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Inngest TypeScript SDK exposes environment variables via serve() handler on unhandled HTTP methods

Collected exploitation and prediction evidence

Risk source coverage

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

cve-program · CVE-2026-42047

Published

Inngest is a platform for running event-driven and scheduled background functions with queueing, retries, and step orchestration. Versions 3.22.0 through 3.53.1 contain a vulnerability that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to exfiltrate environment variables from the host process via the serve() HTTP handler. The serve() handler implements GET, POST, and PUT methods. Requests using PATCH, OPTIONS, or DELETE fall through to a generic handler that returns diagnostic information. A change introduced in v3.22.0 caused this diagnostic response to include the contents of process.env, exposing any secrets, API keys, or credentials present in the environment. An application is vulnerable if its serve() endpoint is reachable via PATCH, OPTIONS, or DELETE requests, which is common in setups like Next.js Pages Router or Express's app.use(...). Not affected are Next.js App Router handlers that export only GET, POST, and PUT, and applications using the connect worker method. This issue has been fixed in version 3.54.0. To work around this issue if upgrading is not immediately possible, restrict the serve() endpoint at the framework or reverse-proxy layer to accept only GET, POST, and PUT. The Inngest serve() endpoint does not require any other HTTP methods.

Source published
7 May 2026 20:38:36 UTC
Source modified
8 May 2026 13:52:50 UTC
Observed here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · 8.6 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

euvd · EUVD-2026-28441

Published

Inngest is a platform for running event-driven and scheduled background functions with queueing, retries, and step orchestration. Versions 3.22.0 through 3.53.1 contain a vulnerability that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to exfiltrate environment variables from the host process via the serve() HTTP handler. The serve() handler implements GET, POST, and PUT methods. Requests using PATCH, OPTIONS, or DELETE fall through to a generic handler that returns diagnostic information. A change introduced in v3.22.0 caused this diagnostic response to include the contents of process.env, exposing any secrets, API keys, or credentials present in the environment. An application is vulnerable if its serve() endpoint is reachable via PATCH, OPTIONS, or DELETE requests, which is common in setups like Next.js Pages Router or Express's app.use(...). Not affected are Next.js App Router handlers that export only GET, POST, and PUT, and applications using the connect worker method. This issue has been fixed in version 3.54.0. To work around this issue if upgrading is not immediately possible, restrict the serve() endpoint at the framework or reverse-proxy layer to accept only GET, POST, and PUT. The Inngest serve() endpoint does not require any other HTTP methods.

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: May 7, 2026, 8:38:36 PM

dateUpdated: May 8, 2026, 1:52:50 PM

Source published
May 7, 2026, 8:38:36 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
May 8, 2026, 1:52:50 PM (timezone not stated)
Observed here
1 Nov 2026 07:11:31 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 8.6 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

nvd · CVE-2026-42047

Published

Inngest is a platform for running event-driven and scheduled background functions with queueing, retries, and step orchestration. Versions 3.22.0 through 3.53.1 contain a vulnerability that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to exfiltrate environment variables from the host process via the serve() HTTP handler. The serve() handler implements GET, POST, and PUT methods. Requests using PATCH, OPTIONS, or DELETE fall through to a generic handler that returns diagnostic information. A change introduced in v3.22.0 caused this diagnostic response to include the contents of process.env, exposing any secrets, API keys, or credentials present in the environment. An application is vulnerable if its serve() endpoint is reachable via PATCH, OPTIONS, or DELETE requests, which is common in setups like Next.js Pages Router or Express's app.use(...). Not affected are Next.js App Router handlers that export only GET, POST, and PUT, and applications using the connect worker method. This issue has been fixed in version 3.54.0. To work around this issue if upgrading is not immediately possible, restrict the serve() endpoint at the framework or reverse-proxy layer to accept only GET, POST, and PUT. The Inngest serve() endpoint does not require any other HTTP methods.

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Analyzed

Weakness classifications: CWE-200 · CWE-497

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-05-07T21:16:29.980

lastModified: 2026-10-26T20:10:00.160

1 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:inngest:inngest:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

Source published
7 May 2026 21:16:29 UTC
Source modified
26 Oct 2026 20:10:00 UTC
Observed here
27 Oct 2026 11:12:01 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 8.6 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

osv · GHSA-2jf5-6wwv-vhxx

Published

# Summary A vulnerability in the Inngest TypeScript SDK versions `3.22.0` through `3.53.1` allows unauthenticated remote attackers to exfiltrate environment variables from the host process via the `serve()` HTTP handler. The `serve()` handler implements `GET`, `POST`, and `PUT` methods. Requests using `PATCH`, `OPTIONS`, or `DELETE` fall through to a generic handler that returns diagnostic information. A change introduced in `v3.22.0` caused this diagnostic response to include the contents of `process.env`, exposing any secrets, API keys, or credentials present in the environment. # Who is affected An application is vulnerable if **all** of the following are true: - It uses `inngest` SDK version `>= 3.22.0, <= 3.53.1` (inclusive) - Its `serve()` endpoint is reachable via `PATCH`, `OPTIONS`, or `DELETE` requests. Please check your framework's implementation for the serve handler ([documentation](https://www.inngest.com/docs/learn/serving-inngest-functions)) to asses whether it handles these HTTP methods. Common vulnerable configurations include: - Next.js Pages Router, which forwards all HTTP methods to the handler. - Express via `app.use('/api/inngest', serve(...))`, which routes `PATCH` and `OPTIONS` to the handler by default. The following are **not** affected: - Next.js App Router handlers that explicitly export only `GET`, `POST`, and `PUT`. - Applications using the `connect` worker method. - SDK versions `< 3.22.0` and `>= 3.54.0`, including all `4.x` releases. The vulnerability was responsibly disclosed by an Inngest user. At this time, there are no known reports of exploitation. # Remediation 1. Upgrade to `[email protected]` or later. The fix is backwards compatible with the `3.x` release line. The `4.x` line is also unaffected. 2. Rotate any secrets that were presence in environment variables (`process.env`) within affected environments including Inngest signing keys and event keys 3. Search logs for any requests to your `serve` endpoints using the `PATCH`, `OPTIONS`, `DELETE` http methods to assess if any environment variables may have been exposed. ## Additional recommendations Users on platforms with long-lived deployments (e.g. Vercel, Cloudflare Workers) should be aware that prior deployments remain reachable at their immutable URLs and may continue to expose the vulnerability even after a new deployment is promoted. For example, Vercel offers security features such as "[Deployment Protection](https://vercel.com/docs/deployment-protection#standard-protection)" and [the ability to delete older deployments](https://vercel.com/kb/guide/how-do-i-delete-an-individual-deployment) which can help immediately mitigate impact. For additional security, users can also adjust firewall or proxy rules to only allow requests to their `serve` endpoint from Inngest IP addresses available here: http://inngest.com/ips-v4, http://inngest.com/ips-v6 ### Workarounds If upgrading is not immediately possible, restrict the `serve()` endpoint at the framework or reverse-proxy layer to accept only `GET`, `POST`, and `PUT`. The Inngest `serve()` endpoint does not require any other HTTP methods. ### Resources - Rotating Inngest keys: https://www.inngest.com/docs/platform/manage/rotating-keys - Inngest signing keys: https://www.inngest.com/docs/platform/signing-keys - Inngest event keys: https://www.inngest.com/docs/events/creating-an-event-key - Inngest security best practices: https://www.inngest.com/docs/learn/security ### Credits - Ben Hylak - an independent security researcher, discovered and responsibly disclosed the vulnerability.

Source published
5 May 2026 18:13:52 UTC
Source modified
11 May 2026 13:53:13 UTC
Observed here
24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

Publisher rating · HIGH

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 2 Nov 15:22 UTC · 275 of 275 readable · 272 fully read · documentation 469/469 current