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Nginx UI: Improper Path Validation Allows Recursive Deletion of the Nginx Configuration Directory

CVSS 4.0 6.9 MEDIUMEUVD CVSS 4.0 6.9 CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary 6.9 MEDIUMCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary 6.5 MEDIUMCVSS_V4 Publisher rating MODERATEosv · severity unknownCheck source for fixed versionsKEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-33027

Published

Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. Prior to version 2.3.4, the nginx-ui configuration improperly handles URL-encoded traversal sequences. When specially crafted paths are supplied, the backend resolves them to the base Nginx configuration directory and executes the operation on the base directory (/etc/nginx). In particular, this allows an authenticated user to remove the entire /etc/nginx directory, resulting in a partial Denial of Service. This issue has been patched in version 2.3.4.

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euvd · EUVD-2026-17151

Published

Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. Prior to version 2.3.4, the nginx-ui configuration improperly handles URL-encoded traversal sequences. When specially crafted paths are supplied, the backend resolves them to the base Nginx configuration directory and executes the operation on the base directory (/etc/nginx). In particular, this allows an authenticated user to remove the entire /etc/nginx directory, resulting in a partial Denial of Service. This issue has been patched in version 2.3.4.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-33027

Published

Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. Prior to version 2.3.4, the nginx-ui configuration improperly handles URL-encoded traversal sequences. When specially crafted paths are supplied, the backend resolves them to the base Nginx configuration directory and executes the operation on the base directory (/etc/nginx). In particular, this allows an authenticated user to remove the entire /etc/nginx directory, resulting in a partial Denial of Service. This issue has been patched in version 2.3.4.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-m8p8-53vf-8357

Published

## Summary The nginx-ui configuration improperly handles URL-encoded traversal sequences. When specially crafted paths are supplied, the backend resolves them to the base Nginx configuration directory and executes the operation on the base directory (/etc/nginx). In particular, this allows an authenticated user to remove the entire `/etc/nginx` directory, resulting in a partial Denial of Service. ## Details The file deletion logic fails to correctly validate and normalize paths containing URL-encoded traversal sequences such as `..%252F`. When such input is processed, the internal path resolution logic attempts to clamp the path into the allowed configuration directory. Instead of rejecting the traversal attempt, the clamping mechanism resolves the path to the base Nginx configuration directory itself. Because the deletion handler invokes `os.RemoveAll`, which recursively removes directories, this results in the deletion of the entire `/etc/nginx` directory. This behavior creates a dangerous interaction between path normalization and deletion logic: - Traversal sequences are not rejected. - Double-encoding (`..%252F`) is used to bypass initial shallow filters. - The clamping mechanism resolves malicious paths to the base configuration directory. - The deletion handler recursively deletes the resolved path. As a result, an attacker can trigger deletion of the entire Nginx configuration directory instead of being blocked by path validation logic. ### Root Cause The vulnerability results from a combination of design flaws: - **Improper Path Canonicalization**: URL-encoded traversal sequences are not properly rejected. - **Unsafe Fallback Logic**: The `GetConfPath` clamping mechanism returns the base configuration directory when traversal is detected instead of rejecting the request. - **Unsafe Deletion Primitive**: The deletion handler invokes `os.RemoveAll`, which recursively deletes directories without additional safeguards. (delete.go) ``` // Delete the file or directory err = os.RemoveAll(fullPath) if err != nil { cosy.ErrHandler(c, err) return } ``` This interaction causes the deletion operation to target the most sensitive directory when a traversal attempt occurs. ### Environment - **Server OS**: Kali Linux 6.17.10-1kali1 (6.17.10+kali-amd64) - **Nginx UI Version**: nginx-ui v2.3.3 - **Deployment**: Docker / Default installation ## Proof of Concept ### Steps to Reproduce 1. Log into nginx-ui. 2. Go to Manage Configs and create a Folder named *..%252F..%252F..%252F..%252Ftest* <img width="1608" height="559" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/738d7d65-7e13-48fa-affc-d5509c43900f" /> 3. Observe that the backend resolves the path to /etc/nginx.. 4. Now lets create a file called *testing*. 5. Save it and rename it to *..%252F..%252F..%252F..%252Ftest* (It is not possible to create it directly with the payload name so we have to rename it) 6. Go back to manage configs and Click Delete to remove the file we just created. 7. Check that there is an error: <img width="1578" height="696" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/51a36310-0676-4fe5-b80c-e0199498efbf" /> 8. Reload the website and check that the /etc/nginx folder has been completely removed: <img width="1313" height="722" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0a9ddd1b-786b-4cf2-8abd-1dc6f3a77807" /> ## Impact An authenticated user capable of invoking the configuration deletion endpoint can trigger the recursive deletion of the entire Nginx configuration directory (`/etc/nginx`). This results in: - Immediate failure of the Nginx service due to missing configuration files. - Loss of all Nginx configuration managed by nginx-ui. - Denial of Service for all web services relying on the affected Nginx instance. As the deletion operation uses a recursive filesystem call, the entire configuration directory is removed, leaving the system unable to restart Nginx until the configuration is manually restored. A patched version is available at https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/releases/tag/v2.3.4.

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osv · GO-2026-4907

Published

Nginx Configuration Directory Vulnerable to Recursive Deletion via Improper Path Validation in github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI

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Affected versions, risk and source history

cve-program · CVE-2026-33027

Published

nginx-ui

Vendor product

Publisher's version information

Shown as published. These rules are not interpreted as NuGet package version ranges.

{
                    "vendor": "0xJacky",
                    "product": "nginx-ui",
                    "versions": [
                        {
                            "version": "< 2.3.4",
                            "status": "affected"
                        }
                    ]
                }

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

euvd · EUVD-2026-17151

Published

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Mar 30, 2026, 5:59:30 PM

dateUpdated: Mar 30, 2026, 6:37:18 PM

1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

WID-SEC-W-2026-0931: nginx-ui: Mehrere Schwachstellen

CVE-2026-33026 · CVE-2026-33027 · CVE-2026-33028 · CVE-2026-33029 · CVE-2026-33030 · CVE-2026-33032

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

nvd · CVE-2026-33027

Published

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Analyzed

Weakness classifications: CWE-22 · CWE-73

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-03-30T18:16:18.783

lastModified: 2026-06-17T10:36:48.413

1 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:nginxui:nginx_ui:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GHSA-m8p8-53vf-8357

Published

github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI

Go

ECOSYSTEM · introduced 0 → last_affected 1.99

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GO-2026-4907

Published

github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

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