Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. Prior to version 4.12.4, when using serveStatic together with route-based middleware protections (e.g. app.use('/admin/*', ...)), inconsistent URL decoding allowed protected static resources to be accessed without authorization. The router used decodeURI, while serveStatic used decodeURIComponent. This mismatch allowed paths containing encoded slashes (%2F) to bypass middleware protections while still resolving to the intended filesystem path. This issue has been patched in version 4.12.4.
Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. Prior to version 4.12.4, when using serveStatic together with route-based middleware protections (e.g. app.use('/admin/*', ...)), inconsistent URL decoding allowed protected static resources to be accessed without authorization. The router used decodeURI, while serveStatic used decodeURIComponent. This mismatch allowed paths containing encoded slashes (%2F) to bypass middleware protections while still resolving to the intended filesystem path. This issue has been patched in version 4.12.4.
Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. Prior to version 4.12.4, when using serveStatic together with route-based middleware protections (e.g. app.use('/admin/*', ...)), inconsistent URL decoding allowed protected static resources to be accessed without authorization. The router used decodeURI, while serveStatic used decodeURIComponent. This mismatch allowed paths containing encoded slashes (%2F) to bypass middleware protections while still resolving to the intended filesystem path. This issue has been patched in version 4.12.4.
## Summary
When using `serveStatic` together with route-based middleware protections (e.g. `app.use('/admin/*', ...)`), inconsistent URL decoding allowed protected static resources to be accessed without authorization.
The router used `decodeURI`, while `serveStatic` used `decodeURIComponent`. This mismatch allowed paths containing encoded slashes (`%2F`) to bypass middleware protections while still resolving to the intended filesystem path.
## Details
The routing layer preserved `%2F` as a literal string, while `serveStatic` decoded it into `/` before resolving the file path.
Example:
Request: `/admin%2Fsecret.html`
- Router sees: `/admin%2Fsecret.html` → does not match `/admin/*`
- Static handler resolves: `/admin/secret.html`
As a result, static files under the configured static root could be served without triggering route-based protections.
This only affects applications that both:
- Protect subpaths using route-based middleware, and
- Serve files from the same static root using `serveStatic`.
This does **not** allow access outside the static root and is **not** a path traversal vulnerability.
## Impact
An unauthenticated attacker could bypass route-based authorization for protected static resources by supplying paths containing encoded slashes.
Applications relying solely on route-based middleware to protect static subpaths may have exposed those resources.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Mar 4, 2026, 10:09:22 PM
dateUpdated: Mar 5, 2026, 3:42:05 PM
1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
WID-SEC-W-2026-0933: IBM App Connect Enterprise (Hono und Undici): Mehrere Schwachstellen
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Analyzed
Weakness classifications: CWE-177
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-03-04T23:16:10.247
lastModified: 2026-06-17T10:29:30.013
1 source CPE criteria · context only
cpe:2.3:a:hono:hono:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.