the prior mode was per CPU. It invokes mm_drop_cid_on_cpu() which clears the not set ONCPU bit and then invokes clear_bit() with an insanely large bit number because TRANSIT is set (bit 29). Prevent that by actually validating that the CID is CPU owned in mm_drop_cid_on_cpu().

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cve-program · CVE-2026-23225

Published

sched/mmcid: Don't assume CID is CPU owned on mode switch

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched/mmcid: Don't assume CID is CPU owned on mode switch Shinichiro reported a KASAN UAF, which is actually an out of bounds access in the MMCID management code. CPU0 CPU1 T1 runs in userspace T0: fork(T4) -> Switch to per CPU CID mode fixup() set MM_CID_TRANSIT on T1/CPU1 T4 exit() T3 exit() T2 exit() T1 exit() switch to per task mode ---> Out of bounds access. As T1 has not scheduled after T0 set the TRANSIT bit, it exits with the TRANSIT bit set. sched_mm_cid_remove_user() clears the TRANSIT bit in the task and drops the CID, but it does not touch the per CPU storage. That's functionally correct because a CID is only owned by the CPU when the ONCPU bit is set, which is mutually exclusive with the TRANSIT flag. Now sched_mm_cid_exit() assumes that the CID is CPU owned because the prior mode was per CPU. It invokes mm_drop_cid_on_cpu() which clears the not set ONCPU bit and then invokes clear_bit() with an insanely large bit number because TRANSIT is set (bit 29). Prevent that by actually validating that the CID is CPU owned in mm_drop_cid_on_cpu().

Source published
18 Feb 2026 14:53:28 UTC
Source modified
5 Aug 2026 12:20:43 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
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CVSS 3.1 · 7.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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