elo · remote code execution
cve-program · CVE-2026-44266
PublishedElo is a purely functional expression language for no-code tools. Prior to 1.0.1, the Ruby backend in src/compilers/ruby.ts embeds attacker-controlled text in Ruby double-quoted strings without escaping #, so Ruby interpolation forms in the string-literal emitter or the labelled subtype-constraint branch become executable Ruby. The affected entry points include the /try playground with the Ruby target, bin/eloc -t ruby -x, and defaultFormats.elo.parse() followed by Ruby emission. A failing labelled subtype constraint evaluates its message, while an ordinary string literal is evaluated when the compiled Ruby runs, allowing Ruby code and shell command execution through backticks. JavaScript, Python, and SQL emission are not affected by this Ruby-specific path. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.1.
Read the publisher's advisoryeuvd · EUVD-2026-116110
PublishedElo is a purely functional expression language for no-code tools. Prior to 1.0.1, the Ruby backend in src/compilers/ruby.ts embeds attacker-controlled text in Ruby double-quoted strings without escaping #, so Ruby interpolation forms in the string-literal emitter or the labelled subtype-constraint branch become executable Ruby. The affected entry points include the /try playground with the Ruby target, bin/eloc -t ruby -x, and defaultFormats.elo.parse() followed by Ruby emission. A failing labelled subtype constraint evaluates its message, while an ordinary string literal is evaluated when the compiled Ruby runs, allowing Ruby code and shell command execution through backticks. JavaScript, Python, and SQL emission are not affected by this Ruby-specific path. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.1.
Read the publisher's advisorynvd · CVE-2026-44266
PublishedElo is a purely functional expression language for no-code tools. Prior to 1.0.1, the Ruby backend in src/compilers/ruby.ts embeds attacker-controlled text in Ruby double-quoted strings without escaping #, so Ruby interpolation forms in the string-literal emitter or the labelled subtype-constraint branch become executable Ruby. The affected entry points include the /try playground with the Ruby target, bin/eloc -t ruby -x, and defaultFormats.elo.parse() followed by Ruby emission. A failing labelled subtype constraint evaluates its message, while an ordinary string literal is evaluated when the compiled Ruby runs, allowing Ruby code and shell command execution through backticks. JavaScript, Python, and SQL emission are not affected by this Ruby-specific path. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.1.
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GHSA-7w38-ggh5-v542
Published### Summary Elo's Ruby backend emits attacker-controlled text into Ruby double-quoted strings without escaping the `#` character. Because `#` begins Ruby's interpolation sequences — `#{expr}`, `#@ivar`, `#@@cvar`, `#$gvar` — and any expression wrapped in `#{...}` may use backticks for shell execution, an Elo program that contains a crafted string literal or a labelled subtype constraint compiles to Ruby that evaluates attacker-chosen Ruby, and through backticks runs attacker-chosen shell commands, at runtime. The same Elo source compiled to JavaScript, Python, or SQL is benign, so the bug also breaks the cross-target portability guarantee the rest of the compiler honours. ### Vulnerable sinks Two sinks exist in `src/compilers/ruby.ts` at commit `749af7b`: 1. **String-literal emitter — lines 180–184.** The emitter escapes backslash, double quote, and control characters, but not `#`. Any `#{...}` sequence in an Elo string literal flows straight into the emitted Ruby source. 2. **Labelled subtype-constraint branch — lines 405–412.** The error message passed to `p_fail(p, "...")` is wrapped in a Ruby double-quoted string with no escape pass at all. Because the parser at `src/parser.ts:1339–1348` accepts single-quoted Elo strings as constraint labels, a label such as `'#{` `` `id` `` `}'` flows unchanged into the emitted Ruby. ### Attack surfaces All three surfaces share the same root cause (the missing `#` escape in the Ruby double-quoted-string emission path) and are addressed by the same patch: | # | Entry point | Threat model | |---|---|---| | 1 | `/try` playground on elo-lang.org (Ruby target) | 0-click server-side RCE against elo-lang.org infrastructure from a shared PoC URL | | 2 | `bin/eloc -t ruby -x` on a CI or DevOps host | RCE on any host that passes Elo strings through the CLI | | 3 | Library API — `defaultFormats.elo.parse()` with a Ruby emission step | Ruby RCE for any downstream integrator using Elo as a rule engine, configuration DSL, or form builder DSL (the primary documented use cases) | ### Proof of Concept **String-literal sink:** ``` # poc.elo 'RES=#{`id 2>&1`}' ``` ``` $ eloc -t ruby -x poc.elo # emitted Ruby contains: "RES=#{`id 2>&1`}" # running it returns the output of id(1). ``` Replacing `` `id 2>&1` `` with `` `touch /tmp/pwned` `` produces a trivially observable filesystem side effect. **Subtype-constraint label sink:** ``` # poc-subtype.elo let X = Int(i | '#{`touch /tmp/pwned2`}': i > 0) in X(-1) ``` The predicate fails for `-1`, causing `p_fail(p, "#{...}")` to interpolate and execute the backtick command at the Ruby layer. Both flows are automated in the reproduction script submitted with the original report and were verified against Ruby 3.x. ### Root cause The Ruby-emitter's double-quoted-string escape routine omitted `#` from its character set, and one emission path (the subtype-constraint label branch) performed no escape pass at all.
Read the publisher's advisoryAffected versions, risk and source history
Related advisories and sources
Publishers link these advisories through the identifiers shown below. A shared identifier or date alone does not tell you whether your software is affected or whether the advisories describe the same cause.
CVE-2026-44266 · CVE overview and exploitation status
cve-program · CVE-2026-44266
- https://github.com/enspirit/elo/security/advisories/GHSA-7w38-ggh5-v542
- https://github.com/enspirit/elo/commit/51b869963fbe445c18328714a7ccfbd76b21ba38
- https://github.com/enspirit/elo/commit/d2a89a8db76a244eb740687524a7e8529b7554b5
euvd · EUVD-2026-116110
- https://github.com/enspirit/elo/security/advisories/GHSA-7w38-ggh5-v542
- https://github.com/enspirit/elo/commit/51b869963fbe445c18328714a7ccfbd76b21ba38
- https://github.com/enspirit/elo/commit/d2a89a8db76a244eb740687524a7e8529b7554b5
nvd · CVE-2026-44266
- https://github.com/enspirit/elo/commit/51b869963fbe445c18328714a7ccfbd76b21ba38
- https://github.com/enspirit/elo/commit/d2a89a8db76a244eb740687524a7e8529b7554b5
- https://github.com/enspirit/elo/security/advisories/GHSA-7w38-ggh5-v542
osv · GHSA-7w38-ggh5-v542
Related changes
Linked by CVE identifier- Elo: Remote Code Execution in Elo Ruby backend via unescaped `#{...}` interpolation in emitted string literals and subtype-constraint labels · Newly collected advisory · 3 Nov 2026
- Elo Ruby backend has Remote Code Execution via unescaped `#{...}` interpolation in emitted string literals and subtype-constraint labels · Newly collected advisory · 3 Nov 2026