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xmldom: XML injection via unsafe CDATA serialization allows attacker-controlled markup insertion

CVSS 3.1 7.5 HIGHEUVD CVSS 3.1 7.5 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 7.5 HIGHCVSS 3.1 · 0b0ca135-0b70-47e7-9f44-1890c2a1c46c · Secondary 7.5 HIGHCVSS_V3 Publisher rating HIGHFixed by @xmldom/xmldom 0.8.12Fixed by @xmldom/xmldom 0.9.9KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-34601

Published

xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) `DOMParser` and `XMLSerializer` module. In xmldom versions 0.6.0 and prior and @xmldom/xmldom prior to versions 0.8.12 and 0.9.9, xmldom/xmldom allows attacker-controlled strings containing the CDATA terminator ]]> to be inserted into a CDATASection node. During serialization, XMLSerializer emitted the CDATA content verbatim without rejecting or safely splitting the terminator. As a result, data intended to remain text-only became active XML markup in the serialized output, enabling XML structure injection and downstream business-logic manipulation. This issue has been patched in xmldom version 0.6.0 and @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.8.12 and 0.9.9.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-18460

Published

xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) `DOMParser` and `XMLSerializer` module. In xmldom versions 0.6.0 and prior and @xmldom/xmldom prior to versions 0.8.12 and 0.9.9, xmldom/xmldom allows attacker-controlled strings containing the CDATA terminator ]]> to be inserted into a CDATASection node. During serialization, XMLSerializer emitted the CDATA content verbatim without rejecting or safely splitting the terminator. As a result, data intended to remain text-only became active XML markup in the serialized output, enabling XML structure injection and downstream business-logic manipulation. This issue has been patched in xmldom version 0.6.0 and @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.8.12 and 0.9.9.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-34601

Published

xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) `DOMParser` and `XMLSerializer` module. In xmldom versions 0.6.0 and prior and @xmldom/xmldom prior to versions 0.8.12 and 0.9.9, xmldom/xmldom allows attacker-controlled strings containing the CDATA terminator ]]> to be inserted into a CDATASection node. During serialization, XMLSerializer emitted the CDATA content verbatim without rejecting or safely splitting the terminator. As a result, data intended to remain text-only became active XML markup in the serialized output, enabling XML structure injection and downstream business-logic manipulation. This issue has been patched in xmldom version 0.6.0 and @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.8.12 and 0.9.9.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-wh4c-j3r5-mjhp

Published

## Summary `@xmldom/xmldom` allows attacker-controlled strings containing the CDATA terminator `]]>` to be inserted into a `CDATASection` node. During serialization, `XMLSerializer` emitted the CDATA content verbatim without rejecting or safely splitting the terminator. As a result, data intended to remain text-only became **active XML markup** in the serialized output, enabling XML structure injection and downstream business-logic manipulation. The sequence `]]>` is not allowed inside CDATA content and must be rejected or safely handled during serialization. ([MDN Web Docs](https://developer.mozilla.org/)) ### Attack surface `Document.createCDATASection(data)` is the most direct entry point, but it is not the only one. The WHATWG DOM spec intentionally does not validate `]]>` in mutation methods — only `createCDATASection` carries that guard. The following paths therefore also allow `]]>` to enter a CDATASection node and reach the serializer: - `CharacterData.appendData()` - `CharacterData.replaceData()` - `CharacterData.insertData()` - Direct assignment to `.data` - Direct assignment to `.textContent` (Note: assigning to `.nodeValue` does **not** update `.data` in this implementation — the serializer reads `.data` directly — so `.nodeValue` is not an exploitable path.) ### Parse path Parsing XML that contains a CDATA section is **not** affected. The SAX parser's non-greedy `CDSect` regex stops at the first `]]>`, so parsed CDATA data never contains the terminator. --- ## Impact If an application uses `xmldom` to generate "trusted" XML documents that embed **untrusted user input** inside CDATA (a common pattern in exports, feeds, SOAP/XML integrations, etc.), an attacker can inject additional XML elements/attributes into the generated document. This can lead to: - Integrity violation of generated XML documents. - Business-logic injection in downstream consumers (e.g., injecting `<approved>true</approved>`, `<role>admin</role>`, workflow flags, or other security-relevant elements). - Unexpected privilege/workflow decisions if downstream logic assumes injected nodes cannot appear. This issue does **not** require malformed parsers or browser behavior; it is caused by serialization producing attacker-influenced XML markup. --- ## Root Cause (with file + line numbers) **File:** `lib/dom.js` ### 1. No validation in `createCDATASection` `createCDATASection: function (data)` accepts any string and appends it directly. - **Lines 2216–2221** (0.9.8) ### 2. Unsafe CDATA serialization Serializer prints CDATA sections as: ``` <![CDATA[ + node.data + ]]> ``` without handling `]]>` in the data. - **Lines 2919–2920** (0.9.8) Because CDATA content is emitted verbatim, an embedded `]]>` closes the CDATA section early and the remainder of the attacker-controlled payload is interpreted as markup in the serialized XML. --- ## Proof of Concept — Fix A: `createCDATASection` now throws On patched versions, passing `]]>` directly to `createCDATASection` throws `InvalidCharacterError` instead of silently accepting the payload: ```js const { DOMImplementation } = require('./lib'); const doc = new DOMImplementation().createDocument(null, 'root', null); try { doc.createCDATASection('SAFE]]><injected attr="pwn"/>'); console.log('VULNERABLE — no error thrown'); } catch (e) { console.log('FIXED — threw:', e.name); // InvalidCharacterError } ``` Expected output on patched versions: ``` FIXED — threw: InvalidCharacterError ``` --- ## Proof of Concept — Fix B: mutation vector now safe On patched versions, injecting `]]>` via a mutation method (`appendData`, `replaceData`, `.data =`, `.textContent =`) no longer produces injectable output. The serializer splits the terminator so the result round-trips as safe text: ```js const { DOMImplementation, XMLSerializer } = require('./lib'); const { DOMParser } = require('./lib'); const doc = new DOMImplementation().createDocument(null, 'root', null); // Start with safe data, then mutate to include the terminator const cdata = doc.createCDATASection('safe'); doc.documentElement.appendChild(cdata); cdata.appendData(']]><injected attr="pwn"/><more>TEXT</more><![CDATA['); const out = new XMLSerializer().serializeToString(doc); console.log('Serialized:', out); const reparsed = new DOMParser().parseFromString(out, 'text/xml'); const injected = reparsed.getElementsByTagName('injected').length > 0; console.log('Injected element found in reparsed doc:', injected); // VULNERABLE: true | FIXED: false ``` Expected output on patched versions: ``` Serialized: <root><![CDATA[safe]]]]><![CDATA[><injected attr="pwn"/><more>TEXT</more><![CDATA[]]></root> Injected element found in reparsed doc: false ``` --- ## Fix Applied Both mitigations were implemented: ### Option A — Strict/spec-aligned: reject `]]>` in `createCDATASection()` `Document.createCDATASection(data)` now throws `InvalidCharacterError` (per the [WHATWG DOM spec](https://dom.spec.whatwg.org/#dom-document-createcdatasection)) when `data` contains `]]>`. This closes the direct entry point. Code that previously passed a string containing `]]>` to `createCDATASection` and relied on the silent/unsafe behaviour will now receive `InvalidCharacterError`. Use a mutation method such as `appendData` if you intentionally need `]]>` in a CDATASection node's data (the serializer split in Option B will keep the output safe). ### Option B — Defensive serialization: split the terminator during serialization `XMLSerializer` now replaces every occurrence of `]]>` in CDATA section data with the split sequence `]]]]><![CDATA[>` before emitting. This closes all mutation-vector paths that Option A alone cannot guard, and means the serialized output is always well-formed XML regardless of how `]]>` entered the node. ## Update — 2026-04-xx (0.9.10 / 0.8.13) ### `splitCDATASections` is deprecated The CDATA split behavior introduced as Option B of this fix (replacing `]]>` with`]]]]><![CDATA[>` during serialization) is **deprecated** as of 0.9.10 / 0.8.13. This release introduces a `requireWellFormed` option on `XMLSerializer.serializeToString()`. When `{ requireWellFormed: true }` is passed as the second argument, the serializer throws `InvalidStateError` if CDATA section data contains `]]>` — this is the spec-aligned behavior (W3C DOM Parsing and Serialization, `require well-formed` flag) and the recommended migration path going forward. The split behavior is now controlled by an explicit `splitCDATASections` option (default `true`, preserving the current behavior). The three serialization behaviors are: | `requireWellFormed` | `splitCDATASections` | Behavior ||---|---|---|| `false` (default) | `true` (default) | Split `]]>` → `]]]]><![CDATA[>` (current behavior, deprecated) || `true` | — (ignored) | Throw `InvalidStateError` — spec-aligned, recommended |\ `false` | `false` | Emit verbatim — same as pre-0.9.9 behavior | `requireWellFormed: true` takes precedence: the split path is unreachable when it is set. ### Migration Replace any reliance on the default split behavior with an explicit opt-in: ```js// Before (implicit split, deprecated): const xml = new XMLSerializer().serializeToString(doc); // After (explicit guard, spec-aligned): const xml = new XMLSerializer().serializeToString(doc, { requireWellFormed: true }); // Throws InvalidStateError if any CDATASection contains ']]>' ``` ### Removal timeline Both the `splitCDATASections` option and the underlying `]]>` → `]]]]><![CDATA[>` split mechanics will be removed in the next breaking (`0.10.0`) release. After removal, the only behaviors will be verbatim (default) and `requireWellFormed: true` (throws). Removal is tracked in [xmldom/xmldom#999](https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/issues/999).

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Affected versions, risk and source history

cve-program · CVE-2026-34601

Published

xmldom

Vendor product

Publisher's version information

Shown as published. These rules are not interpreted as NuGet package version ranges.

{
                    "vendor": "xmldom",
                    "product": "xmldom",
                    "versions": [
                        {
                            "version": "xmldom <= 0.6.0",
                            "status": "affected"
                        },
                        {
                            "version": "@xmldom/xmldom < 0.8.12",
                            "status": "affected"
                        },
                        {
                            "version": "@xmldom/xmldom >= 0.9.0, < 0.9.9",
                            "status": "affected"
                        }
                    ]
                }

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

euvd · EUVD-2026-18460

Published

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Apr 2, 2026, 5:47:13 PM

dateUpdated: Jul 15, 2026, 1:04:09 AM

5 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

openSUSE-SU-2026:10506-1: jupyter-jupyterlab-templates-0.5.3-1.1 on GA media

CVE-2026-34601

WID-SEC-W-2026-1407: IBM App Connect Enterprise Certified Container: Mehrere Schwachstellen

CVE-2026-26013 · CVE-2026-27142 · CVE-2026-28277 · CVE-2026-28684 · CVE-2026-32288 · CVE-2026-33151 · CVE-2026-33349 · CVE-2026-33532 · CVE-2026-33891 · CVE-2026-33894 · CVE-2026-33895 · CVE-2026-33896 · CVE-2026-33916 · CVE-2026-34601 · CVE-2026-35469 · CVE-2026-39406 · CVE-2026-39407 · CVE-2026-39408 · CVE-2026-39409 · CVE-2026-39410 · CVE-2026-39983 · CVE-2026-40175 · CVE-2026-40347 · CVE-2026-40895 · CVE-2026-41238 · CVE-2026-41239 · CVE-2026-41240 · CVE-2026-4923 · CVE-2026-4926

msrc_CVE-2026-34601: xmldom: XML injection via unsafe CDATA serialization allows attacker-controlled markup insertion

CVE-2026-34601

WID-SEC-W-2026-2933: Splunk SOAR: Mehrere Schwachstellen

CVE-2025-13465 · CVE-2025-13473 · CVE-2025-14550 · CVE-2025-15599 · CVE-2025-53859 · CVE-2025-6545 · CVE-2025-6547 · CVE-2025-66221 · CVE-2025-67724 · CVE-2025-67725 · CVE-2025-67726 · CVE-2025-68428 · CVE-2025-69873 · CVE-2026-0540 · CVE-2026-1207 · CVE-2026-1285 · CVE-2026-1287 · CVE-2026-1312 · CVE-2026-1642 · CVE-2026-2004 · CVE-2026-2005 · CVE-2026-2006 · CVE-2026-21226 · CVE-2026-21860 · CVE-2026-22702 · CVE-2026-22815 · CVE-2026-2391 · CVE-2026-24001 · CVE-2026-24040 · CVE-2026-24043 · CVE-2026-24133 · CVE-2026-24737 · CVE-2026-25535 · CVE-2026-25673 · CVE-2026-25674 · CVE-2026-25755 · CVE-2026-25940 · CVE-2026-26007 · CVE-2026-26996 · CVE-2026-27199 · CVE-2026-2739 · CVE-2026-27651 · CVE-2026-27654 · CVE-2026-27784 · CVE-2026-27959 · CVE-2026-28277 · CVE-2026-28684 · CVE-2026-28753 · CVE-2026-28755 · CVE-2026-29063 · CVE-2026-2950 · CVE-2026-30922 · CVE-2026-31898 · CVE-2026-31938 · CVE-2026-31958 · CVE-2026-32141 · CVE-2026-32597 · CVE-2026-32647 · CVE-2026-33228 · CVE-2026-33532 · CVE-2026-33671 · CVE-2026-33672 · CVE-2026-33750 · CVE-2026-34513 · CVE-2026-34514 · CVE-2026-34515 · CVE-2026-34516 · CVE-2026-34517 · CVE-2026-34518 · CVE-2026-34519 · CVE-2026-34520 · CVE-2026-34525 · CVE-2026-34601 · CVE-2026-35536 · CVE-2026-40087 · CVE-2026-40460 · CVE-2026-40701 · CVE-2026-41066 · CVE-2026-42215 · CVE-2026-42284 · CVE-2026-42934 · CVE-2026-42945 · CVE-2026-42946 · CVE-2026-44243 · CVE-2026-44244 · CVE-2026-4800 · CVE-2026-76356 · CVE-2026-76357 · CVE-2026-76358 · CVE-2026-76359 · CVE-2026-76360 · CVE-2026-76361 · CVE-2026-76362 · CVE-2026-76363 · CVE-2026-76364 · CVE-2026-76365 · CVE-2026-76366 · CVE-2026-76367 · CVE-2026-76368 · CVE-2026-76369 · CVE-2026-76370 · CVE-2026-9256

openSUSE-SU-2026:10497-1: heroic-games-launcher-2.20.1-5.1 on GA media

CVE-2026-34601

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

nvd · CVE-2026-34601

Published

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-91

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-04-02T18:16:31.933

lastModified: 2026-07-21T19:10:00.107

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GHSA-wh4c-j3r5-mjhp

Published

xmldom

npm

SEMVER · introduced 0 → last_affected 0.6.0

@xmldom/xmldom

npm

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 0.8.12

@xmldom/xmldom

npm

SEMVER · introduced 0.9.0 → fixed 0.9.9

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 16 Nov 01:32 UTC · 272 of 275 readable · 250 fully read · 18 waiting for GitHub's hourly limit · documentation 469/469 current