Budibase: SSRF in Automation Steps - Webhook, Zapier, N8N, Slack, Discord Bypass IP Blacklist
cve-program · CVE-2026-35219
PublishedBudibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.41.3, automation steps in packages/server/src/automations/steps/outgoingWebhook.ts, packages/server/src/automations/steps/zapier.ts, packages/server/src/automations/steps/n8n.ts, packages/server/src/automations/steps/slack.ts, and packages/server/src/automations/steps/discord.ts use node-fetch on user-provided URLs without the BLACKLIST_IPS enforcement used by the REST integration, allowing an authenticated user to make server-side requests to cloud metadata and internal services. This issue is fixed in version 3.41.3.
Read the publisher's advisoryeuvd · EUVD-2026-60381
PublishedBudibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.41.3, automation steps in packages/server/src/automations/steps/outgoingWebhook.ts, packages/server/src/automations/steps/zapier.ts, packages/server/src/automations/steps/n8n.ts, packages/server/src/automations/steps/slack.ts, and packages/server/src/automations/steps/discord.ts use node-fetch on user-provided URLs without the BLACKLIST_IPS enforcement used by the REST integration, allowing an authenticated user to make server-side requests to cloud metadata and internal services. This issue is fixed in version 3.41.3.
Read the publisher's advisorynvd · CVE-2026-35219
PublishedBudibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.41.3, automation steps in packages/server/src/automations/steps/outgoingWebhook.ts, packages/server/src/automations/steps/zapier.ts, packages/server/src/automations/steps/n8n.ts, packages/server/src/automations/steps/slack.ts, and packages/server/src/automations/steps/discord.ts use node-fetch on user-provided URLs without the BLACKLIST_IPS enforcement used by the REST integration, allowing an authenticated user to make server-side requests to cloud metadata and internal services. This issue is fixed in version 3.41.3.
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GHSA-5fpj-28rv-84r7
Published## Summary Budibase automation steps (outgoing webhook, Zapier, n8n, Slack, Discord, Make.com) make server-side HTTP requests to user-provided URLs using `node-fetch` directly, completely bypassing the IP blacklist protection that exists in the REST API integration. Additionally, the REST API blacklist itself defaults to empty when `BLACKLIST_IPS` is not configured. ## Vulnerable Code ### Automation Steps (No Blacklist) All automation steps use `fetch()` directly without any IP validation: **`packages/server/src/automations/steps/outgoingWebhook.ts` line 69:** ```typescript const response = await fetch(url, request) // No blacklist check ``` **`packages/server/src/automations/steps/zapier.ts` line 34:** ```typescript response = await fetch(url, {method: "post", ...}) // No blacklist check ``` **`packages/server/src/automations/steps/n8n.ts` line 53:** ```typescript response = await fetch(url, request) // No blacklist check ``` **`packages/server/src/automations/steps/slack.ts` line 20:** ```typescript response = await fetch(url, {method: "post", ...}) // No blacklist check ``` **`packages/server/src/automations/steps/discord.ts` line 29:** ```typescript response = await fetch(url, {method: "post", ...}) // No blacklist check ``` ### REST API Integration (Empty Default Blacklist) **`packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts` line 684:** ```typescript if (await blacklist.isBlacklisted(url)) { throw new Error("Cannot connect to URL.") } ``` But `BLACKLIST_IPS` env var defaults to undefined, so the blacklist is empty: **`packages/backend-core/src/blacklist/blacklist.ts` lines 39-45:** ```typescript if (blackListArray?.length === 0) { return false // Always passes when no IPs configured } ``` ## Impact - **Automation steps**: ANY user can create automations with webhook/Zapier/n8n/Slack/Discord steps pointing to internal IPs. These completely bypass the blacklist module - **REST API**: Even when BLACKLIST_IPS is configured, it only blocks listed IPs. Default deployments have no protection. - **Cloud metadata**: `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/` accessible via any automation step - **Internal services**: Access databases, admin panels, Kubernetes API on private IPs ## Remediation 1. Apply blacklist checks to ALL outbound HTTP requests, including automation steps 2. Add hardcoded default private IP ranges (127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 169.254.0.0/16) 3. Use a centralized HTTP client wrapper instead of direct `fetch()` calls 4. SSRF protection should be on by default, not opt-in via environment variable
Read the publisher's advisoryAffected versions, risk and source history
Exploitation and risk
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cve-program · CVE-2026-35219
PublishedBudibase: SSRF in Automation Steps - Webhook, Zapier, N8N, Slack, Discord Bypass IP Blacklist
Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.41.3, automation steps in packages/server/src/automations/steps/outgoingWebhook.ts, packages/server/src/automations/steps/zapier.ts, packages/server/src/automations/steps/n8n.ts, packages/server/src/automations/steps/slack.ts, and packages/server/src/automations/steps/discord.ts use node-fetch on user-provided URLs without the BLACKLIST_IPS enforcement used by the REST integration, allowing an authenticated user to make server-side requests to cloud metadata and internal services. This issue is fixed in version 3.41.3.
- Source published
- 17 Aug 2026 20:28:40 UTC
- Source modified
- 18 Aug 2026 12:37:02 UTC
- Saved here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 4.0 · 7.1 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
euvd · EUVD-2026-60381
PublishedBudibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.41.3, automation steps in packages/server/src/automations/steps/outgoingWebhook.ts, packages/server/src/automations/steps/zapier.ts, packages/server/src/automations/steps/n8n.ts, pack…
Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.41.3, automation steps in packages/server/src/automations/steps/outgoingWebhook.ts, packages/server/src/automations/steps/zapier.ts, packages/server/src/automations/steps/n8n.ts, packages/server/src/automations/steps/slack.ts, and packages/server/src/automations/steps/discord.ts use node-fetch on user-provided URLs without the BLACKLIST_IPS enforcement used by the REST integration, allowing an authenticated user to make server-side requests to cloud metadata and internal services. This issue is fixed in version 3.41.3.
Additional publisher context
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Aug 17, 2026, 8:28:40 PM
dateUpdated: Aug 18, 2026, 12:37:02 PM
1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
WID-SEC-W-2026-2849: Budibase: Mehrere Schwachstellen
CVE-2026-35219 · CVE-2026-54356 · CVE-2026-82240 · CVE-2026-82243 · CVE-2026-82239
- Source published
- Aug 17, 2026, 8:28:40 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Aug 18, 2026, 12:37:02 PM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 17 Nov 2026 14:31:30 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 7.1 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
nvd · CVE-2026-35219
PublishedBudibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.41.3, automation steps in packages/server/src/automations/steps/outgoingWebhook.ts, packages/server/src/automations/steps/zapier.ts, packages/server/src/automations/steps/n8n.ts, pack…
Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.41.3, automation steps in packages/server/src/automations/steps/outgoingWebhook.ts, packages/server/src/automations/steps/zapier.ts, packages/server/src/automations/steps/n8n.ts, packages/server/src/automations/steps/slack.ts, and packages/server/src/automations/steps/discord.ts use node-fetch on user-provided URLs without the BLACKLIST_IPS enforcement used by the REST integration, allowing an authenticated user to make server-side requests to cloud metadata and internal services. This issue is fixed in version 3.41.3.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-918
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-08-17T21:16:44.550
lastModified: 2026-09-08T21:03:08.410
- Source published
- 17 Aug 2026 21:16:44 UTC
- Source modified
- 8 Sep 2026 21:03:08 UTC
- Saved here
- 25 Oct 2026 08:17:41 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.1 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
osv · GHSA-5fpj-28rv-84r7
PublishedBudibase: SSRF in Automation Steps - Webhook, Zapier, N8N, Slack, Discord Bypass IP Blacklist
## Summary Budibase automation steps (outgoing webhook, Zapier, n8n, Slack, Discord, Make.com) make server-side HTTP requests to user-provided URLs using `node-fetch` directly, completely bypassing the IP blacklist protection that exists in the REST API integration. Additionally, the REST API blacklist itself defaults to empty when `BLACKLIST_IPS` is not configured. ## Vulnerable Code ### Automation Steps (No Blacklist) All automation steps use `fetch()` directly without any IP validation: **`packages/server/src/automations/steps/outgoingWebhook.ts` line 69:** ```typescript const response = await fetch(url, request) // No blacklist check ``` **`packages/server/src/automations/steps/zapier.ts` line 34:** ```typescript response = await fetch(url, {method: "post", ...}) // No blacklist check ``` **`packages/server/src/automations/steps/n8n.ts` line 53:** ```typescript response = await fetch(url, request) // No blacklist check ``` **`packages/server/src/automations/steps/slack.ts` line 20:** ```typescript response = await fetch(url, {method: "post", ...}) // No blacklist check ``` **`packages/server/src/automations/steps/discord.ts` line 29:** ```typescript response = await fetch(url, {method: "post", ...}) // No blacklist check ``` ### REST API Integration (Empty Default Blacklist) **`packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts` line 684:** ```typescript if (await blacklist.isBlacklisted(url)) { throw new Error("Cannot connect to URL.") } ``` But `BLACKLIST_IPS` env var defaults to undefined, so the blacklist is empty: **`packages/backend-core/src/blacklist/blacklist.ts` lines 39-45:** ```typescript if (blackListArray?.length === 0) { return false // Always passes when no IPs configured } ``` ## Impact - **Automation steps**: ANY user can create automations with webhook/Zapier/n8n/Slack/Discord steps pointing to internal IPs. These completely bypass the blacklist module - **REST API**: Even when BLACKLIST_IPS is configured, it only blocks listed IPs. Default deployments have no protection. - **Cloud metadata**: `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/` accessible via any automation step - **Internal services**: Access databases, admin panels, Kubernetes API on private IPs ## Remediation 1. Apply blacklist checks to ALL outbound HTTP requests, including automation steps 2. Add hardcoded default private IP ranges (127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 169.254.0.0/16) 3. Use a centralized HTTP client wrapper instead of direct `fetch()` calls 4. SSRF protection should be on by default, not opt-in via environment variable
- Source published
- 14 Aug 2026 19:18:47 UTC
- Source modified
- 14 Aug 2026 19:41:00 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Publisher rating · HIGH