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Step CA: Unauthenticated Certificate Issuance via SCEP UpdateReq (MessageType=18)

CVSS 3.1 10.0 CRITICALEUVD CVSS 3.1 10.0 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 10.0 CRITICALCVSS_V3 Publisher rating CRITICALFixed by github.com/smallstep/certificates 0.30.0osv · severity unknownFixed by github.com/smallstep/certificates 0.30.0KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-30836

Published

Step CA is an online certificate authority for secure, automated certificate management for DevOps. Versions 0.30.0-rc6 and below do not safeguard against unauthenticated certificate issuance through the SCEP UpdateReq. This issue has been fixed in version 0.30.0.

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euvd · EUVD-2026-13200

Published

Step CA is an online certificate authority for secure, automated certificate management for DevOps. Versions 0.30.0-rc6 and below do not safeguard against unauthenticated certificate issuance through the SCEP UpdateReq. This issue has been fixed in version 0.30.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-30836

Published

Step CA is an online certificate authority for secure, automated certificate management for DevOps. Versions 0.30.0-rc6 and below do not safeguard against unauthenticated certificate issuance through the SCEP UpdateReq. This issue has been fixed in version 0.30.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-q4r8-xm5f-56gw

Published

## Summary An attacker can force a Step CA SCEP provisioner to create certificates without completing certain protocol authorization checks. ## Details SCEP requests carry a message type. On receipt of a SCEP request, Step CA starts processing it by parsing its contents. Message types that were considered valid, but not explicitly supported in Step CA, would result in getting parsed successfully. While processing the parsed SCEP message, authorization logic would be skipped for the non-supported message types. As a result, the request would be treated as authorized, bypassing the authorization checks normally enforced as part of the SCEP protocol and its implementation in Step CA. Authorization webhooks and regular CA policies, such as allowed names and restrictions on certificate validity periods, remain in place. ## Mitigations If you are unable to upgrade to v0.30.0 or newer, the attack can be mitigated by (temporarily) disabling or removing SCEP provisioners, or restricting access to SCEP provisioners to trusted clients only. ## Fix In v0.30.0, additional validation was added to SCEP provisioners, so that they reject unsupported message types. ## Acknowledgements This issue was identified and reported by Prasanth Sundararajan. ## Embargo List If your organization runs Step CA in production and would like advance, embargoed notification of future security updates, visit https://u.step.sm/disclosure to request inclusion on our embargo list. Stay safe, and thank you for helping us keep the ecosystem secure. If you have urgent questions, please contact [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected]).

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osv · GO-2026-4775

Published

step-ca has Unauthenticated Certificate Issuance via SCEP UpdateReq (MessageType=18) in github.com/smallstep/certificates

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

Related advisories and sources

Publishers link these advisories through the identifiers shown below. A shared identifier or date alone does not tell you whether your software is affected or whether the advisories describe the same cause.

CVE-2026-30836 · CVE overview and exploitation status

EUVD-2026-13200

GHSA-q4r8-xm5f-56gw

GO-2026-4775

cve-program · CVE-2026-30836

euvd · EUVD-2026-13200

nvd · CVE-2026-30836

osv · GHSA-q4r8-xm5f-56gw

osv · GO-2026-4775

Related changes

Linked by CVE identifier

No related changes are available here.

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