jsdiff is a JavaScript text differencing implementation. Prior to versions 8.0.3, 5.2.2, 4.0.4, and 3.5.1, attempting to parse a patch whose filename headers contain the line break characters `\r`, `\u2028`, or `\u2029` can cause the `parsePatch` method to enter an infinite loop. It then consumes memory without limit until the process crashes due to running out of memory. Applications are therefore likely to be vulnerable to a denial-of-service attack if they call `parsePatch` with a user-provided patch as input. A large payload is not needed to trigger the vulnerability, so size limits on user input do not provide any protection. Furthermore, some applications may be vulnerable even when calling `parsePatch` on a patch generated by the application itself if the user is nonetheless able to control the filename headers (e.g. by directly providing the filenames of the files to be diffed). The `applyPatch` method is similarly affected if (and only if) called with a string representation of a patch as an argument, since under the hood it parses that string using `parsePatch`. Other methods of the library are unaffected. Finally, a second and lesser interdependent bug - a ReDOS - also exhibits when those same line break characters are present in a patch's *patch* header (also known as its "leading garbage"). A maliciously-crafted patch header of length *n* can take `parsePatch` O(*n*³) time to parse. Versions 8.0.3, 5.2.2, 4.0.4, and 3.5.1 contain a fix. As a workaround, do not attempt to parse patches that contain any of these characters: `\r`, `\u2028`, or `\u2029`.
jsdiff is a JavaScript text differencing implementation. Prior to versions 8.0.3, 5.2.2, 4.0.4, and 3.5.1, attempting to parse a patch whose filename headers contain the line break characters `\r`, `\u2028`, or `\u2029` can cause the `parsePatch` method to enter an infinite loop. It then consumes memory without limit until the process crashes due to running out of memory. Applications are therefore likely to be vulnerable to a denial-of-service attack if they call `parsePatch` with a user-provided patch as input. A large payload is not needed to trigger the vulnerability, so size limits on user input do not provide any protection. Furthermore, some applications may be vulnerable even when calling `parsePatch` on a patch generated by the application itself if the user is nonetheless able to control the filename headers (e.g. by directly providing the filenames of the files to be diffed). The `applyPatch` method is similarly affected if (and only if) called with a string representation of a patch as an argument, since under the hood it parses that string using `parsePatch`. Other methods of the library are unaffected. Finally, a second and lesser interdependent bug - a ReDOS - also exhibits when those same line break characters are present in a patch's *patch* header (also known as its "leading garbage"). A maliciously-crafted patch header of length *n* can take `parsePatch` O(*n*³) time to parse. Versions 8.0.3, 5.2.2, 4.0.4, and 3.5.1 contain a fix. As a workaround, do not attempt to parse patches that contain any of these characters: `\r`, `\u2028`, or `\u2029`.
jsdiff is a JavaScript text differencing implementation. Prior to versions 8.0.3, 5.2.2, 4.0.4, and 3.5.1, attempting to parse a patch whose filename headers contain the line break characters `\r`, `\u2028`, or `\u2029` can cause the `parsePatch` method to enter an infinite loop. It then consumes memory without limit until the process crashes due to running out of memory. Applications are therefore likely to be vulnerable to a denial-of-service attack if they call `parsePatch` with a user-provided patch as input. A large payload is not needed to trigger the vulnerability, so size limits on user input do not provide any protection. Furthermore, some applications may be vulnerable even when calling `parsePatch` on a patch generated by the application itself if the user is nonetheless able to control the filename headers (e.g. by directly providing the filenames of the files to be diffed). The `applyPatch` method is similarly affected if (and only if) called with a string representation of a patch as an argument, since under the hood it parses that string using `parsePatch`. Other methods of the library are unaffected. Finally, a second and lesser interdependent bug - a ReDOS - also exhibits when those same line break characters are present in a patch's *patch* header (also known as its "leading garbage"). A maliciously-crafted patch header of length *n* can take `parsePatch` O(*n*³) time to parse. Versions 8.0.3, 5.2.2, 4.0.4, and 3.5.1 contain a fix. As a workaround, do not attempt to parse patches that contain any of these characters: `\r`, `\u2028`, or `\u2029`.
### Impact
Attempting to parse a patch whose filename headers contain the line break characters `\r`, `\u2028`, or `\u2029` can cause the `parsePatch` method to enter an infinite loop. It then consumes memory without limit until the process crashes due to running out of memory.
Applications are therefore likely to be vulnerable to a denial-of-service attack if they call `parsePatch` with a user-provided patch as input. A large payload is not needed to trigger the vulnerability, so size limits on user input do not provide any protection. Furthermore, some applications may be vulnerable even when calling `parsePatch` on a patch generated by the application itself if the user is nonetheless able to control the filename headers (e.g. by directly providing the filenames of the files to be diffed).
The `applyPatch` method is similarly affected if (and only if) called with a string representation of a patch as an argument, since under the hood it parses that string using `parsePatch`. Other methods of the library are unaffected.
Finally, a second and lesser bug - a ReDOS - also exhibits when those same line break characters are present in a patch's *patch* header (also known as its "leading garbage"). A maliciously-crafted patch header of length *n* can take `parsePatch` O(*n*³) time to parse.
### Patches
All vulnerabilities described are fixed in v8.0.3.
### Workarounds
If using a version of jsdiff earlier than v8.0.3, do not attempt to parse patches that contain any of these characters: `\r`, `\u2028`, or `\u2029`.
### References
PR that fixed the bug: https://github.com/kpdecker/jsdiff/pull/649
### CVE Notes
Note that although the advisory describes two bugs, they each enable exactly the same attack vector (that an attacker who controls input to `parsePatch` can cause a DOS). Fixing one bug without fixing the other therefore does not fix the vulnerability and does not provide any security benefit. Therefore we assume that the bugs cannot possibly constitute Independently Fixable Vulnerabilities in the sense of CVE CNA rule 4.2.11, but rather that this advisory is properly construed under the rules as describing a single Vulnerability.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Jan 22, 2026, 2:23:44 AM
dateUpdated: Jul 15, 2026, 1:17:39 AM
2 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
WID-SEC-W-2026-2933: Splunk SOAR: Mehrere Schwachstellen
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Modified
Weakness classifications: CWE-400 · CWE-1333
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-01-22T03:15:47.627
lastModified: 2026-07-15T02:18:46.763
1 source CPE criteria · context only
cpe:2.3:a:kpdecker:jsdiff:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.