apko allows users to build and publish OCI container images built from apk packages. From version 0.14.8 to before version 1.2.5, a crafted .apk could install a TypeSymlink tar entry whose target pointed outside the build root, and a subsequent directory-creation or file-write entry in the same or later archive could traverse that symlink to reach host paths the build user could write to. This issue has been patched in version 1.2.5.
apko allows users to build and publish OCI container images built from apk packages. From version 0.14.8 to before version 1.2.5, a crafted .apk could install a TypeSymlink tar entry whose target pointed outside the build root, and a subsequent directory-creation or file-write entry in the same or later archive could traverse that symlink to reach host paths the build user could write to. This issue has been patched in version 1.2.5.
apko allows users to build and publish OCI container images built from apk packages. From version 0.14.8 to before version 1.2.5, a crafted .apk could install a TypeSymlink tar entry whose target pointed outside the build root, and a subsequent directory-creation or file-write entry in the same or later archive could traverse that symlink to reach host paths the build user could write to. This issue has been patched in version 1.2.5.
### Impact
A crafted `.apk` could install a `TypeSymlink` tar entry whose target pointed outside the build root, and a subsequent directory-creation or file-write entry in the same or later archive could traverse that symlink to reach host paths the build user could write to. The root cause was the `sanitizePath` helper in `pkg/apk/fs/rwosfs.go`, which rejected only lexical `..` traversal and did not resolve or refuse symlinks. Every disk-backed `DirFS` method that handed its caller-supplied path to a symlink-following stdlib call — `ReadFile`, `WriteFile`, `Chmod`, `Chown`, `Chtimes`, `MkdirAll`, `Mkdir`, and `Mknod` — was affected. The reachable primitive from a malicious APK during tar extraction is the `MkdirAll` / `Mkdir` / `WriteFile` chain via `apko build-cpio` and disk-backed consumers such as `melange`; the remaining sinks are reachable by direct callers of the `pkg/apk/fs` package. The in-memory `tarfs` install path used by `apko build`, `apko publish`, and `apko build-minirootfs` is not affected.
### Patches
Fixed in apko **v1.2.5** by [#2187](https://github.com/chainguard-dev/apko/pull/2187) / commit [f5a96e1](https://github.com/chainguard-dev/apko/commit/f5a96e1299ac81c7ea9441705ec467688086f442), which scopes all `DirFS` operations through a Go 1.24 `*os.Root`. The `sanitizePath` helper has been removed; `*os.Root` refuses traversal via `..`, absolute-target symlinks, relative-target symlinks, and hardlinks by construction. Regression tests in `pkg/apk/apk/path_traversal_test.go` cover each composite primitive.
### Workarounds
No complete workaround. Operators running pre-1.2.5 apko (or downstream tools such as melange that embed pre-1.2.5 `pkg/apk/fs`) should upgrade. Consuming only APKs from trusted, signed sources reduces but does not eliminate exposure.
### Resources
- https://github.com/chainguard-dev/apko/pull/2187
- https://github.com/chainguard-dev/apko/commit/f5a96e1299ac81c7ea9441705ec467688086f442
- https://github.com/chainguard-dev/apko/releases/tag/v1.2.5
- Related: GHSA-5g94-c2wx-8pxw (CVE-2026-25121) — prior lexical `..` traversal fix
### Credits
apko thanks Oleh Konko ([@1seal](https://github.com/1seal) from [1seal.org](https://1seal.org/)) for the initial report of the symlink-escape class, and to [@Xh081iX](https://github.com/Xh081iX) for a follow-up set of reports covering additional reachable primitives (`ReadFile`, `Chmod`/`Chown`, `Mknod`, `MkdirAll`/`Mkdir`) that shaped the comprehensive fix.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: May 9, 2026, 7:24:48 PM
dateUpdated: May 11, 2026, 5:11:40 PM
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-22 · CWE-59
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-05-09T20:16:29.420
lastModified: 2026-07-24T21:10:00.143
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.