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Kata guest escape: runtime-rs guest-root to host-root escape via virtiofs

CVSS 4.0 9.2 CRITICALEUVD CVSS 4.0 9.2 CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary 9.2 CRITICALCVSS_V4 Publisher rating HIGHFixed by github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers 0.0.0-20260519062212-ffa59ce3aa78osv · severity unknownFixed by github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers 0.0.0-20260519062212-ffa59ce3aa78KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-47243

Published

Kata Containers is an open source project focusing on a standard implementation of lightweight Virtual Machines (VMs) that perform like containers. Prior to 3.31.0, the runtime-rs standalone virtio-fs path is vulnerable to a guest-root to host-root escape. In this configuration, Kata runs the host virtiofsd as root with --sandbox none --seccomp none, so an attacker with root-equivalent access inside the guest can bypass the guest virtio-fs client entirely by taking over the virtio-fs PCI device and building a virtqueue in userspace to submit raw FUSE requests directly to the host virtiofsd. A crafted FUSE_SYMLINK request whose new symlink name is an absolute host path is honored outside the configured shared directory, allowing guest root to create root-owned symlinks in sensitive host locations such as /etc/cron.d. By pointing such a symlink at a guest-controlled crontab payload reachable through a live runtime process's mount namespace, the attacker causes the host cron daemon to execute that payload as host root, crossing the Kata isolation boundary. This issue is fixed in version 3.31.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-54710

Published

Kata Containers is an open source project focusing on a standard implementation of lightweight Virtual Machines (VMs) that perform like containers. Prior to 3.31.0, the runtime-rs standalone virtio-fs path is vulnerable to a guest-root to host-root escape. In this configuration, Kata runs the host virtiofsd as root with --sandbox none --seccomp none, so an attacker with root-equivalent access inside the guest can bypass the guest virtio-fs client entirely by taking over the virtio-fs PCI device and building a virtqueue in userspace to submit raw FUSE requests directly to the host virtiofsd. A crafted FUSE_SYMLINK request whose new symlink name is an absolute host path is honored outside the configured shared directory, allowing guest root to create root-owned symlinks in sensitive host locations such as /etc/cron.d. By pointing such a symlink at a guest-controlled crontab payload reachable through a live runtime process's mount namespace, the attacker causes the host cron daemon to execute that payload as host root, crossing the Kata isolation boundary. This issue is fixed in version 3.31.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-47243

Published

Kata Containers is an open source project focusing on a standard implementation of lightweight Virtual Machines (VMs) that perform like containers. Prior to 3.31.0, the runtime-rs standalone virtio-fs path is vulnerable to a guest-root to host-root escape. In this configuration, Kata runs the host virtiofsd as root with --sandbox none --seccomp none, so an attacker with root-equivalent access inside the guest can bypass the guest virtio-fs client entirely by taking over the virtio-fs PCI device and building a virtqueue in userspace to submit raw FUSE requests directly to the host virtiofsd. A crafted FUSE_SYMLINK request whose new symlink name is an absolute host path is honored outside the configured shared directory, allowing guest root to create root-owned symlinks in sensitive host locations such as /etc/cron.d. By pointing such a symlink at a guest-controlled crontab payload reachable through a live runtime process's mount namespace, the attacker causes the host cron daemon to execute that payload as host root, crossing the Kata isolation boundary. This issue is fixed in version 3.31.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-2gv2-cffp-j227

Published

### Summary In the runtime-rs standalone virtio-fs path, verified here with QEMU (and verified with Cloud Hypervisor too), Kata Containers runs host `virtiofsd` as root with: ``` --sandbox none --seccomp none ``` If an attacker has root-equivalent execution inside the Kata guest VM, they can send raw FUSE requests directly to the host `virtiofsd`. With the tested runtime-rs virtio-fs configuration, a raw `FUSE_SYMLINK` request whose new symlink name is an absolute host path is honored outside the virtio-fs shared directory. This lets guest root create host-root owned symlinks in sensitive host paths. The PoC created here will create symlinks in the host `/etc/cron.d` directory, causing host cron to execute a guest-controlled payload as host root. Impact: guest root can execute code as host root. ### Affected configuration The verified host used: ``` /opt/kata/share/defaults/kata-containers/runtime-rs/configuration-qemu-runtime-rs.toml rootless = false shared_fs = "virtio-fs" virtio_fs_daemon = "/opt/kata/libexec/virtiofsd" hypervisor_name = "qemu" debug_console_enabled = false ``` Pinned upstream references, using Kata Containers `main` commit `2ffd1538a296cff93a357bfba0dfca747480a1f8`: - runtime-rs standalone virtio-fs adds [`--sandbox none --seccomp none`](https://github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers/blob/2ffd1538a296cff93a357bfba0dfca747480a1f8/src/runtime-rs/crates/resource/src/share_fs/share_virtio_fs_standalone.rs#L82-L92) to the `virtiofsd` command line. - runtime-rs QEMU leaves rootless mode disabled by default: [`rootless = false`](https://github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers/blob/2ffd1538a296cff93a357bfba0dfca747480a1f8/src/runtime-rs/config/configuration-qemu-runtime-rs.toml.in#L31-L34). - The QEMU runtime-rs config template generates an installed config that uses standalone virtio-fs and points runtime-rs at the host `virtiofsd` binary: [`shared_fs` and `virtio_fs_daemon`](https://github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers/blob/2ffd1538a296cff93a357bfba0dfca747480a1f8/src/runtime-rs/config/configuration-qemu-runtime-rs.toml.in#L164-L171). - The runtime-rs Makefile resolves those placeholders to [`virtio-fs`](https://github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers/blob/2ffd1538a296cff93a357bfba0dfca747480a1f8/src/runtime-rs/Makefile#L496-L499) and [`$(LIBEXECDIR)/virtiofsd`](https://github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers/blob/2ffd1538a296cff93a357bfba0dfca747480a1f8/src/runtime-rs/Makefile#L184-L190). - runtime-rs selects the same standalone virtio-fs implementation whenever `shared_fs = "virtio-fs"`: [`ShareVirtioFsStandalone`](https://github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers/blob/2ffd1538a296cff93a357bfba0dfca747480a1f8/src/runtime-rs/crates/resource/src/share_fs/mod.rs#L158-L167). ### Details The guest kernel normally owns the virtio-fs client. A normal guest process will use filesystem syscalls, and the guest kernel will validate the paths, and only then does the kernel send FUSE messages to the host backend. An attacker with root-equivalent access inside the guest can bypass that guest virtio-fs client. They can access the virtio-fs PCI device, mmap the virtio PCI BAR, recover guest physical addresses from `/proc/self/pagemap`, and build their own virtqueue from userspace. That queue can submit attacker-built FUSE messages directly to host `virtiofsd`. The relevant primitive is `FUSE_SYMLINK`. An attacker can send a request whose body contains: ``` new symlink name: /etc/cron.d/kata-go-escape-cron-<pid> symlink target: /proc/<pid>/root/run/kata-containers/shared/sandboxes/<sid>/ro/passthrough/<sid>/rootfs/tmp/kata-go-escape-payload ``` The new symlink name is an absolute host path. `virtiofsd` should reject that request or force it to resolve below the configured `--shared-dir`. In the tested runtime-rs path, host-root unsandboxed `virtiofsd` accepts the absolute name, creating a real host symlink under `/etc/cron.d`. The attacker can make the symlink target resolve through `/proc/<pid>/root/...` for a live Kata runtime process whose mount namespace can see the guest-created payload. One matching runtime PID is enough. When the host cron reads `/etc/cron.d`, it follows the root-owned symlink, loads the guest-created crontab payload, and executes it as host root. ### PoC ```shell sudo timeout --foreground --kill-after=10s 600s ctr run --rm \ --runtime /opt/kata/runtime-rs/bin/containerd-shim-kata-v2 \ --runtime-config-path /opt/kata/share/defaults/kata-containers/runtime-rs/configuration-qemu-runtime-rs.toml \ --privileged \ --privileged-without-host-devices \ docker.io/library/kata-go-escape:local \ "$run_id" ``` The container is privileged only to model the post-escape condition where the attacker already has guest-root capabilities. It is not the vulnerability by itself. Inside the guest, the PoC: 1. Writes a cron payload to guest `/tmp/kata-go-escape-payload`. 2. Finds the virtio-fs PCI device in guest /sys. 3. Takes over a virtio-fs queue from userspace. 4. Sends `FUSE_INIT`. 5. Discovers the current runtime-rs sandbox under `passthrough/`. 6. Looks up `passthrough/<sid>/rootfs/tmp/kata-go-escape-payload`. 7. Sends raw `FUSE_SYMLINK` requests where the new symlink names are absolute host paths under `/etc/cron.d`. 8. Keeps the guest alive while host cron scans. Example log lines: ``` [guest] virtio-fs PCI device: /sys/devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:05.0 [res] sandbox_id=kata-go-escape-test-1778522686-1539 [res] lookup_path_error=0 path=passthrough/kata-go-escape-test-1778522686-1539/rootfs/tmp/kata-go-escape-payload nodeid=21 [spray] pid=1 err=-2 created_candidates=1 ``` `err=-2` is expected for the symlink spray. `virtiofsd` can return `ENOENT` after the side effect because its follow-up lookup is still relative to the export root. The host symlink creation has already happened. ### Impact The PoC proves guest-root to host-root command execution. Verified host proof: ``` /run/kata-go-escape.proof uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) Mon May 11 18:05:01 UTC 2026 ``` The proof file is written in host `/run` by host cron. It is not written by the guest process and not written by `virtiofsd`. An attacker who reaches guest root can therefore cross the Kata isolation boundary and execute commands as host root on affected runtime-rs virtio-fs deployments.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GO-2026-5042

Published

Kata guest escape: runtime-rs guest-root to host-root escape via virtiofs in github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

Exploitation and risk

Source status

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cve-program · CVE-2026-47243

Published

Kata guest escape: runtime-rs guest-root to host-root escape via virtiofs

Kata Containers is an open source project focusing on a standard implementation of lightweight Virtual Machines (VMs) that perform like containers. Prior to 3.31.0, the runtime-rs standalone virtio-fs path is vulnerable to a guest-root to host-root escape. In this configuration, Kata runs the host virtiofsd as root with --sandbox none --seccomp none, so an attacker with root-equivalent access inside the guest can bypass the guest virtio-fs client entirely by taking over the virtio-fs PCI device and building a virtqueue in userspace to submit raw FUSE requests directly to the host virtiofsd. A crafted FUSE_SYMLINK request whose new symlink name is an absolute host path is honored outside the configured shared directory, allowing guest root to create root-owned symlinks in sensitive host locations such as /etc/cron.d. By pointing such a symlink at a guest-controlled crontab payload reachable through a live runtime process's mount namespace, the attacker causes the host cron daemon to execute that payload as host root, crossing the Kata isolation boundary. This issue is fixed in version 3.31.0.

Source published
7 Aug 2026 21:36:49 UTC
Source modified
10 Aug 2026 13:34:09 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · 9.2 CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N

euvd · EUVD-2026-54710

Published

Kata Containers is an open source project focusing on a standard implementation of lightweight Virtual Machines (VMs) that perform like containers. Prior to 3.31.0, the runtime-rs standalone virtio-fs path is vulnerable to a guest-root to h…

Kata Containers is an open source project focusing on a standard implementation of lightweight Virtual Machines (VMs) that perform like containers. Prior to 3.31.0, the runtime-rs standalone virtio-fs path is vulnerable to a guest-root to host-root escape. In this configuration, Kata runs the host virtiofsd as root with --sandbox none --seccomp none, so an attacker with root-equivalent access inside the guest can bypass the guest virtio-fs client entirely by taking over the virtio-fs PCI device and building a virtqueue in userspace to submit raw FUSE requests directly to the host virtiofsd. A crafted FUSE_SYMLINK request whose new symlink name is an absolute host path is honored outside the configured shared directory, allowing guest root to create root-owned symlinks in sensitive host locations such as /etc/cron.d. By pointing such a symlink at a guest-controlled crontab payload reachable through a live runtime process's mount namespace, the attacker causes the host cron daemon to execute that payload as host root, crossing the Kata isolation boundary. This issue is fixed in version 3.31.0.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

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datePublished: Aug 7, 2026, 9:36:49 PM

dateUpdated: Aug 10, 2026, 1:34:09 PM

1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

msrc_CVE-2026-47243: Kata guest escape: runtime-rs guest-root to host-root escape via virtiofs

CVE-2026-47243

Source published
Aug 7, 2026, 9:36:49 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Aug 10, 2026, 1:34:09 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
20 Nov 2026 02:28:21 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 9.2 CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N

nvd · CVE-2026-47243

Published

Kata Containers is an open source project focusing on a standard implementation of lightweight Virtual Machines (VMs) that perform like containers. Prior to 3.31.0, the runtime-rs standalone virtio-fs path is vulnerable to a guest-root to h…

Kata Containers is an open source project focusing on a standard implementation of lightweight Virtual Machines (VMs) that perform like containers. Prior to 3.31.0, the runtime-rs standalone virtio-fs path is vulnerable to a guest-root to host-root escape. In this configuration, Kata runs the host virtiofsd as root with --sandbox none --seccomp none, so an attacker with root-equivalent access inside the guest can bypass the guest virtio-fs client entirely by taking over the virtio-fs PCI device and building a virtqueue in userspace to submit raw FUSE requests directly to the host virtiofsd. A crafted FUSE_SYMLINK request whose new symlink name is an absolute host path is honored outside the configured shared directory, allowing guest root to create root-owned symlinks in sensitive host locations such as /etc/cron.d. By pointing such a symlink at a guest-controlled crontab payload reachable through a live runtime process's mount namespace, the attacker causes the host cron daemon to execute that payload as host root, crossing the Kata isolation boundary. This issue is fixed in version 3.31.0.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-22 · CWE-36

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-08-07T22:16:58.753

lastModified: 2026-09-09T21:02:22.660

Source published
7 Aug 2026 22:16:58 UTC
Source modified
9 Sep 2026 21:02:22 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 12:17:20 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 9.2 CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

osv · GHSA-2gv2-cffp-j227

Published

Kata guest escape: runtime-rs guest-root to host-root escape via virtiofs

### Summary In the runtime-rs standalone virtio-fs path, verified here with QEMU (and verified with Cloud Hypervisor too), Kata Containers runs host `virtiofsd` as root with: ``` --sandbox none --seccomp none ``` If an attacker has root-equivalent execution inside the Kata guest VM, they can send raw FUSE requests directly to the host `virtiofsd`. With the tested runtime-rs virtio-fs configuration, a raw `FUSE_SYMLINK` request whose new symlink name is an absolute host path is honored outside the virtio-fs shared directory. This lets guest root create host-root owned symlinks in sensitive host paths. The PoC created here will create symlinks in the host `/etc/cron.d` directory, causing host cron to execute a guest-controlled payload as host root. Impact: guest root can execute code as host root. ### Affected configuration The verified host used: ``` /opt/kata/share/defaults/kata-containers/runtime-rs/configuration-qemu-runtime-rs.toml rootless = false shared_fs = "virtio-fs" virtio_fs_daemon = "/opt/kata/libexec/virtiofsd" hypervisor_name = "qemu" debug_console_enabled = false ``` Pinned upstream references, using Kata Containers `main` commit `2ffd1538a296cff93a357bfba0dfca747480a1f8`: - runtime-rs standalone virtio-fs adds [`--sandbox none --seccomp none`](https://github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers/blob/2ffd1538a296cff93a357bfba0dfca747480a1f8/src/runtime-rs/crates/resource/src/share_fs/share_virtio_fs_standalone.rs#L82-L92) to the `virtiofsd` command line. - runtime-rs QEMU leaves rootless mode disabled by default: [`rootless = false`](https://github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers/blob/2ffd1538a296cff93a357bfba0dfca747480a1f8/src/runtime-rs/config/configuration-qemu-runtime-rs.toml.in#L31-L34). - The QEMU runtime-rs config template generates an installed config that uses standalone virtio-fs and points runtime-rs at the host `virtiofsd` binary: [`shared_fs` and `virtio_fs_daemon`](https://github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers/blob/2ffd1538a296cff93a357bfba0dfca747480a1f8/src/runtime-rs/config/configuration-qemu-runtime-rs.toml.in#L164-L171). - The runtime-rs Makefile resolves those placeholders to [`virtio-fs`](https://github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers/blob/2ffd1538a296cff93a357bfba0dfca747480a1f8/src/runtime-rs/Makefile#L496-L499) and [`$(LIBEXECDIR)/virtiofsd`](https://github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers/blob/2ffd1538a296cff93a357bfba0dfca747480a1f8/src/runtime-rs/Makefile#L184-L190). - runtime-rs selects the same standalone virtio-fs implementation whenever `shared_fs = "virtio-fs"`: [`ShareVirtioFsStandalone`](https://github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers/blob/2ffd1538a296cff93a357bfba0dfca747480a1f8/src/runtime-rs/crates/resource/src/share_fs/mod.rs#L158-L167). ### Details The guest kernel normally owns the virtio-fs client. A normal guest process will use filesystem syscalls, and the guest kernel will validate the paths, and only then does the kernel send FUSE messages to the host backend. An attacker with root-equivalent access inside the guest can bypass that guest virtio-fs client. They can access the virtio-fs PCI device, mmap the virtio PCI BAR, recover guest physical addresses from `/proc/self/pagemap`, and build their own virtqueue from userspace. That queue can submit attacker-built FUSE messages directly to host `virtiofsd`. The relevant primitive is `FUSE_SYMLINK`. An attacker can send a request whose body contains: ``` new symlink name: /etc/cron.d/kata-go-escape-cron-<pid> symlink target: /proc/<pid>/root/run/kata-containers/shared/sandboxes/<sid>/ro/passthrough/<sid>/rootfs/tmp/kata-go-escape-payload ``` The new symlink name is an absolute host path. `virtiofsd` should reject that request or force it to resolve below the configured `--shared-dir`. In the tested runtime-rs path, host-root unsandboxed `virtiofsd` accepts the absolute name, creating a real host symlink under `/etc/cron.d`. The attacker can make the symlink target resolve through `/proc/<pid>/root/...` for a live Kata runtime process whose mount namespace can see the guest-created payload. One matching runtime PID is enough. When the host cron reads `/etc/cron.d`, it follows the root-owned symlink, loads the guest-created crontab payload, and executes it as host root. ### PoC ```shell sudo timeout --foreground --kill-after=10s 600s ctr run --rm \ --runtime /opt/kata/runtime-rs/bin/containerd-shim-kata-v2 \ --runtime-config-path /opt/kata/share/defaults/kata-containers/runtime-rs/configuration-qemu-runtime-rs.toml \ --privileged \ --privileged-without-host-devices \ docker.io/library/kata-go-escape:local \ "$run_id" ``` The container is privileged only to model the post-escape condition where the attacker already has guest-root capabilities. It is not the vulnerability by itself. Inside the guest, the PoC: 1. Writes a cron payload to guest `/tmp/kata-go-escape-payload`. 2. Finds the virtio-fs PCI device in guest /sys. 3. Takes over a virtio-fs queue from userspace. 4. Sends `FUSE_INIT`. 5. Discovers the current runtime-rs sandbox under `passthrough/`. 6. Looks up `passthrough/<sid>/rootfs/tmp/kata-go-escape-payload`. 7. Sends raw `FUSE_SYMLINK` requests where the new symlink names are absolute host paths under `/etc/cron.d`. 8. Keeps the guest alive while host cron scans. Example log lines: ``` [guest] virtio-fs PCI device: /sys/devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:05.0 [res] sandbox_id=kata-go-escape-test-1778522686-1539 [res] lookup_path_error=0 path=passthrough/kata-go-escape-test-1778522686-1539/rootfs/tmp/kata-go-escape-payload nodeid=21 [spray] pid=1 err=-2 created_candidates=1 ``` `err=-2` is expected for the symlink spray. `virtiofsd` can return `ENOENT` after the side effect because its follow-up lookup is still relative to the export root. The host symlink creation has already happened. ### Impact The PoC proves guest-root to host-root command execution. Verified host proof: ``` /run/kata-go-escape.proof uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) Mon May 11 18:05:01 UTC 2026 ``` The proof file is written in host `/run` by host cron. It is not written by the guest process and not written by `virtiofsd`. An attacker who reaches guest root can therefore cross the Kata isolation boundary and execute commands as host root on affected runtime-rs virtio-fs deployments.

Source published
27 May 2026 22:50:01 UTC
Source modified
17 Jun 2026 00:26:20 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:P

Publisher rating · HIGH

osv · GO-2026-5042

Published

Kata guest escape: runtime-rs guest-root to host-root escape via virtiofs in github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers

Kata guest escape: runtime-rs guest-root to host-root escape via virtiofs in github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers

Source published
16 Jun 2026 23:55:18 UTC
Source modified
17 Jun 2026 00:15:12 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 21 Nov 21:31 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 270 fully read · documentation 469/469 current