Flowise: SSRF Protection Bypass via Direct node-fetch / axios Usage (Patch Enforcement Failure)
Collected exploitation and prediction evidence
Risk source coverageCISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.
No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.
cve-program · CVE-2026-43995
PublishedFlowise is a drag & drop user interface to build a customized large language model flow. Prior to 3.1.0, multiple tool implementations directly import and invoke raw HTTP clients (node-fetch, axios) instead of using the secured wrapper. These tools include (1) OpenAPIToolkit/OpenAPIToolkit.ts, (2) WebScraperTool/WebScraperTool.ts, (3) MCP/core.ts, and (4) Arxiv/core.ts. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.0.
- Source published
- 11 May 2026 17:49:42 UTC
- Source modified
- 11 May 2026 18:21:09 UTC
- Observed here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS 4.0 · 5.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N
euvd · EUVD-2026-29175
PublishedFlowise is a drag & drop user interface to build a customized large language model flow. Prior to 3.1.0, multiple tool implementations directly import and invoke raw HTTP clients (node-fetch, axios) instead of using the secured wrapper. These tools include (1) OpenAPIToolkit/OpenAPIToolkit.ts, (2) WebScraperTool/WebScraperTool.ts, (3) MCP/core.ts, and (4) Arxiv/core.ts. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.0.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: May 11, 2026, 5:49:42 PM
dateUpdated: May 11, 2026, 6:21:09 PM
- Source published
- May 11, 2026, 5:49:42 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- May 11, 2026, 6:21:09 PM (timezone not stated)
- Observed here
- 7 Nov 2026 09:37:41 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 5.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N
nvd · CVE-2026-43995
PublishedFlowise is a drag & drop user interface to build a customized large language model flow. Prior to 3.1.0, multiple tool implementations directly import and invoke raw HTTP clients (node-fetch, axios) instead of using the secured wrapper. These tools include (1) OpenAPIToolkit/OpenAPIToolkit.ts, (2) WebScraperTool/WebScraperTool.ts, (3) MCP/core.ts, and (4) Arxiv/core.ts. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.0.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Analyzed
Weakness classifications: CWE-918
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-05-11T18:16:37.660
lastModified: 2026-10-26T18:10:00.173
1 source CPE criteria · context only
- cpe:2.3:a:flowiseai:flowise:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
- Source published
- 11 May 2026 18:16:37 UTC
- Source modified
- 26 Oct 2026 18:10:00 UTC
- Observed here
- 27 Oct 2026 11:12:09 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 5.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary · 9.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
osv · GHSA-qqvm-66q4-vf5c
Published### Summary Flowise introduced SSRF protections through a centralized HTTP security wrapper (`httpSecurity.ts`) that implements deny-list validation and IP pinning logic. However, multiple tool implementations directly import and invoke raw HTTP clients (`node-fetch`, `axios`Instead of using the secured wrapper. Because enforcement is neither mandatory nor centralized, these tools bypass SSRF mitigation entirely, restoring full SSRF capability even after the patch. This issue is distinct from specification trust issues and represents incomplete mitigation of previously addressed SSRF vulnerabilities. ### Details **Intended Security Model:** All outbound HTTP requests should pass through the centralized validation layer implemented in: ``` packages/components/src/httpSecurity.ts ``` This layer performs: - `HTTP_DENY_LIST` enforcement - IP resolution validation - IP pinning - Loopback blocking **Observed Implementation Gap:** Multiple tools bypass this layer and import HTTP libraries directly. Examples include: - `packages/components/nodes/tools/OpenAPIToolkit/OpenAPIToolkit.ts` - `packages/components/nodes/tools/WebScraperTool/WebScraperTool.ts` - `packages/components/nodes/tools/MCP/core.ts` - `packages/components/nodes/tools/Arxiv/core.ts` These files directly execute: ``` importfetchfrom'node-fetch' ``` or invoke `axios` without passing through the centralized validation wrapper. Because there is no global interceptor or enforcement mechanism, outbound requests in these components are executed without SSRF validation. This renders the mitigation introduced in GHSA-2x8m-83vc-6wv4 incomplete. ### Root Cause Security enforcement is not centralized. Outbound request validation depends on voluntary usage of a wrapper function rather than being structurally enforced. Because direct imports of HTTP clients are allowed, the mitigation is easily bypassed. This is an architectural enforcement failure rather than a single implementation bug. ### PoC Even when an administrator configures: ``` HTTP_DENY_LIST=169.254.0.0/16,127.0.0.0/8 ``` The following attack succeeds if a vulnerable tool is enabled: **Chat Prompt:** ``` Use the Web Scraper tool to retrieve: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ ``` Execution flow: 1. The LLM triggers `WebScraperTool`. 2. The tool calls raw `fetch()` directly. 3. No `httpSecurity.ts` validation is applied. 4. The request reaches the metadata endpoint. 5. The response is returned to the chat context. This demonstrates that SSRF protection is opt-in rather than enforced. ### Impact **Severity:** Critical (CVSS v3.1: 9.1 – AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N) This issue: - Completely bypasses the centralized SSRF mitigation. - Allows access to internal network resources. - Enables the exploitation of cloud metadata and credential theft. - Invalidates the security assumptions of the recent patch. Any deployment enabling affected tools remains vulnerable. ### Recommended Remediation 1. Refactor all tools to use the centralized `secureFetch()` wrapper. 2. Add ESLint `no-restricted-imports` rules to prohibit the direct usage of `node-fetch` or `axios` in tool components. 3. Consider implementing a single internal HTTP client abstraction layer. 4. Apply network-level egress filtering as defense-in-depth.
- Source published
- 16 Apr 2026 21:23:03 UTC
- Source modified
- 13 May 2026 14:17:49 UTC
- Observed here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N
Publisher rating · MODERATE