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apko allows users to build and publish OCI container images built from apk packages. Prior to version 1.2.7,…

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 7.5 HIGHCheck source for fixed versionsKEV status unknown

Historical advisory recorded 25 Oct 2026 10:17:15 UTC. Read the latest advisory.

nvd · CVE-2026-42575

Published

apko allows users to build and publish OCI container images built from apk packages. Prior to version 1.2.7, apko verifies the signature on APKINDEX.tar.gz but never compares individually downloaded .apk packages against the checksum recorded in the signed index. The checksum is parsed and available via ChecksumString(), and the downloaded package control hash is computed, but the two values are never compared in getPackageImpl(). Mismatched packages are silently accepted. An attacker who can substitute download responses (compromised mirror, HTTP repository, poisoned CDN cache) can install arbitrary packages into built images. This issue has been patched in version 1.2.7.

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

nvd · CVE-2026-42575

Published

apko allows users to build and publish OCI container images built from apk packages. Prior to version 1.2.7, apko verifies the signature on APKINDEX.tar.gz but never compares individually downloaded .apk packages against the checksum record…

apko allows users to build and publish OCI container images built from apk packages. Prior to version 1.2.7, apko verifies the signature on APKINDEX.tar.gz but never compares individually downloaded .apk packages against the checksum recorded in the signed index. The checksum is parsed and available via ChecksumString(), and the downloaded package control hash is computed, but the two values are never compared in getPackageImpl(). Mismatched packages are silently accepted. An attacker who can substitute download responses (compromised mirror, HTTP repository, poisoned CDN cache) can install arbitrary packages into built images. This issue has been patched in version 1.2.7.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-345 · CWE-494

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-05-09T20:16:29.573

lastModified: 2026-07-24T20:10:00.147

Source published
9 May 2026 20:16:29 UTC
Source modified
24 Jul 2026 20:10:00 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 10:17:15 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

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Sources read 15 Nov 13:16 UTC · 255 of 275 readable · 250 fully read · documentation 469/469 current