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Marko: XSS via case-insensitive script/style closing tag bypass in runtime HTML escaping

CVSS 3.1 6.4 MEDIUMEUVD CVSS 3.1 6.4 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 6.4 MEDIUMCVSS_V3 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by marko 5.38.36Fixed by @marko/runtime-tags 6.0.164KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-41591

Published

Marko is a declarative, HTML-based language for building web apps. Prior to marko version 5.38.36 and prior to @marko/runtime-tags 6.0.164, when dynamic text is interpolated into a <script> or <style> tag the Marko runtime failed to prevent tag breakout when the closing tag used non-lowercase casing. An attacker able to place input inside a <script> or <style> block could break out of the tag with </SCRIPT>, </Style>, etc. and inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript, resulting in cross-site scripting. This issue has been patched in marko version 5.38.36 and @marko/runtime-tags 6.0.164.

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euvd · EUVD-2026-28790

Published

Marko is a declarative, HTML-based language for building web apps. Prior to marko version 5.38.36 and prior to @marko/runtime-tags 6.0.164, when dynamic text is interpolated into a <script> or <style> tag the Marko runtime failed to prevent tag breakout when the closing tag used non-lowercase casing. An attacker able to place input inside a <script> or <style> block could break out of the tag with </SCRIPT>, </Style>, etc. and inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript, resulting in cross-site scripting. This issue has been patched in marko version 5.38.36 and @marko/runtime-tags 6.0.164.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-41591

Published

Marko is a declarative, HTML-based language for building web apps. Prior to marko version 5.38.36 and prior to @marko/runtime-tags 6.0.164, when dynamic text is interpolated into a <script> or <style> tag the Marko runtime failed to prevent tag breakout when the closing tag used non-lowercase casing. An attacker able to place input inside a <script> or <style> block could break out of the tag with </SCRIPT>, </Style>, etc. and inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript, resulting in cross-site scripting. This issue has been patched in marko version 5.38.36 and @marko/runtime-tags 6.0.164.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-x9fj-57fh-c8wq

Published

### Summary When dynamic text is interpolated into a `<script>` or `<style>` tag the Marko runtime failed to prevent tag breakout when the closing tag used non-lowercase casing. An attacker able to place input inside a `<script>` or `<style>` block could break out of the tag with `</SCRIPT>`, `</Style>`, etc. and inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript, resulting in cross-site scripting. ### Details The affected helpers used case-sensitive regular expressions to detect attempts at closing the surrounding tag: ```js // packages/runtime-tags/src/html/content.ts const unsafeScriptReg = /<\/script/g; const unsafeStyleReg = /<\/style/g; // packages/runtime-class/src/runtime/html/helpers/escape-script-placeholder.js const unsafeCharsReg = /<\/script/g; // packages/runtime-class/src/runtime/html/helpers/escape-style-placeholder.js const unsafeCharsReg = /<\/style/g; ``` HTML tag names are case-insensitive in the browser parser, so inputs such as `</SCRIPT>`, `</Script>`, or `</sTyLe>` were not matched by these regexes and passed through the helpers unchanged. A browser rendering the output treats the mixed-case end tag as a valid closing tag, terminating the script or style context, and then parses anything that follows as HTML. The Marko compiler routes interpolated values inside `<script>` and `<style>` tags through these helpers automatically (see `native-tag.ts:1080-1085`), so application code following the framework's conventions had no way to detect or compensate for the gap. ### PoC ```marko $ const userCode = "</SCRIPT><script>alert(1)//"; <script> const data = ${JSON.stringify(userCode)}; </script> ``` Would yield the following: ```html <script>const data = "</SCRIPT><script>alert(1)//";</script> ``` Which is then parsed in any WHATWG-compliant browser as: ```html <script>const data = "</script> <script>alert(1)//";</script> ``` ### Impact Cross-site scripting. Any Marko template that explicitly interpolates untrusted data inside a `<script>` or `<style>` block is affected. Stored XSS is trivial if the value originates from any persisted user input (username, profile bio, comment body, etc.) that is later embedded in a script tag during rendering. Exploitation yields arbitrary JavaScript execution in the victim's browser, enabling session token theft, account takeover, and arbitrary actions as the victim. Since the internal `_escape_script` and `_escape_style` helpers are the framework's designated defense against script/style tag breakout, applications following standard Marko patterns had no obvious reason to add a second layer of sanitization. This does not affect scripts or hydration state serialized by Marko itself — only templates that explicitly interpolate untrusted values inside a <script> or <style> tag. ### Patch Commit `19d4b37d0` — `fix: html script, style, and comment escaping`. ```diff - const unsafeScriptReg = /<\/script/g; + const unsafeScriptReg = /<\/script/gi; - const unsafeStyleReg = /<\/style/g; + const unsafeStyleReg = /<\/style/gi; ``` The same commit also introduced an `_escape_comment` helper and corresponding `escape-comment-placeholder.js`, hardening HTML comment escaping as a related preventative fix. Test fixtures were added under `escape-script-case`, `escape-style-case`, and `escape-comment`. ### Workarounds Upgrade to the patched release. As a short-term mitigation on affected versions, pre-sanitize any untrusted data before it reaches a template position rendered inside a `<script>` or `<style>` tag — e.g. normalize `</script`, `</style`, and their mixed-case variants before interpolation, or avoid direct interpolation of untrusted values inside these tags entirely.

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Affected versions, risk and source history

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CVE-2026-41591 · CVE overview and exploitation status

EUVD-2026-28790

GHSA-x9fj-57fh-c8wq

cve-program · CVE-2026-41591

euvd · EUVD-2026-28790

nvd · CVE-2026-41591

osv · GHSA-x9fj-57fh-c8wq

Related changes

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No related changes are available here.

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Sources read 20 Nov 19:02 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 270 fully read · documentation 469/469 current