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Vikunja has Rate-Limit Bypass for Unauthenticated Users via Spoofed Headers

CVSS 3.1 5.3 MEDIUMEUVD CVSS 3.1 5.3 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 5.3 MEDIUMCVSS_V3 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by code.vikunja.io/api 2.2.0osv · severity unknownKEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-29794

Published

Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Starting in version 0.8 and prior to version 2.2.0, unauthenticated users are able to bypass the application's built-in rate-limits by spoofing the `X-Forwarded-For` or `X-Real-IP` headers due to the rate-limit relying on the value of `(echo.Context).RealIP`. Unauthenticated users can abuse endpoints available to them for different potential impacts. The immediate concern would be brute-forcing usernames or specific accounts' passwords. This bypass allows unlimited requests against unauthenticated endpoints. Version 2.2.0 patches the issue.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-13706

Published

Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Starting in version 0.8 and prior to version 2.2.0, unauthenticated users are able to bypass the application's built-in rate-limits by spoofing the `X-Forwarded-For` or `X-Real-IP` headers due to the rate-limit relying on the value of `(echo.Context).RealIP`. Unauthenticated users can abuse endpoints available to them for different potential impacts. The immediate concern would be brute-forcing usernames or specific accounts' passwords. This bypass allows unlimited requests against unauthenticated endpoints. Version 2.2.0 patches the issue.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-29794

Published

Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Starting in version 0.8 and prior to version 2.2.0, unauthenticated users are able to bypass the application's built-in rate-limits by spoofing the `X-Forwarded-For` or `X-Real-IP` headers due to the rate-limit relying on the value of `(echo.Context).RealIP`. Unauthenticated users can abuse endpoints available to them for different potential impacts. The immediate concern would be brute-forcing usernames or specific accounts' passwords. This bypass allows unlimited requests against unauthenticated endpoints. Version 2.2.0 patches the issue.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-m547-hp4w-j6jx

Published

### Summary Unauthenticated users are able to bypass the application's built-in rate-limits by spoofing the `X-Forwarded-For` or `X-Real-IP` headers due to the rate-limit relying on the value of `(echo.Context).RealIP`. ### Details In the first file below, the rate-limit for unauthenticated users can be observed being populated with the `ip` value. In the second file, it shows it using the `c.RealIP()` function for the `ip` case. Due to this, the rate-limit will rely on the value of one of the two mentioned headers (`X-Forwarded-For` or `X-Real-IP`). These can be spoofed by users client-side in order to completely bypass any unauthenticated rate-limits in place. Some reverse proxies like Traefik will overwrite this value by default, but others will not, leaving any deployment that either isn't using a reserve proxy that specifically overwrites the header's value or isn't using a reverse proxy vulnerable. **File 1:** pkg\routes\routes.go:318 ```go // This is the group with no auth // It is its own group to be able to rate limit this based on different heuristics n := a.Group("") setupRateLimit(n, "ip") // Docs n.GET("/docs.json", apiv1.DocsJSON) n.GET("/docs", apiv1.RedocUI) // Prometheus endpoint setupMetrics(n) // Separate route for unauthenticated routes to enable rate limits for it ur := a.Group("") rate := limiter.Rate{ Period: 60 * time.Second, Limit: config.RateLimitNoAuthRoutesLimit.GetInt64(), } rateLimiter := createRateLimiter(rate) ur.Use(RateLimit(rateLimiter, "ip")) ``` **File 2:** pkg\routes\rate_limit.go:41 ```go // RateLimit is the rate limit middleware func RateLimit(rateLimiter *limiter.Limiter, rateLimitKind string) echo.MiddlewareFunc { return func(next echo.HandlerFunc) echo.HandlerFunc { return func(c *echo.Context) (err error) { var rateLimitKey string switch rateLimitKind { case "ip": rateLimitKey = c.RealIP() case "user": auth, err := auth2.GetAuthFromClaims(c) if err != nil { log.Errorf("Error getting auth from jwt claims: %v", err) } rateLimitKey = "user_" + strconv.FormatInt(auth.GetID(), 10) default: log.Errorf("Unknown rate limit kind configured: %s", rateLimitKind) } ``` ### PoC 1. Download and run the default docker compose file via the instructions here: [https://vikunja.io/install/](https://vikunja.io/install/). Do not configure a proxy. 2. Once running, navigate to the application in a web browser that is using a web proxy, such as Burp Suite. 3. Attempt to authenticate to the application with an invalid username and password. 4. In the web proxy's logs, locate the request to the `/api/v1/login` endpoint. Observe that the response contains rate-limit details: ```http HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden Cache-Control: no-store Content-Type: application/json Vary: Origin X-Ratelimit-Limit: 10 X-Ratelimit-Remaining: 9 X-Ratelimit-Reset: 1772224455 Date: Fri, 27 Feb 2026 20:33:16 GMT Content-Length: 54 {"code":1011,"message":"Wrong username or password."} ``` 5. Add the `X-Forwarded-For` header with an arbitrary value, like so: `X-Forwarded-For: FakeValue`. Send the request 10 times, or until the rate-limit is at zero. 6. Modify the `X-Forwarded-For` headers value to be different, like so: `X-Forwarded-For: NewValue`. 7. Observe that the `X-Ratelimit-Remaining` header's value has reset its countdown and is back at `9`. ### Impact Unauthenticated users can abuse endpoints available to them for different potential impacts. The immediate concern would be brute-forcing usernames or specific accounts' passwords. This bypass allows unlimited requests against unauthenticated endpoints.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GO-2026-4791

Published

Vikunja has a Rate-Limit Bypass for Unauthenticated Users via Spoofed Headers in code.vikunja.io/api. NOTE: The source advisory for this report contains additional versions that could not be automatically mapped to standard Go module versions. (If this is causing false-positive reports from vulnerability scanners, please suggest an edit to the report.) The additional affected modules and versions are: code.vikunja.io/api from v0.8.0 before v2.2.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

cve-program · CVE-2026-29794

Published

vikunja

Vendor product

Publisher's version information

Shown as published. These rules are not interpreted as NuGet package version ranges.

{
                    "vendor": "go-vikunja",
                    "product": "vikunja",
                    "versions": [
                        {
                            "version": ">= 0.8, < 2.2.0",
                            "status": "affected"
                        }
                    ]
                }

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

euvd · EUVD-2026-13706

Published

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Mar 20, 2026, 2:39:59 PM

dateUpdated: Mar 20, 2026, 5:15:23 PM

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

nvd · CVE-2026-29794

Published

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Analyzed

Weakness classifications: CWE-807

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-03-20T15:16:16.393

lastModified: 2026-06-17T10:29:54.000

1 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:vikunja:vikunja:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GHSA-m547-hp4w-j6jx

Published

code.vikunja.io/api

Go

ECOSYSTEM · introduced 0.8 → fixed 2.2.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GO-2026-4791

Published
ChangeIntel

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