minimatch has a ReDoS: matchOne() combinatorial backtracking via multiple non-adjacent GLOBSTAR segments
cve-program · CVE-2026-27903
Publishedminimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Prior to version 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.3, `matchOne()` performs unbounded recursive backtracking when a glob pattern contains multiple non-adjacent `**` (GLOBSTAR) segments and the input path does not match. The time complexity is O(C(n, k)) -- binomial -- where `n` is the number of path segments and `k` is the number of globstars. With k=11 and n=30, a call to the default `minimatch()` API stalls for roughly 5 seconds. With k=13, it exceeds 15 seconds. No memoization or call budget exists to bound this behavior. Any application where an attacker can influence the glob pattern passed to `minimatch()` is vulnerable. The realistic attack surface includes build tools and task runners that accept user-supplied glob arguments (ESLint, Webpack, Rollup config), multi-tenant systems where one tenant configures glob-based rules that run in a shared process, admin or developer interfaces that accept ignore-rule or filter configuration as globs, and CI/CD pipelines that evaluate user-submitted config files containing glob patterns. An attacker who can place a crafted pattern into any of these paths can stall the Node.js event loop for tens of seconds per invocation. The pattern is 56 bytes for a 5-second stall and does not require authentication in contexts where pattern input is part of the feature. Versions 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.3 fix the issue.
Read the publisher's advisoryeuvd · EUVD-2026-8801
Publishedminimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Prior to version 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.3, `matchOne()` performs unbounded recursive backtracking when a glob pattern contains multiple non-adjacent `**` (GLOBSTAR) segments and the input path does not match. The time complexity is O(C(n, k)) -- binomial -- where `n` is the number of path segments and `k` is the number of globstars. With k=11 and n=30, a call to the default `minimatch()` API stalls for roughly 5 seconds. With k=13, it exceeds 15 seconds. No memoization or call budget exists to bound this behavior. Any application where an attacker can influence the glob pattern passed to `minimatch()` is vulnerable. The realistic attack surface includes build tools and task runners that accept user-supplied glob arguments (ESLint, Webpack, Rollup config), multi-tenant systems where one tenant configures glob-based rules that run in a shared process, admin or developer interfaces that accept ignore-rule or filter configuration as globs, and CI/CD pipelines that evaluate user-submitted config files containing glob patterns. An attacker who can place a crafted pattern into any of these paths can stall the Node.js event loop for tens of seconds per invocation. The pattern is 56 bytes for a 5-second stall and does not require authentication in contexts where pattern input is part of the feature. Versions 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.3 fix the issue.
Read the publisher's advisorynvd · CVE-2026-27903
Publishedminimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Prior to version 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.3, `matchOne()` performs unbounded recursive backtracking when a glob pattern contains multiple non-adjacent `**` (GLOBSTAR) segments and the input path does not match. The time complexity is O(C(n, k)) -- binomial -- where `n` is the number of path segments and `k` is the number of globstars. With k=11 and n=30, a call to the default `minimatch()` API stalls for roughly 5 seconds. With k=13, it exceeds 15 seconds. No memoization or call budget exists to bound this behavior. Any application where an attacker can influence the glob pattern passed to `minimatch()` is vulnerable. The realistic attack surface includes build tools and task runners that accept user-supplied glob arguments (ESLint, Webpack, Rollup config), multi-tenant systems where one tenant configures glob-based rules that run in a shared process, admin or developer interfaces that accept ignore-rule or filter configuration as globs, and CI/CD pipelines that evaluate user-submitted config files containing glob patterns. An attacker who can place a crafted pattern into any of these paths can stall the Node.js event loop for tens of seconds per invocation. The pattern is 56 bytes for a 5-second stall and does not require authentication in contexts where pattern input is part of the feature. Versions 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.3 fix the issue.
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GHSA-7r86-cg39-jmmj
Published### Summary `matchOne()` performs unbounded recursive backtracking when a glob pattern contains multiple non-adjacent `**` (GLOBSTAR) segments and the input path does not match. The time complexity is O(C(n, k)) -- binomial -- where `n` is the number of path segments and `k` is the number of globstars. With k=11 and n=30, a call to the default `minimatch()` API stalls for roughly 5 seconds. With k=13, it exceeds 15 seconds. No memoization or call budget exists to bound this behavior. --- ### Details The vulnerable loop is in `matchOne()` at [`src/index.ts#L960`](https://github.com/isaacs/minimatch/blob/v10.2.2/src/index.ts#L960): ```typescript while (fr < fl) { .. if (this.matchOne(file.slice(fr), pattern.slice(pr), partial)) { .. return true } .. fr++ } ``` When a GLOBSTAR is encountered, the function tries to match the remaining pattern against every suffix of the remaining file segments. Each `**` multiplies the number of recursive calls by the number of remaining segments. With k non-adjacent globstars and n file segments, the total number of calls is C(n, k). There is no depth counter, visited-state cache, or budget limit applied to this recursion. The call tree is fully explored before returning `false` on a non-matching input. Measured timing with n=30 path segments: | k (globstars) | Pattern size | Time | |---------------|--------------|----------| | 7 | 36 bytes | ~154ms | | 9 | 46 bytes | ~1.2s | | 11 | 56 bytes | ~5.4s | | 12 | 61 bytes | ~9.7s | | 13 | 66 bytes | ~15.9s | --- ### PoC Tested on [email protected], Node.js 20. **Step 1 -- inline script** ```javascript import { minimatch } from 'minimatch' // k=9 globstars, n=30 path segments // pattern: 46 bytes, default options const pattern = '**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/b' const path = 'a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a' const start = Date.now() minimatch(path, pattern) console.log(Date.now() - start + 'ms') // ~1200ms ``` To scale the effect, increase k: ```javascript // k=11 -> ~5.4s, k=13 -> ~15.9s const k = 11 const pattern = Array.from({ length: k }, () => '**/a').join('/') + '/b' const path = Array(30).fill('a').join('/') minimatch(path, pattern) ``` No special options are required. This reproduces with the default `minimatch()` call. **Step 2 -- HTTP server (event loop starvation proof)** The following server demonstrates the event loop starvation effect. It is a minimal harness, not a claim that this exact deployment pattern is common: ```javascript // poc1-server.mjs import http from 'node:http' import { URL } from 'node:url' import { minimatch } from 'minimatch' const PORT = 3000 const server = http.createServer((req, res) => { const url = new URL(req.url, `http://localhost:${PORT}`) if (url.pathname !== '/match') { res.writeHead(404); res.end(); return } const pattern = url.searchParams.get('pattern') ?? '' const path = url.searchParams.get('path') ?? '' const start = process.hrtime.bigint() const result = minimatch(path, pattern) const ms = Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - start) / 1e6 res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' }) res.end(JSON.stringify({ result, ms: ms.toFixed(0) }) + '\n') }) server.listen(PORT) ``` Terminal 1 -- start the server: ``` node poc1-server.mjs ``` Terminal 2 -- send the attack request (k=11, ~5s stall) and immediately return to shell: ``` curl "http://localhost:3000/match?pattern=**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2Fb&path=a%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa" & ``` Terminal 3 -- while the attack is in-flight, send a benign request: ``` curl -w "\ntime_total: %{time_total}s\n" "http://localhost:3000/match?pattern=**%2Fy%2Fz&path=x%2Fy%2Fz" ``` **Observed output (Terminal 3):** ``` {"result":true,"ms":"0"} time_total: 4.132709s ``` The server reports `"ms":"0"` -- the legitimate request itself takes zero processing time. The 4+ second `time_total` is entirely time spent waiting for the event loop to be released by the attack request. Every concurrent user is blocked for the full duration of each attack call. Repeating the benign request while no attack is in-flight confirms the baseline: ``` {"result":true,"ms":"0"} time_total: 0.001599s ``` --- ### Impact Any application where an attacker can influence the glob pattern passed to `minimatch()` is vulnerable. The realistic attack surface includes build tools and task runners that accept user-supplied glob arguments (ESLint, Webpack, Rollup config), multi-tenant systems where one tenant configures glob-based rules that run in a shared process, admin or developer interfaces that accept ignore-rule or filter configuration as globs, and CI/CD pipelines that evaluate user-submitted config files containing glob patterns. An attacker who can place a crafted pattern into any of these paths can stall the Node.js event loop for tens of seconds per invocation. The pattern is 56 bytes for a 5-second stall and does not require authentication in contexts where pattern input is part of the feature.
Read the publisher's advisoryAffected versions, risk and source history
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cve-program · CVE-2026-27903
Publishedminimatch has a ReDoS: matchOne() combinatorial backtracking via multiple non-adjacent GLOBSTAR segments
minimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Prior to version 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.3, `matchOne()` performs unbounded recursive backtracking when a glob pattern contains multiple non-adjacent `**` (GLOBSTAR) segments and the input path does not match. The time complexity is O(C(n, k)) -- binomial -- where `n` is the number of path segments and `k` is the number of globstars. With k=11 and n=30, a call to the default `minimatch()` API stalls for roughly 5 seconds. With k=13, it exceeds 15 seconds. No memoization or call budget exists to bound this behavior. Any application where an attacker can influence the glob pattern passed to `minimatch()` is vulnerable. The realistic attack surface includes build tools and task runners that accept user-supplied glob arguments (ESLint, Webpack, Rollup config), multi-tenant systems where one tenant configures glob-based rules that run in a shared process, admin or developer interfaces that accept ignore-rule or filter configuration as globs, and CI/CD pipelines that evaluate user-submitted config files containing glob patterns. An attacker who can place a crafted pattern into any of these paths can stall the Node.js event loop for tens of seconds per invocation. The pattern is 56 bytes for a 5-second stall and does not require authentication in contexts where pattern input is part of the feature. Versions 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.3 fix the issue.
- Source published
- 26 Feb 2026 01:06:32 UTC
- Source modified
- 26 Feb 2026 19:20:51 UTC
- Saved here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
euvd · EUVD-2026-8801
Publishedminimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Prior to version 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.3, `matchOne()` performs unbounded recursive backtracking whe…
minimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Prior to version 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.3, `matchOne()` performs unbounded recursive backtracking when a glob pattern contains multiple non-adjacent `**` (GLOBSTAR) segments and the input path does not match. The time complexity is O(C(n, k)) -- binomial -- where `n` is the number of path segments and `k` is the number of globstars. With k=11 and n=30, a call to the default `minimatch()` API stalls for roughly 5 seconds. With k=13, it exceeds 15 seconds. No memoization or call budget exists to bound this behavior. Any application where an attacker can influence the glob pattern passed to `minimatch()` is vulnerable. The realistic attack surface includes build tools and task runners that accept user-supplied glob arguments (ESLint, Webpack, Rollup config), multi-tenant systems where one tenant configures glob-based rules that run in a shared process, admin or developer interfaces that accept ignore-rule or filter configuration as globs, and CI/CD pipelines that evaluate user-submitted config files containing glob patterns. An attacker who can place a crafted pattern into any of these paths can stall the Node.js event loop for tens of seconds per invocation. The pattern is 56 bytes for a 5-second stall and does not require authentication in contexts where pattern input is part of the feature. Versions 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.3 fix the issue.
Additional publisher context
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Feb 26, 2026, 1:06:32 AM
dateUpdated: Feb 26, 2026, 7:20:51 PM
7 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
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msrc_CVE-2026-27903: minimatch has a ReDoS: matchOne() combinatorial backtracking via multiple non-adjacent GLOBSTAR segments
CVE-2026-27903
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- Source published
- Feb 26, 2026, 1:06:32 AM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Feb 26, 2026, 7:20:51 PM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 15 Nov 2026 09:27:38 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
nvd · CVE-2026-27903
Publishedminimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Prior to version 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.3, `matchOne()` performs unbounded recursive backtracking whe…
minimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Prior to version 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.3, `matchOne()` performs unbounded recursive backtracking when a glob pattern contains multiple non-adjacent `**` (GLOBSTAR) segments and the input path does not match. The time complexity is O(C(n, k)) -- binomial -- where `n` is the number of path segments and `k` is the number of globstars. With k=11 and n=30, a call to the default `minimatch()` API stalls for roughly 5 seconds. With k=13, it exceeds 15 seconds. No memoization or call budget exists to bound this behavior. Any application where an attacker can influence the glob pattern passed to `minimatch()` is vulnerable. The realistic attack surface includes build tools and task runners that accept user-supplied glob arguments (ESLint, Webpack, Rollup config), multi-tenant systems where one tenant configures glob-based rules that run in a shared process, admin or developer interfaces that accept ignore-rule or filter configuration as globs, and CI/CD pipelines that evaluate user-submitted config files containing glob patterns. An attacker who can place a crafted pattern into any of these paths can stall the Node.js event loop for tens of seconds per invocation. The pattern is 56 bytes for a 5-second stall and does not require authentication in contexts where pattern input is part of the feature. Versions 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.3 fix the issue.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Analyzed
Weakness classifications: CWE-407
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-02-26T02:16:21.353
lastModified: 2026-06-17T10:27:51.187
1 source CPE criteria · context only
- cpe:2.3:a:minimatch_project:minimatch:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
- Source published
- 26 Feb 2026 02:16:21 UTC
- Source modified
- 17 Jun 2026 10:27:51 UTC
- Saved here
- 25 Oct 2026 06:17:33 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
osv · GHSA-7r86-cg39-jmmj
Publishedminimatch has ReDoS: matchOne() combinatorial backtracking via multiple non-adjacent GLOBSTAR segments
### Summary `matchOne()` performs unbounded recursive backtracking when a glob pattern contains multiple non-adjacent `**` (GLOBSTAR) segments and the input path does not match. The time complexity is O(C(n, k)) -- binomial -- where `n` is the number of path segments and `k` is the number of globstars. With k=11 and n=30, a call to the default `minimatch()` API stalls for roughly 5 seconds. With k=13, it exceeds 15 seconds. No memoization or call budget exists to bound this behavior. --- ### Details The vulnerable loop is in `matchOne()` at [`src/index.ts#L960`](https://github.com/isaacs/minimatch/blob/v10.2.2/src/index.ts#L960): ```typescript while (fr < fl) { .. if (this.matchOne(file.slice(fr), pattern.slice(pr), partial)) { .. return true } .. fr++ } ``` When a GLOBSTAR is encountered, the function tries to match the remaining pattern against every suffix of the remaining file segments. Each `**` multiplies the number of recursive calls by the number of remaining segments. With k non-adjacent globstars and n file segments, the total number of calls is C(n, k). There is no depth counter, visited-state cache, or budget limit applied to this recursion. The call tree is fully explored before returning `false` on a non-matching input. Measured timing with n=30 path segments: | k (globstars) | Pattern size | Time | |---------------|--------------|----------| | 7 | 36 bytes | ~154ms | | 9 | 46 bytes | ~1.2s | | 11 | 56 bytes | ~5.4s | | 12 | 61 bytes | ~9.7s | | 13 | 66 bytes | ~15.9s | --- ### PoC Tested on [email protected], Node.js 20. **Step 1 -- inline script** ```javascript import { minimatch } from 'minimatch' // k=9 globstars, n=30 path segments // pattern: 46 bytes, default options const pattern = '**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/b' const path = 'a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a' const start = Date.now() minimatch(path, pattern) console.log(Date.now() - start + 'ms') // ~1200ms ``` To scale the effect, increase k: ```javascript // k=11 -> ~5.4s, k=13 -> ~15.9s const k = 11 const pattern = Array.from({ length: k }, () => '**/a').join('/') + '/b' const path = Array(30).fill('a').join('/') minimatch(path, pattern) ``` No special options are required. This reproduces with the default `minimatch()` call. **Step 2 -- HTTP server (event loop starvation proof)** The following server demonstrates the event loop starvation effect. It is a minimal harness, not a claim that this exact deployment pattern is common: ```javascript // poc1-server.mjs import http from 'node:http' import { URL } from 'node:url' import { minimatch } from 'minimatch' const PORT = 3000 const server = http.createServer((req, res) => { const url = new URL(req.url, `http://localhost:${PORT}`) if (url.pathname !== '/match') { res.writeHead(404); res.end(); return } const pattern = url.searchParams.get('pattern') ?? '' const path = url.searchParams.get('path') ?? '' const start = process.hrtime.bigint() const result = minimatch(path, pattern) const ms = Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - start) / 1e6 res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' }) res.end(JSON.stringify({ result, ms: ms.toFixed(0) }) + '\n') }) server.listen(PORT) ``` Terminal 1 -- start the server: ``` node poc1-server.mjs ``` Terminal 2 -- send the attack request (k=11, ~5s stall) and immediately return to shell: ``` curl "http://localhost:3000/match?pattern=**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2Fb&path=a%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa" & ``` Terminal 3 -- while the attack is in-flight, send a benign request: ``` curl -w "\ntime_total: %{time_total}s\n" "http://localhost:3000/match?pattern=**%2Fy%2Fz&path=x%2Fy%2Fz" ``` **Observed output (Terminal 3):** ``` {"result":true,"ms":"0"} time_total: 4.132709s ``` The server reports `"ms":"0"` -- the legitimate request itself takes zero processing time. The 4+ second `time_total` is entirely time spent waiting for the event loop to be released by the attack request. Every concurrent user is blocked for the full duration of each attack call. Repeating the benign request while no attack is in-flight confirms the baseline: ``` {"result":true,"ms":"0"} time_total: 0.001599s ``` --- ### Impact Any application where an attacker can influence the glob pattern passed to `minimatch()` is vulnerable. The realistic attack surface includes build tools and task runners that accept user-supplied glob arguments (ESLint, Webpack, Rollup config), multi-tenant systems where one tenant configures glob-based rules that run in a shared process, admin or developer interfaces that accept ignore-rule or filter configuration as globs, and CI/CD pipelines that evaluate user-submitted config files containing glob patterns. An attacker who can place a crafted pattern into any of these paths can stall the Node.js event loop for tens of seconds per invocation. The pattern is 56 bytes for a 5-second stall and does not require authentication in contexts where pattern input is part of the feature.
- Source published
- 26 Feb 2026 22:10:18 UTC
- Source modified
- 10 Sep 2026 03:50:34 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Publisher rating · HIGH