Public mode

No access to your tenant or devices. Every item links to its source. What this means

Sources need attention Customize Public modeDiscuss ChangeIntel on Discord

@modelcontextprotocol/sdk has cross-client data leak via shared server/transport instance reuse

CVSS 3.1 7.1 HIGHEUVD CVSS 3.1 7.1 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 7.1 HIGHCVSS 3.1 · 0b0ca135-0b70-47e7-9f44-1890c2a1c46c · Secondary 7.1 HIGHCVSS_V3 Publisher rating HIGHFixed by @modelcontextprotocol/sdk 1.26.0KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-25536

Published

MCP TypeScript SDK is the official TypeScript SDK for Model Context Protocol servers and clients. From version 1.10.0 to 1.25.3, cross-client response data leak when a single McpServer/Server and transport instance is reused across multiple client connections, most commonly in stateless StreamableHTTPServerTransport deployments. This issue has been patched in version 1.26.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-5335

Published

MCP TypeScript SDK is the official TypeScript SDK for Model Context Protocol servers and clients. From version 1.10.0 to 1.25.3, cross-client response data leak when a single McpServer/Server and transport instance is reused across multiple client connections, most commonly in stateless StreamableHTTPServerTransport deployments. This issue has been patched in version 1.26.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-25536

Published

MCP TypeScript SDK is the official TypeScript SDK for Model Context Protocol servers and clients. From version 1.10.0 to 1.25.3, cross-client response data leak when a single McpServer/Server and transport instance is reused across multiple client connections, most commonly in stateless StreamableHTTPServerTransport deployments. This issue has been patched in version 1.26.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-345p-7cg4-v4c7

Published

### Summary Cross-client data leak via two distinct issues: (1) reusing a single `StreamableHTTPServerTransport` across multiple client requests, and (2) reusing a single `McpServer`/`Server` instance across multiple transports. Both are most common in stateless deployments. ### Impact This advisory covers two related but distinct vulnerabilities. A deployment may be affected by one or both. #### Issue 1: Transport re-use **What happens:** When a single `StreamableHTTPServerTransport` instance handles multiple client requests, JSON-RPC message ID collisions cause responses to be routed to the wrong client's HTTP connection. The transport maintains an internal `requestId → stream` mapping, and since MCP client SDKs generate message IDs using an incrementing counter starting at 0, two clients produce identical IDs. The second client's request overwrites the first client's mapping entry, routing the response to the wrong HTTP stream. **What is affected:** All request types — `tools/call`, `resources/read`, `prompts/get`, etc. No server-initiated features are required to trigger this. **Conditions:** - A single `StreamableHTTPServerTransport` instance is reused across multiple client requests (most common in stateless mode without `sessionIdGenerator`) - Two or more clients send requests concurrently - Clients generate overlapping JSON-RPC message IDs (the SDK's default client uses an incrementing counter starting at 0) #### Issue 2: Server/Protocol re-use **What happens:** When a single `McpServer` (or `Server`) instance is `connect()`ed to multiple transports (one per client), the Protocol's internal `this._transport` reference is silently overwritten. The final response to a request is routed correctly (the Protocol captures the transport reference at request time), but any **server-to-client messages sent during request handling** use the shared `this._transport` reference, which may point to a different client's transport. **What is affected:** This depends on what features your server uses: - **Final responses** (the return value from a tool/resource/prompt handler): Affected in most cases. The Protocol captures this._transport at [request-handling time](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/typescript-sdk/blob/main/packages/core/src/shared/protocol.ts#L760), not the transport that delivered the request. This means: - If a request is already in-flight when a second connect() occurs (i.e., the request arrived before the transport was overwritten), the captured reference is correct and the response routes properly. - If a request arrives on the old transport after a second connect() has overwritten this._transport, the captured reference points to the new transport, and the response is mis-routed. The requesting client will time out. - **Progress notifications** sent during tool execution via `sendNotification`: **Affected.** These are dispatched through `this._transport`. When the transport has been overwritten and message IDs collide on the new transport, notifications are routed to the wrong client's HTTP stream. - **Sampling** (`createMessage`) and **elicitation** requests sent during tool execution via `sendRequest`: **Affected.** Same mechanism — the request is sent to the wrong client. - **Spontaneous server-initiated notifications** (outside any request handler): **Affected.** These are sent to whichever client's transport was most recently connected. **Conditions:** - A single `McpServer`/`Server` instance is `connect()`ed to multiple transports across requests or sessions - Two or more clients connect concurrently - For in-request notifications/requests: message ID collision on the other transport is required for silent data leaking (the SDK's default client uses an incrementing counter starting at 0). Without collision, the transport will throw an error rather than misroute. - For spontaneous notifications: no collision needed, messages are always sent to the last-connected client's transport #### How to tell if you're affected - **You use `sessionIdGenerator` (stateful mode) with a new `McpServer` per session** → not affected by either issue. Each session has its own transport and server instance. - **You use `sessionIdGenerator` but share a single `McpServer` across sessions** → not affected by Issue 1 (transport re-use), but affected by Issue 2 (server re-use) if your tools send progress notifications, sampling, or elicitation during execution. - **You are in stateless mode and reuse both a transport and a server across requests** → affected by both issues; all request types can leak. - **You are in stateless mode and create a new transport per request, but reuse the server** → affected by Issue 2 only; safe if your tools only return results without sending progress notifications, sampling, or elicitation during execution. - **You create a new server + transport per request** → not affected. - **Single-client environments** (e.g., local development with one IDE) → not affected. ### Patches The fix (v1.26.0) adds runtime guards that turn silent data misrouting into immediate, actionable errors: 1. `Protocol.connect()` now throws if the protocol is already connected to a transport, preventing silent transport overwriting (addresses Issue 2) 2. Stateless `StreamableHTTPServerTransport.handleRequest()` now throws if called more than once, enforcing one-request-per-transport in stateless mode (addresses Issue 1) 3. In-flight request handler abort controllers are cleaned up on `close()`, and `sendNotification`/`sendRequest` in handler extras check the abort signal before sending, preventing messages from leaking after a transport is replaced Servers that were incorrectly reusing instances will now receive a clear error message directing them to create separate instances per connection. ### Workarounds If you cannot upgrade immediately, ensure your server creates fresh `McpServer` and transport instances for each request (stateless) or session (stateful): ```typescript // Stateless mode: create new server + transport per request app.post('/mcp', async (req, res) => { const server = new McpServer({ name: 'my-server', version: '1.0.0' }); // ... register tools, resources, etc. const transport = new StreamableHTTPServerTransport({ sessionIdGenerator: undefined }); await server.connect(transport); await transport.handleRequest(req, res); }); // Stateful mode: create new server + transport per session const sessions = new Map(); app.post('/mcp', async (req, res) => { const sessionId = req.headers['mcp-session-id']; if (sessions.has(sessionId)) { await sessions.get(sessionId).transport.handleRequest(req, res); } else { const server = new McpServer({ name: 'my-server', version: '1.0.0' }); // ... register tools, resources, etc. const transport = new StreamableHTTPServerTransport({ sessionIdGenerator: () => randomUUID() }); await server.connect(transport); sessions.set(transport.sessionId, { server, transport }); await transport.handleRequest(req, res); } }); ```

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

cve-program · CVE-2026-25536

Published

typescript-sdk

Vendor product

Publisher's version information

Shown as published. These rules are not interpreted as NuGet package version ranges.

{
                    "vendor": "modelcontextprotocol",
                    "product": "typescript-sdk",
                    "versions": [
                        {
                            "version": ">= 1.10.0, < 1.26.0",
                            "status": "affected"
                        }
                    ]
                }

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

euvd · EUVD-2026-5335

Published

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Feb 4, 2026, 9:29:38 PM

dateUpdated: Jul 15, 2026, 1:16:18 AM

2 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

RHSA-2026:3960: Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.6 Container Release Update

CVE-2025-4565 · CVE-2025-13465 · CVE-2025-53643 · CVE-2025-59057 · CVE-2025-61140 · CVE-2025-61726 · CVE-2025-66471 · CVE-2025-69223 · CVE-2026-1207 · CVE-2026-1287 · CVE-2026-1312 · CVE-2026-21441 · CVE-2026-21884 · CVE-2026-22029 · CVE-2026-24049 · CVE-2026-24486 · CVE-2026-25536

WID-SEC-W-2026-0574: IBM App Connect Enterprise: Mehrere Schwachstellen

CVE-2025-13490 · CVE-2026-2327 · CVE-2026-24398 · CVE-2026-24472 · CVE-2026-24473 · CVE-2026-24771 · CVE-2026-25536

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

nvd · CVE-2026-25536

Published

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Modified

Weakness classifications: CWE-362 · CWE-367

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-02-04T22:15:59.663

lastModified: 2026-07-15T02:18:54.340

1 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:lfprojects:mcp_typescript_sdk:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GHSA-345p-7cg4-v4c7

Published

@modelcontextprotocol/sdk

npm

SEMVER · introduced 1.10.0 → fixed 1.26.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 16 Nov 11:47 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 250 fully read · 20 waiting for GitHub's hourly limit · documentation 469/469 current