budibase · Vulnerability
cve-program · CVE-2026-48151
PublishedBudibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.0, the webhook schema-building endpoint is registered under builderRoutes, but the generic authorization middleware skips authorization for all paths matching /api/webhooks/schema. As a result, an unauthenticated caller can update the body schema for a known webhook and mutate the corresponding automation trigger output schema. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.0.
Read the publisher's advisoryeuvd · EUVD-2026-32589
PublishedBudibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.0, the webhook schema-building endpoint is registered under builderRoutes, but the generic authorization middleware skips authorization for all paths matching /api/webhooks/schema. As a result, an unauthenticated caller can update the body schema for a known webhook and mutate the corresponding automation trigger output schema. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.0.
Read the publisher's advisorynvd · CVE-2026-48151
PublishedBudibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.0, the webhook schema-building endpoint is registered under builderRoutes, but the generic authorization middleware skips authorization for all paths matching /api/webhooks/schema. As a result, an unauthenticated caller can update the body schema for a known webhook and mutate the corresponding automation trigger output schema. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.0.
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GHSA-qhv3-wjg8-6fx6
PublishedThe webhook schema-building endpoint is registered under `builderRoutes`, but the generic authorization middleware skips authorization for all paths matching `/api/webhooks/schema`. As a result, an unauthenticated caller can update the body schema for a known webhook and mutate the corresponding automation trigger output schema. ### Details The route appears to be builder-only: - `packages/server/src/api/routes/webhook.ts:5-9` ```ts 5:builderRoutes 6: .get("/api/webhooks", controller.fetch) 7: .put("/api/webhooks", webhookValidator(), controller.save) 8: .delete("/api/webhooks/:id/:rev", controller.destroy) 9: .post("/api/webhooks/schema/:instance/:id", controller.buildSchema) ``` However, webhook endpoint detection explicitly includes `schema`: - `packages/server/src/middleware/utils.ts:3-9` ```ts 3:const WEBHOOK_ENDPOINTS = new RegExp( 4: "^/api/webhooks/(trigger|schema|discord|ms-teams|slack)(/|$)" 5:) 6: 7:export function isWebhookEndpoint(ctx: UserCtx): boolean { 8: const path = ctx.path || ctx.request.url.split("?")[0] 9: return WEBHOOK_ENDPOINTS.test(path) ``` The authorization middleware bypasses all webhook endpoints before checking `ctx.user` or permissions: - `packages/server/src/middleware/authorized.ts:90-99` ```ts 90: ) => 91: async (ctx: UserCtx, next: any) => { 92: // webhooks don't need authentication, each webhook unique 93: // also internal requests (between services) don't need authorized 94: if (isWebhookEndpoint(ctx) || ctx.internal) { 95: return next() 96: } 97: 98: if (!ctx.user) { 99: return ctx.throw(401, "No user info found") ``` The bypassed controller writes attacker-derived schema data to the webhook and automation trigger outputs: - `packages/server/src/api/controllers/webhook.ts:56-83` ```ts 56:export async function buildSchema( 57: ctx: Ctx<BuildWebhookSchemaRequest, BuildWebhookSchemaResponse> 58:) { 59: await context.doInWorkspaceContext(ctx.params.instance, async () => { 60: const db = context.getWorkspaceDB() 61: const webhook = await db.get<Webhook>(ctx.params.id) 62: webhook.bodySchema = toJsonSchema(ctx.request.body) 63: // update the automation outputs 64: if (webhook.action.type === WebhookActionType.AUTOMATION) { 65: let automation = await db.get<Automation>(webhook.action.target) 66: const autoOutputs = automation.definition.trigger.schema.outputs 67: let properties = webhook.bodySchema?.properties 68: // reset webhook outputs 69: autoOutputs.properties = { 70: body: autoOutputs.properties.body, 71: } 72: for (let prop of Object.keys(properties || {})) { 73: if (properties?.[prop] == null) { 74: continue 75: } 76: const def = properties[prop] 77: if (typeof def === "boolean") { 78: continue 79: } 80: autoOutputs.properties[prop] = { 81: type: def.type as AutomationIOType, 82: description: AUTOMATION_DESCRIPTION, 83: } ``` The route grouping suggests builder authorization was intended, but the global webhook bypass removes it. ### PoC Non-destructive validation approach: 1. Create a webhook-backed automation as a builder. 2. Record the workspace ID and webhook ID. 3. Log out or send no auth headers. 4. Send: ```http POST /api/webhooks/schema/<workspaceId>/<webhookId> HTTP/1.1 content-type: application/json {"unauth_schema_probe":"test"} ``` 5. Fetch the webhook as a builder and observe that `bodySchema` has changed. 6. For automation-backed webhooks, inspect the automation trigger schema outputs and observe that properties were reset/updated. ### Impact An unauthenticated attacker can modify webhook schema metadata and automation trigger output schema for known webhook IDs. This can corrupt builder-visible automation definitions, alter downstream binding behavior, and disrupt webhook-backed automation workflows.
Read the publisher's advisoryAffected versions, risk and source history
Exploitation and risk
Source statusCISA KEV lists vulnerabilities known to be exploited. FIRST EPSS estimates the likelihood of exploitation in the next 30 days. An unavailable score does not mean zero risk.
Which CVEs have scores here?
This view includes predictions for CVE identifiers explicitly listed in public NuGet advisories. Microsoft release pages have their own prediction coverage. Check source status for the scope and latest checks.
No exploitation or prediction data is available here for these CVEs. This does not mean they are safe or unlikely to be exploited.
cve-program · CVE-2026-48151
PublishedBudibase: Webhook schema endpoint authorization bypass allows unauthenticated mutation of webhook and automation schema
Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.0, the webhook schema-building endpoint is registered under builderRoutes, but the generic authorization middleware skips authorization for all paths matching /api/webhooks/schema. As a result, an unauthenticated caller can update the body schema for a known webhook and mutate the corresponding automation trigger output schema. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.0.
- Source published
- 27 May 2026 16:57:36 UTC
- Source modified
- 28 May 2026 14:12:26 UTC
- Saved here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
euvd · EUVD-2026-32589
PublishedBudibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.0, the webhook schema-building endpoint is registered under builderRoutes, but the generic authorization middleware skips authorization for all paths matching /api/webhooks/schema.…
Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.0, the webhook schema-building endpoint is registered under builderRoutes, but the generic authorization middleware skips authorization for all paths matching /api/webhooks/schema. As a result, an unauthenticated caller can update the body schema for a known webhook and mutate the corresponding automation trigger output schema. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.0.
Additional publisher context
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: May 27, 2026, 4:57:36 PM
dateUpdated: May 28, 2026, 2:12:26 PM
1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
WID-SEC-W-2026-1629: Budibase: Mehrere Schwachstellen
CVE-2026-48128 · CVE-2026-48146 · CVE-2026-48147 · CVE-2026-48148 · CVE-2026-48149 · CVE-2026-48150 · CVE-2026-48151 · CVE-2026-48152 · CVE-2026-48153
- Source published
- May 27, 2026, 4:57:36 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- May 28, 2026, 2:12:26 PM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 13 Nov 2026 13:58:56 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
nvd · CVE-2026-48151
PublishedBudibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.0, the webhook schema-building endpoint is registered under builderRoutes, but the generic authorization middleware skips authorization for all paths matching /api/webhooks/schema.…
Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.0, the webhook schema-building endpoint is registered under builderRoutes, but the generic authorization middleware skips authorization for all paths matching /api/webhooks/schema. As a result, an unauthenticated caller can update the body schema for a known webhook and mutate the corresponding automation trigger output schema. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.0.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-862
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-05-27T18:16:27.593
lastModified: 2026-06-17T10:54:53.923
- Source published
- 27 May 2026 18:16:27 UTC
- Source modified
- 17 Jun 2026 10:54:53 UTC
- Saved here
- 25 Oct 2026 12:17:32 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
osv · GHSA-qhv3-wjg8-6fx6
PublishedBudibase: Webhook schema endpoint authorization bypass allows unauthenticated mutation of webhook and automation schema
The webhook schema-building endpoint is registered under `builderRoutes`, but the generic authorization middleware skips authorization for all paths matching `/api/webhooks/schema`. As a result, an unauthenticated caller can update the body schema for a known webhook and mutate the corresponding automation trigger output schema. ### Details The route appears to be builder-only: - `packages/server/src/api/routes/webhook.ts:5-9` ```ts 5:builderRoutes 6: .get("/api/webhooks", controller.fetch) 7: .put("/api/webhooks", webhookValidator(), controller.save) 8: .delete("/api/webhooks/:id/:rev", controller.destroy) 9: .post("/api/webhooks/schema/:instance/:id", controller.buildSchema) ``` However, webhook endpoint detection explicitly includes `schema`: - `packages/server/src/middleware/utils.ts:3-9` ```ts 3:const WEBHOOK_ENDPOINTS = new RegExp( 4: "^/api/webhooks/(trigger|schema|discord|ms-teams|slack)(/|$)" 5:) 6: 7:export function isWebhookEndpoint(ctx: UserCtx): boolean { 8: const path = ctx.path || ctx.request.url.split("?")[0] 9: return WEBHOOK_ENDPOINTS.test(path) ``` The authorization middleware bypasses all webhook endpoints before checking `ctx.user` or permissions: - `packages/server/src/middleware/authorized.ts:90-99` ```ts 90: ) => 91: async (ctx: UserCtx, next: any) => { 92: // webhooks don't need authentication, each webhook unique 93: // also internal requests (between services) don't need authorized 94: if (isWebhookEndpoint(ctx) || ctx.internal) { 95: return next() 96: } 97: 98: if (!ctx.user) { 99: return ctx.throw(401, "No user info found") ``` The bypassed controller writes attacker-derived schema data to the webhook and automation trigger outputs: - `packages/server/src/api/controllers/webhook.ts:56-83` ```ts 56:export async function buildSchema( 57: ctx: Ctx<BuildWebhookSchemaRequest, BuildWebhookSchemaResponse> 58:) { 59: await context.doInWorkspaceContext(ctx.params.instance, async () => { 60: const db = context.getWorkspaceDB() 61: const webhook = await db.get<Webhook>(ctx.params.id) 62: webhook.bodySchema = toJsonSchema(ctx.request.body) 63: // update the automation outputs 64: if (webhook.action.type === WebhookActionType.AUTOMATION) { 65: let automation = await db.get<Automation>(webhook.action.target) 66: const autoOutputs = automation.definition.trigger.schema.outputs 67: let properties = webhook.bodySchema?.properties 68: // reset webhook outputs 69: autoOutputs.properties = { 70: body: autoOutputs.properties.body, 71: } 72: for (let prop of Object.keys(properties || {})) { 73: if (properties?.[prop] == null) { 74: continue 75: } 76: const def = properties[prop] 77: if (typeof def === "boolean") { 78: continue 79: } 80: autoOutputs.properties[prop] = { 81: type: def.type as AutomationIOType, 82: description: AUTOMATION_DESCRIPTION, 83: } ``` The route grouping suggests builder authorization was intended, but the global webhook bypass removes it. ### PoC Non-destructive validation approach: 1. Create a webhook-backed automation as a builder. 2. Record the workspace ID and webhook ID. 3. Log out or send no auth headers. 4. Send: ```http POST /api/webhooks/schema/<workspaceId>/<webhookId> HTTP/1.1 content-type: application/json {"unauth_schema_probe":"test"} ``` 5. Fetch the webhook as a builder and observe that `bodySchema` has changed. 6. For automation-backed webhooks, inspect the automation trigger schema outputs and observe that properties were reset/updated. ### Impact An unauthenticated attacker can modify webhook schema metadata and automation trigger output schema for known webhook IDs. This can corrupt builder-visible automation definitions, alter downstream binding behavior, and disrupt webhook-backed automation workflows.
- Source published
- 12 Jun 2026 18:28:34 UTC
- Source modified
- 10 Sep 2026 03:50:50 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Publisher rating · HIGH