Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. Prior to 4.12.12, a path handling inconsistency in serveStatic allows protected static files to be accessed by using repeated slashes (//) in the request path. When route-based middleware (e.g., /admin/*) is used for authorization, the router may not match paths containing repeated slashes, while serveStatic resolves them as normalized paths. This can lead to a middleware bypass. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.12.12.
Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. Prior to 4.12.12, a path handling inconsistency in serveStatic allows protected static files to be accessed by using repeated slashes (//) in the request path. When route-based middleware (e.g., /admin/*) is used for authorization, the router may not match paths containing repeated slashes, while serveStatic resolves them as normalized paths. This can lead to a middleware bypass. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.12.12.
Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. Prior to 4.12.12, a path handling inconsistency in serveStatic allows protected static files to be accessed by using repeated slashes (//) in the request path. When route-based middleware (e.g., /admin/*) is used for authorization, the router may not match paths containing repeated slashes, while serveStatic resolves them as normalized paths. This can lead to a middleware bypass. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.12.12.
## Summary
A path handling inconsistency in `serveStatic` allows protected static files to be accessed by using repeated slashes (`//`) in the request path.
When route-based middleware (e.g., `/admin/*`) is used for authorization, the router may not match paths containing repeated slashes, while serveStatic resolves them as normalized paths. This can lead to a middleware bypass.
## Details
The routing layer and `serveStatic` handle repeated slashes differently.
For example:
```
/admin/secret.txt => matches /admin/*
/admin//secret.txt => may not match /admin/*
```
However, `serveStatic` may interpret both paths as the same file location (e.g., `admin/secret.txt`) and return the file.
This inconsistency allows a request such as:
```
GET //admin/secret.txt
```
to bypass middleware registered on `/admin/*` and access protected files.
The issue has been fixed by rejecting paths that contain repeated slashes, ensuring consistent behavior between route matching and static file resolution.
## Impact
An attacker can access static files that are intended to be protected by route-based middleware by using repeated slashes in the request path.
This can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive files under the static root.
This issue affects applications that rely on serveStatic together with route-based middleware for access control.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Apr 8, 2026, 2:41:20 PM
dateUpdated: Apr 8, 2026, 4:04:59 PM
1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
WID-SEC-W-2026-1407: IBM App Connect Enterprise Certified Container: Mehrere Schwachstellen
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Analyzed
Weakness classifications: CWE-22
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-04-08T15:16:14.667
lastModified: 2026-07-24T21:10:00.143
1 source CPE criteria · context only
cpe:2.3:a:hono:hono:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.