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Kata Containers: CopyFile Policy Subversion via Symlinks

CVSS 4.0 8.2 HIGHEUVD CVSS 4.0 8.2 CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary 8.2 HIGHCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary 8.2 HIGHCVSS 3.1 · 0b0ca135-0b70-47e7-9f44-1890c2a1c46c · Secondary 8.8 HIGHCVSS_V3 CVSS_V4 Publisher rating HIGHFixed by github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers 0.0.0-20260422180503-1b9e49eb2763osv · severity unknownFixed by github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers 0.0.0-20260422180503-1b9e49eb2763KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-41326

Published

Kata Containers is an open source project focusing on a standard implementation of lightweight Virtual Machines (VMs) that perform like containers. From v3.4.0 to v3.28.0, an oversight in the CopyFile policy (and perhaps the CopyFile handler) allows untrusted hosts to write to arbitrary locations inside the guest workload image. This can be used to overwrite binaries inside the guest and exfiltrate data from containers; even those running inside CVMs. This vulnerability is fixed in v3.29.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-25611

Published

Kata Containers is an open source project focusing on a standard implementation of lightweight Virtual Machines (VMs) that perform like containers. From v3.4.0 to v3.28.0, an oversight in the CopyFile policy (and perhaps the CopyFile handler) allows untrusted hosts to write to arbitrary locations inside the guest workload image. This can be used to overwrite binaries inside the guest and exfiltrate data from containers; even those running inside CVMs. This vulnerability is fixed in v3.29.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-41326

Published

Kata Containers is an open source project focusing on a standard implementation of lightweight Virtual Machines (VMs) that perform like containers. From v3.4.0 to v3.28.0, an oversight in the CopyFile policy (and perhaps the CopyFile handler) allows untrusted hosts to write to arbitrary locations inside the guest workload image. This can be used to overwrite binaries inside the guest and exfiltrate data from containers; even those running inside CVMs. This vulnerability is fixed in v3.29.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-q49m-57vm-c8cc

Published

### Summary An oversight in the CopyFile policy (and perhaps the CopyFile handler) allows untrusted hosts to write to arbitrary locations inside the guest workload image. This can be used to overwrite binaries inside the guest and exfiltrate data from containers; even those running inside CVMs. ### Details Here is the policy that covers CopyFile requests. ``` CopyFileRequest if { print("CopyFileRequest: input.path =", input.path) check_directory_traversal(input.path) some regex1 in policy_data.request_defaults.CopyFileRequest regex2 := replace(regex1, "$(sfprefix)", policy_data.common.sfprefix) regex3 := replace(regex2, "$(cpath)", policy_data.common.cpath) regex4 := replace(regex3, "$(bundle-id)", "[a-z0-9]{64}") print("CopyFileRequest: regex4 =", regex4) regex.match(regex4, input.path) print("CopyFileRequest: true") } ``` This checks that files are being copied to `policy_data.common.cpath`, which is typically set to `/run/kata-containers/shared/containers`. In other words, you're allowed to copy files to anywhere inside the shared dir. For reference, here is the CopyFile message. Note that none of the other fields are check in the policy. ``` message CopyFileRequest { // Path is the destination file in the guest. It must be absolute, // canonical and below /run. string path = 1; // FileSize is the expected file size, for security reasons write operations // are made in a temporary file, once it has the expected size, it's moved // to the destination path. int64 file_size = 2; // FileMode is the file mode. uint32 file_mode = 3; // DirMode is the mode for the parent directories of destination path. uint32 dir_mode = 4; // Uid is the numeric user id. int32 uid = 5; // Gid is the numeric group id. int32 gid = 6; // Offset for the next write operation. int64 offset = 7; // Data to write in the destination file. bytes data = 8; } ``` In addition to copying files directly, the Kata Agent supports creating symlinks via the CopyFile API. In this case the `path` is the symlink name and the `data` field contains the symlink target. Given that the policy only checks the path, an attacker can craft a CopyFile request that results in a symlink going from any location into the shared dir. ### PoC The above primitive can be used to to write arbitrary data into container images (pulled in the guest or otherwise). A couple steps are required. First, identify some target path in the guest image. This could be a binary that will be called by the workload. You could also experiment with overwriting other stuff. Create a symlink from this binary to the shared dir. The path/link name should be in the shared dir and the data/target should point to the path of the target file inside the container image in the guest fs. Create a second CopyFile request to copy your data from the host into the symlink you just created in the shared dir. This will then be propagated into the image. You may want to restart the container to ensure that your new binary is invoked. ### Impact Anyone who is using the upstream `genpolicy` implementation and expects it to prevent host access to container images is vulnerable This includes Confidential Containers workloads where the trust model explicitly forbids this type of access. If you have your own policy implementation you may or may not be vulnerable. If you do not care about protecting the image from the host (e.g. you are using unprotected host pull), you are not vulnerable. This was individually discovered and reported by - @calonso-nv - @fikriwahab - @kodareef5

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GO-2026-5563

Published

Kata Container has CopyFile Policy Subversion via Symlinks in github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

Exploitation and risk

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cve-program · CVE-2026-41326

Published

Kata Containers: CopyFile Policy Subversion via Symlinks

Kata Containers is an open source project focusing on a standard implementation of lightweight Virtual Machines (VMs) that perform like containers. From v3.4.0 to v3.28.0, an oversight in the CopyFile policy (and perhaps the CopyFile handler) allows untrusted hosts to write to arbitrary locations inside the guest workload image. This can be used to overwrite binaries inside the guest and exfiltrate data from containers; even those running inside CVMs. This vulnerability is fixed in v3.29.0.

Source published
24 Apr 2026 18:46:21 UTC
Source modified
1 Sep 2026 12:04:43 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · 8.2 CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N

euvd · EUVD-2026-25611

Published

Kata Containers is an open source project focusing on a standard implementation of lightweight Virtual Machines (VMs) that perform like containers. From v3.4.0 to v3.28.0, an oversight in the CopyFile policy (and perhaps the CopyFile handle…

Kata Containers is an open source project focusing on a standard implementation of lightweight Virtual Machines (VMs) that perform like containers. From v3.4.0 to v3.28.0, an oversight in the CopyFile policy (and perhaps the CopyFile handler) allows untrusted hosts to write to arbitrary locations inside the guest workload image. This can be used to overwrite binaries inside the guest and exfiltrate data from containers; even those running inside CVMs. This vulnerability is fixed in v3.29.0.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Apr 24, 2026, 6:46:21 PM

dateUpdated: Sep 1, 2026, 12:04:43 PM

1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

RHSA-2026:25200: Red Hat Security Advisory: OpenShift Container Platform 4.19.34 bug fix and security update

CVE-2026-41326 · CVE-2026-43037

Source published
Apr 24, 2026, 6:46:21 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Sep 1, 2026, 12:04:43 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
19 Nov 2026 20:57:46 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 8.2 CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N

nvd · CVE-2026-41326

Published

Kata Containers is an open source project focusing on a standard implementation of lightweight Virtual Machines (VMs) that perform like containers. From v3.4.0 to v3.28.0, an oversight in the CopyFile policy (and perhaps the CopyFile handle…

Kata Containers is an open source project focusing on a standard implementation of lightweight Virtual Machines (VMs) that perform like containers. From v3.4.0 to v3.28.0, an oversight in the CopyFile policy (and perhaps the CopyFile handler) allows untrusted hosts to write to arbitrary locations inside the guest workload image. This can be used to overwrite binaries inside the guest and exfiltrate data from containers; even those running inside CVMs. This vulnerability is fixed in v3.29.0.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Modified

Weakness classifications: CWE-61 · CWE-1220

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-04-24T19:17:12.253

lastModified: 2026-11-11T23:10:00.263

2 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:katacontainers:confidential_containers:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:katacontainers:kata_containers:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

Source published
24 Apr 2026 19:17:12 UTC
Source modified
11 Nov 2026 23:10:00 UTC
Saved here
12 Nov 2026 15:18:55 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 8.2 CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary · 8.2 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

CVSS 3.1 · 0b0ca135-0b70-47e7-9f44-1890c2a1c46c · Secondary · 8.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

osv · GHSA-q49m-57vm-c8cc

Published

Kata Container has CopyFile Policy Subversion via Symlinks

### Summary An oversight in the CopyFile policy (and perhaps the CopyFile handler) allows untrusted hosts to write to arbitrary locations inside the guest workload image. This can be used to overwrite binaries inside the guest and exfiltrate data from containers; even those running inside CVMs. ### Details Here is the policy that covers CopyFile requests. ``` CopyFileRequest if { print("CopyFileRequest: input.path =", input.path) check_directory_traversal(input.path) some regex1 in policy_data.request_defaults.CopyFileRequest regex2 := replace(regex1, "$(sfprefix)", policy_data.common.sfprefix) regex3 := replace(regex2, "$(cpath)", policy_data.common.cpath) regex4 := replace(regex3, "$(bundle-id)", "[a-z0-9]{64}") print("CopyFileRequest: regex4 =", regex4) regex.match(regex4, input.path) print("CopyFileRequest: true") } ``` This checks that files are being copied to `policy_data.common.cpath`, which is typically set to `/run/kata-containers/shared/containers`. In other words, you're allowed to copy files to anywhere inside the shared dir. For reference, here is the CopyFile message. Note that none of the other fields are check in the policy. ``` message CopyFileRequest { // Path is the destination file in the guest. It must be absolute, // canonical and below /run. string path = 1; // FileSize is the expected file size, for security reasons write operations // are made in a temporary file, once it has the expected size, it's moved // to the destination path. int64 file_size = 2; // FileMode is the file mode. uint32 file_mode = 3; // DirMode is the mode for the parent directories of destination path. uint32 dir_mode = 4; // Uid is the numeric user id. int32 uid = 5; // Gid is the numeric group id. int32 gid = 6; // Offset for the next write operation. int64 offset = 7; // Data to write in the destination file. bytes data = 8; } ``` In addition to copying files directly, the Kata Agent supports creating symlinks via the CopyFile API. In this case the `path` is the symlink name and the `data` field contains the symlink target. Given that the policy only checks the path, an attacker can craft a CopyFile request that results in a symlink going from any location into the shared dir. ### PoC The above primitive can be used to to write arbitrary data into container images (pulled in the guest or otherwise). A couple steps are required. First, identify some target path in the guest image. This could be a binary that will be called by the workload. You could also experiment with overwriting other stuff. Create a symlink from this binary to the shared dir. The path/link name should be in the shared dir and the data/target should point to the path of the target file inside the container image in the guest fs. Create a second CopyFile request to copy your data from the host into the symlink you just created in the shared dir. This will then be propagated into the image. You may want to restart the container to ensure that your new binary is invoked. ### Impact Anyone who is using the upstream `genpolicy` implementation and expects it to prevent host access to container images is vulnerable This includes Confidential Containers workloads where the trust model explicitly forbids this type of access. If you have your own policy implementation you may or may not be vulnerable. If you do not care about protecting the image from the host (e.g. you are using unprotected host pull), you are not vulnerable. This was individually discovered and reported by - @calonso-nv - @fikriwahab - @kodareef5

Source published
4 May 2026 19:32:20 UTC
Source modified
25 Jun 2026 23:11:30 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N

Publisher rating · HIGH

osv · GO-2026-5563

Published

Kata Container has CopyFile Policy Subversion via Symlinks in github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers

Kata Container has CopyFile Policy Subversion via Symlinks in github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers

Source published
25 Jun 2026 22:34:34 UTC
Source modified
25 Jun 2026 23:01:30 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 20 Nov 00:28 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 270 fully read · documentation 469/469 current