Elo: Code injection in Elo backends via unvalidated emission of programmatic AST fields
cve-program · CVE-2026-44265
PublishedElo is a purely functional expression language for no-code tools. Prior to 1.0.1, Elo's programmatic AST API accepts arbitrary values from JSON-deserialized input, plugin output, or other untyped sources and interpolates them into generated JavaScript, Ruby, Python, or SQL without runtime syntax validation. The affected fields are int_literal / float_literal .value, variable.name, member_access.property, object_literal keys, datapath segments, lambda.params[].name, and the SQL let binding name. Crafted values become executable expressions or identifiers, allowing arbitrary code execution in JavaScript, Ruby, and Python targets and SQL injection in the SQL target. This programmatic AST-object path is distinct from the plain-string constructor-chain sandbox escape. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.1.
Read the publisher's advisoryeuvd · EUVD-2026-116108
PublishedElo is a purely functional expression language for no-code tools. Prior to 1.0.1, Elo's programmatic AST API accepts arbitrary values from JSON-deserialized input, plugin output, or other untyped sources and interpolates them into generated JavaScript, Ruby, Python, or SQL without runtime syntax validation. The affected fields are int_literal / float_literal .value, variable.name, member_access.property, object_literal keys, datapath segments, lambda.params[].name, and the SQL let binding name. Crafted values become executable expressions or identifiers, allowing arbitrary code execution in JavaScript, Ruby, and Python targets and SQL injection in the SQL target. This programmatic AST-object path is distinct from the plain-string constructor-chain sandbox escape. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.1.
Read the publisher's advisorynvd · CVE-2026-44265
PublishedElo is a purely functional expression language for no-code tools. Prior to 1.0.1, Elo's programmatic AST API accepts arbitrary values from JSON-deserialized input, plugin output, or other untyped sources and interpolates them into generated JavaScript, Ruby, Python, or SQL without runtime syntax validation. The affected fields are int_literal / float_literal .value, variable.name, member_access.property, object_literal keys, datapath segments, lambda.params[].name, and the SQL let binding name. Crafted values become executable expressions or identifiers, allowing arbitrary code execution in JavaScript, Ruby, and Python targets and SQL injection in the SQL target. This programmatic AST-object path is distinct from the plain-string constructor-chain sandbox escape. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.1.
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GHSA-x9rp-7wh3-2rj5
Published### Summary Elo's programmatic AST API accepts arbitrary values in many node fields without runtime type or syntax validation. Each backend's emit stage interpolates those values straight into the generated source with no escape pass. An integrator that populates the AST from JSON-deserialised input, plugin output, or any other untyped source therefore exposes a code-injection primitive that flows through to the emitted JavaScript, Ruby, Python, or SQL. The same pattern was previously addressed in **0.9.7 (2026-01-27)**, which patched the date/datetime/duration literal emitters via `JSON.stringify()` after a report by **naoyashiga**. This advisory generalises that fix to the remaining AST surface — at least 23 emission sites across six node-field categories and four backends. ### Vulnerable sinks Each row is a category of sinks that share the same shape: TypeScript signature erased at runtime → AST-API consumer passes a crafted value → emit interpolates the value verbatim. | # | AST field | Affected backends | Resulting injection | |---|---|---|---| | 1 | `int_literal` / `float_literal` `.value` | JS, Ruby, Python, SQL | Arbitrary expression in the emitted numeric position (RCE on JS/Ruby/Python; SQL expression injection) | | 2 | `variable.name` | JS, Ruby, Python, SQL | Identifier-position injection; on SQL, raw SQL injection because undefined identifiers are intentionally emitted as column references | | 3 | `member_access.property` | JS, Ruby, Python, SQL | Property access escaped into expression (RCE) | | 4 | `object_literal` key | JS, Ruby, SQL | Computed-key / extra-property injection (RCE on JS/Ruby; SQL injection) | | 5 | `datapath` segment | JS, Ruby, Python, SQL | Ruby symbol-list injection allows backtick shell exec; SQL string-segment unquoted in single-quote context allows SQL injection | | 6 | `lambda.params[].name` | JS, Ruby, Python | Parameter-list structural injection (RCE) | | 7 | SQL `let` binding `name` | SQL | Identifier injection in `… AS <name>` clause | ### Proof of Concept End-to-end execution was verified at commit `749af7b` for representative cases per backend. Examples: **Numeric literal injection (all four backends).** Feeding the following AST through `compileToJavaScript` emits a live `console.log` on call: ```js { type: 'literal', value: "(console.log('PWN_INT_JS'),1)" } // emits: (function(_) { return (console.log('PWN_INT_JS'),1); })(null); ``` The same AST against Ruby with `"(system('touch /tmp/pwn_int_ruby'); 1)"` creates the file; Python with `"(print('PWN_INT_PY') or 1)"` prints the sentinel; SQL emits the raw string into the numeric position. **SQL `variable.name` injection:** ```js { type: 'variable', name: "1; DROP TABLE users; --" } // emits: 1; DROP TABLE users; -- ``` **Ruby `datapath` segment shell-exec:** ```js { type: 'datapath', segments: ["a, system(`touch /tmp/pwn_dp_ruby`)"] } // emits: [:a, system(`touch /tmp/pwn_dp_ruby`)] ``` All ten end-to-end cases are automated in the `ast-exec.js` / `ast-exec2.js` scripts attached to the original report; each `console.log` and sentinel file was observed. ### Independence from GHSA #2 This finding is independent of **GHSA #2** (the `.constructor.constructor` sandbox escape). That report covers payloads delivered as plain Elo *strings* through the parser; the present advisory covers payloads delivered as AST *objects* through the programmatic API. The two threat models do not overlap: GHSA #2's identifier regex `^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*$` accepts `constructor` (and is the right behaviour for a parser), while the present advisory adds runtime validation at every backend emit site so that AST-API consumers cannot inject arbitrary text into emitted source.
Read the publisher's advisoryAffected versions, risk and source history
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cve-program · CVE-2026-44265
PublishedElo: Code injection in Elo backends via unvalidated emission of programmatic AST fields
Elo is a purely functional expression language for no-code tools. Prior to 1.0.1, Elo's programmatic AST API accepts arbitrary values from JSON-deserialized input, plugin output, or other untyped sources and interpolates them into generated JavaScript, Ruby, Python, or SQL without runtime syntax validation. The affected fields are int_literal / float_literal .value, variable.name, member_access.property, object_literal keys, datapath segments, lambda.params[].name, and the SQL let binding name. Crafted values become executable expressions or identifiers, allowing arbitrary code execution in JavaScript, Ruby, and Python targets and SQL injection in the SQL target. This programmatic AST-object path is distinct from the plain-string constructor-chain sandbox escape. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.1.
- Source published
- 3 Nov 2026 17:47:03 UTC
- Source modified
- 9 Nov 2026 15:30:14 UTC
- Saved here
- 9 Nov 2026 17:02:10 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · 7.4 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
euvd · EUVD-2026-116108
PublishedElo is a purely functional expression language for no-code tools. Prior to 1.0.1, Elo's programmatic AST API accepts arbitrary values from JSON-deserialized input, plugin output, or other untyped sources and interpolates them into generated…
Elo is a purely functional expression language for no-code tools. Prior to 1.0.1, Elo's programmatic AST API accepts arbitrary values from JSON-deserialized input, plugin output, or other untyped sources and interpolates them into generated JavaScript, Ruby, Python, or SQL without runtime syntax validation. The affected fields are int_literal / float_literal .value, variable.name, member_access.property, object_literal keys, datapath segments, lambda.params[].name, and the SQL let binding name. Crafted values become executable expressions or identifiers, allowing arbitrary code execution in JavaScript, Ruby, and Python targets and SQL injection in the SQL target. This programmatic AST-object path is distinct from the plain-string constructor-chain sandbox escape. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.1.
Additional publisher context
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Nov 3, 2026, 5:47:03 PM
dateUpdated: Nov 9, 2026, 3:30:14 PM
- Source published
- Nov 3, 2026, 5:47:03 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Nov 9, 2026, 3:30:14 PM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 13 Nov 2026 22:08:39 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 7.4 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
nvd · CVE-2026-44265
PublishedElo is a purely functional expression language for no-code tools. Prior to 1.0.1, Elo's programmatic AST API accepts arbitrary values from JSON-deserialized input, plugin output, or other untyped sources and interpolates them into generated…
Elo is a purely functional expression language for no-code tools. Prior to 1.0.1, Elo's programmatic AST API accepts arbitrary values from JSON-deserialized input, plugin output, or other untyped sources and interpolates them into generated JavaScript, Ruby, Python, or SQL without runtime syntax validation. The affected fields are int_literal / float_literal .value, variable.name, member_access.property, object_literal keys, datapath segments, lambda.params[].name, and the SQL let binding name. Crafted values become executable expressions or identifiers, allowing arbitrary code execution in JavaScript, Ruby, and Python targets and SQL injection in the SQL target. This programmatic AST-object path is distinct from the plain-string constructor-chain sandbox escape. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.1.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-20 · CWE-89 · CWE-94 · CWE-749
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-11-03T18:18:02.760
lastModified: 2026-11-12T20:07:11.090
- Source published
- 3 Nov 2026 18:18:02 UTC
- Source modified
- 12 Nov 2026 20:07:11 UTC
- Saved here
- 13 Nov 2026 22:01:12 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.4 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
osv · GHSA-x9rp-7wh3-2rj5
PublishedElo backends have code injection via unvalidated emission of programmatic AST fields
### Summary Elo's programmatic AST API accepts arbitrary values in many node fields without runtime type or syntax validation. Each backend's emit stage interpolates those values straight into the generated source with no escape pass. An integrator that populates the AST from JSON-deserialised input, plugin output, or any other untyped source therefore exposes a code-injection primitive that flows through to the emitted JavaScript, Ruby, Python, or SQL. The same pattern was previously addressed in **0.9.7 (2026-01-27)**, which patched the date/datetime/duration literal emitters via `JSON.stringify()` after a report by **naoyashiga**. This advisory generalises that fix to the remaining AST surface — at least 23 emission sites across six node-field categories and four backends. ### Vulnerable sinks Each row is a category of sinks that share the same shape: TypeScript signature erased at runtime → AST-API consumer passes a crafted value → emit interpolates the value verbatim. | # | AST field | Affected backends | Resulting injection | |---|---|---|---| | 1 | `int_literal` / `float_literal` `.value` | JS, Ruby, Python, SQL | Arbitrary expression in the emitted numeric position (RCE on JS/Ruby/Python; SQL expression injection) | | 2 | `variable.name` | JS, Ruby, Python, SQL | Identifier-position injection; on SQL, raw SQL injection because undefined identifiers are intentionally emitted as column references | | 3 | `member_access.property` | JS, Ruby, Python, SQL | Property access escaped into expression (RCE) | | 4 | `object_literal` key | JS, Ruby, SQL | Computed-key / extra-property injection (RCE on JS/Ruby; SQL injection) | | 5 | `datapath` segment | JS, Ruby, Python, SQL | Ruby symbol-list injection allows backtick shell exec; SQL string-segment unquoted in single-quote context allows SQL injection | | 6 | `lambda.params[].name` | JS, Ruby, Python | Parameter-list structural injection (RCE) | | 7 | SQL `let` binding `name` | SQL | Identifier injection in `… AS <name>` clause | ### Proof of Concept End-to-end execution was verified at commit `749af7b` for representative cases per backend. Examples: **Numeric literal injection (all four backends).** Feeding the following AST through `compileToJavaScript` emits a live `console.log` on call: ```js { type: 'literal', value: "(console.log('PWN_INT_JS'),1)" } // emits: (function(_) { return (console.log('PWN_INT_JS'),1); })(null); ``` The same AST against Ruby with `"(system('touch /tmp/pwn_int_ruby'); 1)"` creates the file; Python with `"(print('PWN_INT_PY') or 1)"` prints the sentinel; SQL emits the raw string into the numeric position. **SQL `variable.name` injection:** ```js { type: 'variable', name: "1; DROP TABLE users; --" } // emits: 1; DROP TABLE users; -- ``` **Ruby `datapath` segment shell-exec:** ```js { type: 'datapath', segments: ["a, system(`touch /tmp/pwn_dp_ruby`)"] } // emits: [:a, system(`touch /tmp/pwn_dp_ruby`)] ``` All ten end-to-end cases are automated in the `ast-exec.js` / `ast-exec2.js` scripts attached to the original report; each `console.log` and sentinel file was observed. ### Independence from GHSA #2 This finding is independent of **GHSA #2** (the `.constructor.constructor` sandbox escape). That report covers payloads delivered as plain Elo *strings* through the parser; the present advisory covers payloads delivered as AST *objects* through the programmatic API. The two threat models do not overlap: GHSA #2's identifier regex `^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*$` accepts `constructor` (and is the right behaviour for a parser), while the present advisory adds runtime validation at every backend emit site so that AST-API consumers cannot inject arbitrary text into emitted source.
- Source published
- 3 Nov 2026 17:48:09 UTC
- Source modified
- 3 Nov 2026 18:02:25 UTC
- Saved here
- 3 Nov 2026 18:57:56 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Publisher rating · HIGH