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Blind SSRF in OAuth2 avatar synchronization via unvalidated OIDC picture claim

cve-program · severity unknownEUVD CVSS 3.1 3.1 CVSS 3.1 · 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0 · Secondary 3.1 LOWCVSS_V3 Publisher rating LOWFixed by code.gitea.io/gitea 1.27.0osv · severity unknownFixed by gitea.dev 1.27.0KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-23603

Published

Blind SSRF in OAuth2 avatar synchronization via unvalidated OIDC picture claim

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-58134

Published

Blind SSRF in OAuth2 avatar synchronization via unvalidated OIDC picture claim

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-23603

Published

Blind SSRF in OAuth2 avatar synchronization via unvalidated OIDC picture claim

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-x77v-q46j-393g

Published

### Summary When `[oauth2_client] UPDATE_AVATAR = true` is enabled, Gitea fetches the avatar URL received from an OAuth2/OIDC provider using Go's default HTTP client. The URL comes from the user's OAuth/OIDC avatar value, commonly the OIDC `picture` claim. The affected code path calls `http.Get(url)` without applying outbound host or IP restrictions. A low-privileged user who can influence their own `picture` claim under an already-configured OAuth2/OIDC source can cause the Gitea server to make arbitrary outbound HTTP GET requests. This includes requests to loopback addresses, RFC 1918 private network addresses, and IPv4 link-local addresses such as `169.254.169.254`. This is a blind SSRF by default. Impact can increase in deployments where the Gitea host can reach cloud metadata services, localhost-only services, or internal services that return valid image data. ### Details The vulnerable sink is in `routers/web/auth/oauth.go`: ```go func oauth2UpdateAvatarIfNeed(ctx *context.Context, url string, u *user_model.User) { if setting.OAuth2Client.UpdateAvatar && len(url) > 0 { resp, err := http.Get(url) if err == nil { defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }() } if err == nil && resp.StatusCode == http.StatusOK { data, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, setting.Avatar.MaxFileSize+1)) if err == nil && int64(len(data)) <= setting.Avatar.MaxFileSize { _ = user_service.UploadAvatar(ctx, u, data) } } } } ``` The caller is in `routers/web/auth/oauth_signin_sync.go`: ```go func oauth2SignInSync(ctx *context.Context, authSourceID int64, u *user_model.User, gothUser goth.User) { oauth2UpdateAvatarIfNeed(ctx, gothUser.AvatarURL, u) ... } ``` `gothUser.AvatarURL` is derived from the OAuth2/OIDC provider's avatar value. For OIDC providers, this is commonly populated from the `picture` claim returned by the provider's userinfo endpoint or ID token. The issue is that this value can be attacker-influenced in some common IdP configurations, while Gitea fetches it server-side using `http.Get` with no host/IP validation and no restricted transport. Comparable outbound fetch paths in Gitea use `hostmatcher.NewDialContext` to enforce restrictions at TCP dial time. For example, repository migration uses an HTTP transport with host matching. The OAuth2 avatar synchronization path does not apply those restrictions. ### PoC #### Requirements - Local Gitea build or binary - Python 3 - Python packages: `requests`, `pyjwt`, `cryptography` - Gitea configured with OAuth2 avatar synchronization enabled Install Python dependencies: ```bash python3 -m pip install requests pyjwt cryptography ``` Configure `app.ini`: ```ini [oauth2_client] UPDATE_AVATAR = true ENABLE_AUTO_REGISTRATION = true USERNAME = userid ``` Run the fake OIDC provider: ```bash python3 fake_oidc.py http://127.0.0.1:8888/ 9999 ``` Run a listener for the SSRF target: ```bash nc -lvnp 8888 ``` Register an OAuth2 authentication source in Gitea: - Provider: `OpenID Connect` - Client ID: `gitea-client` - Client Secret: `gitea-secret` - OpenID Connect Auto Discovery URL: `http://127.0.0.1:9999/.well-known/openid-configuration` Then initiate login through the configured OAuth2 source. Observed request to the SSRF listener: ```http GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1:8888 User-Agent: Go-http-client/1.1 Accept-Encoding: gzip ``` Observe that Gitea fetched the OIDC `picture` claim URL from the server side using the default Go HTTP client. ### Impact When [oauth2_client] UPDATE_AVATAR = true is enabled, a low-privileged OAuth2/OIDC user who can influence their own picture claim can force the Gitea server to make outbound HTTP GET requests to attacker-selected URLs. This allows blind SSRF from the Gitea server’s network position, including requests to loopback addresses, RFC1918 private addresses, link-local addresses such as 169.254.169.254, and other internal services that may not be reachable from the public internet. In practical terms, this can enable internal service probing and interaction with localhost-only or private-network services depending on the deployment’s network access controls. The vulnerability is blind in the common case because non-image responses such as HTML, JSON, or plaintext are rejected during avatar processing and are not directly returned to the attacker. However, impact can increase in cloud or internal-network deployments where metadata services, internal admin panels, monitoring endpoints, or image-generating internal services are reachable from the Gitea host. If an internal endpoint returns a valid supported image format within the configured avatar size limit, the response may be stored as the attacker’s avatar, creating a limited response retrieval primitive.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GO-2026-6083

Published

Gitea: Blind SSRF in OAuth2 avatar synchronization via unvalidated OIDC picture claim in gitea.dev

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

Exploitation and risk

Source status

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cve-program · CVE-2026-23603

Published

Blind SSRF in OAuth2 avatar synchronization via unvalidated OIDC picture claim

Blind SSRF in OAuth2 avatar synchronization via unvalidated OIDC picture claim

Source published
13 Aug 2026 16:44:38 UTC
Source modified
14 Aug 2026 17:45:37 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

euvd · EUVD-2026-58134

Published

Blind SSRF in OAuth2 avatar synchronization via unvalidated OIDC picture claim

Blind SSRF in OAuth2 avatar synchronization via unvalidated OIDC picture claim

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Aug 13, 2026, 4:44:38 PM

dateUpdated: Aug 14, 2026, 5:45:37 PM

1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

WID-SEC-W-2026-2304: Gitea: Mehrere Schwachstellen

CVE-2026-58417 · CVE-2026-58420 · CVE-2026-58425 · CVE-2026-58427 · CVE-2026-58428 · CVE-2026-58429 · CVE-2026-58431 · CVE-2026-58432 · CVE-2026-58433 · CVE-2026-58434 · CVE-2026-58435 · CVE-2026-58436 · CVE-2026-58437 · CVE-2026-58438 · CVE-2026-58439 · CVE-2026-58440 · CVE-2026-58441 · CVE-2026-58442 · CVE-2026-58443 · CVE-2026-58444 · CVE-2026-58445 · CVE-2026-58507 · CVE-2026-58508 · CVE-2026-58510 · CVE-2026-58511 · CVE-2026-59763 · CVE-2026-59765 · CVE-2026-59766 · CVE-2026-23603 · CVE-2026-42931 · CVE-2026-50105 · CVE-2026-54481 · CVE-2026-55982 · CVE-2026-55984 · CVE-2026-55986 · CVE-2026-55987 · CVE-2026-56443 · CVE-2026-56654 · CVE-2026-56657 · CVE-2026-56750 · CVE-2026-56755 · CVE-2026-57886 · CVE-2026-57894 · CVE-2026-57897 · CVE-2026-58314 · CVE-2026-58416

Source published
Aug 13, 2026, 4:44:38 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Aug 14, 2026, 5:45:37 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
19 Nov 2026 11:47:04 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 3.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

nvd · CVE-2026-23603

Published

Blind SSRF in OAuth2 avatar synchronization via unvalidated OIDC picture claim

Blind SSRF in OAuth2 avatar synchronization via unvalidated OIDC picture claim

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-918

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-08-13T17:17:21.770

lastModified: 2026-08-26T16:53:48.300

Source published
13 Aug 2026 17:17:21 UTC
Source modified
26 Aug 2026 16:53:48 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 05:17:36 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0 · Secondary · 3.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

osv · GHSA-x77v-q46j-393g

Published

Gitea: Blind SSRF in OAuth2 avatar synchronization via unvalidated OIDC picture claim

### Summary When `[oauth2_client] UPDATE_AVATAR = true` is enabled, Gitea fetches the avatar URL received from an OAuth2/OIDC provider using Go's default HTTP client. The URL comes from the user's OAuth/OIDC avatar value, commonly the OIDC `picture` claim. The affected code path calls `http.Get(url)` without applying outbound host or IP restrictions. A low-privileged user who can influence their own `picture` claim under an already-configured OAuth2/OIDC source can cause the Gitea server to make arbitrary outbound HTTP GET requests. This includes requests to loopback addresses, RFC 1918 private network addresses, and IPv4 link-local addresses such as `169.254.169.254`. This is a blind SSRF by default. Impact can increase in deployments where the Gitea host can reach cloud metadata services, localhost-only services, or internal services that return valid image data. ### Details The vulnerable sink is in `routers/web/auth/oauth.go`: ```go func oauth2UpdateAvatarIfNeed(ctx *context.Context, url string, u *user_model.User) { if setting.OAuth2Client.UpdateAvatar && len(url) > 0 { resp, err := http.Get(url) if err == nil { defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }() } if err == nil && resp.StatusCode == http.StatusOK { data, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, setting.Avatar.MaxFileSize+1)) if err == nil && int64(len(data)) <= setting.Avatar.MaxFileSize { _ = user_service.UploadAvatar(ctx, u, data) } } } } ``` The caller is in `routers/web/auth/oauth_signin_sync.go`: ```go func oauth2SignInSync(ctx *context.Context, authSourceID int64, u *user_model.User, gothUser goth.User) { oauth2UpdateAvatarIfNeed(ctx, gothUser.AvatarURL, u) ... } ``` `gothUser.AvatarURL` is derived from the OAuth2/OIDC provider's avatar value. For OIDC providers, this is commonly populated from the `picture` claim returned by the provider's userinfo endpoint or ID token. The issue is that this value can be attacker-influenced in some common IdP configurations, while Gitea fetches it server-side using `http.Get` with no host/IP validation and no restricted transport. Comparable outbound fetch paths in Gitea use `hostmatcher.NewDialContext` to enforce restrictions at TCP dial time. For example, repository migration uses an HTTP transport with host matching. The OAuth2 avatar synchronization path does not apply those restrictions. ### PoC #### Requirements - Local Gitea build or binary - Python 3 - Python packages: `requests`, `pyjwt`, `cryptography` - Gitea configured with OAuth2 avatar synchronization enabled Install Python dependencies: ```bash python3 -m pip install requests pyjwt cryptography ``` Configure `app.ini`: ```ini [oauth2_client] UPDATE_AVATAR = true ENABLE_AUTO_REGISTRATION = true USERNAME = userid ``` Run the fake OIDC provider: ```bash python3 fake_oidc.py http://127.0.0.1:8888/ 9999 ``` Run a listener for the SSRF target: ```bash nc -lvnp 8888 ``` Register an OAuth2 authentication source in Gitea: - Provider: `OpenID Connect` - Client ID: `gitea-client` - Client Secret: `gitea-secret` - OpenID Connect Auto Discovery URL: `http://127.0.0.1:9999/.well-known/openid-configuration` Then initiate login through the configured OAuth2 source. Observed request to the SSRF listener: ```http GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1:8888 User-Agent: Go-http-client/1.1 Accept-Encoding: gzip ``` Observe that Gitea fetched the OIDC `picture` claim URL from the server side using the default Go HTTP client. ### Impact When [oauth2_client] UPDATE_AVATAR = true is enabled, a low-privileged OAuth2/OIDC user who can influence their own picture claim can force the Gitea server to make outbound HTTP GET requests to attacker-selected URLs. This allows blind SSRF from the Gitea server’s network position, including requests to loopback addresses, RFC1918 private addresses, link-local addresses such as 169.254.169.254, and other internal services that may not be reachable from the public internet. In practical terms, this can enable internal service probing and interaction with localhost-only or private-network services depending on the deployment’s network access controls. The vulnerability is blind in the common case because non-image responses such as HTML, JSON, or plaintext are rejected during avatar processing and are not directly returned to the attacker. However, impact can increase in cloud or internal-network deployments where metadata services, internal admin panels, monitoring endpoints, or image-generating internal services are reachable from the Gitea host. If an internal endpoint returns a valid supported image format within the configured avatar size limit, the response may be stored as the attacker’s avatar, creating a limited response retrieval primitive.

Source published
21 Jul 2026 20:22:23 UTC
Source modified
27 Jul 2026 17:11:33 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Publisher rating · LOW

osv · GO-2026-6083

Published

Gitea: Blind SSRF in OAuth2 avatar synchronization via unvalidated OIDC picture claim in gitea.dev

Gitea: Blind SSRF in OAuth2 avatar synchronization via unvalidated OIDC picture claim in gitea.dev

Source published
27 Jul 2026 15:32:45 UTC
Source modified
27 Jul 2026 17:00:24 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 20 Nov 20:06 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 270 fully read · documentation 469/469 current