Fleet is an open-source device management platform built on osquery. In versions prior to 4.87.0, the target search endpoint (POST /api/latest/fleet/targets) returned unmasked team enroll secrets and full team configuration, including credential-bearing agent options, to low-privilege observer-class users. Other team-facing endpoints mask these fields for observers, but the target search endpoint did not apply the same sanitization, so an authenticated user with the Observer, Observer+, or Technician role, whether global or team-scoped, could retrieve the secrets and agent options by performing a target search against an observer-runnable query. With a leaked team enroll secret an attacker could enroll unauthorized hosts into the affected team, and if the team's agent options contained credentials such as AWS secret access keys or proxy passwords, those values were disclosed as well. This issue is fixed in version 4.87.0.
Fleet is an open-source device management platform built on osquery. In versions prior to 4.87.0, the target search endpoint (POST /api/latest/fleet/targets) returned unmasked team enroll secrets and full team configuration, including credential-bearing agent options, to low-privilege observer-class users. Other team-facing endpoints mask these fields for observers, but the target search endpoint did not apply the same sanitization, so an authenticated user with the Observer, Observer+, or Technician role, whether global or team-scoped, could retrieve the secrets and agent options by performing a target search against an observer-runnable query. With a leaked team enroll secret an attacker could enroll unauthorized hosts into the affected team, and if the team's agent options contained credentials such as AWS secret access keys or proxy passwords, those values were disclosed as well. This issue is fixed in version 4.87.0.
Fleet is an open-source device management platform built on osquery. In versions prior to 4.87.0, the target search endpoint (POST /api/latest/fleet/targets) returned unmasked team enroll secrets and full team configuration, including credential-bearing agent options, to low-privilege observer-class users. Other team-facing endpoints mask these fields for observers, but the target search endpoint did not apply the same sanitization, so an authenticated user with the Observer, Observer+, or Technician role, whether global or team-scoped, could retrieve the secrets and agent options by performing a target search against an observer-runnable query. With a leaked team enroll secret an attacker could enroll unauthorized hosts into the affected team, and if the team's agent options contained credentials such as AWS secret access keys or proxy passwords, those values were disclosed as well. This issue is fixed in version 4.87.0.
### Summary
The target search endpoint (`POST /api/latest/fleet/targets`) returned team enroll secrets and full team configuration, including credential-bearing agent options, to observer-class users. Other team-facing endpoints mask these fields for observers; the target search endpoint did not apply the same sanitization.
### Impact
An authenticated user with Observer, Observer+, or Technician role (global or team-scoped) could retrieve unmasked team enroll secrets and team agent options by performing a target search against an observer-runnable query.
With a leaked team enroll secret, an attacker could enroll unauthorized hosts into the affected team. If the team's agent options contained credentials such as AWS secret access keys or proxy passwords, those values were also exposed.
### Patches
- v4.87.0
### Workarounds
If an immediate upgrade is not possible, administrators should:
- Rotate team enroll secrets for any team that may have been exposed
- Rotate any credentials stored in team agent options (AWS keys, proxy passwords, session tokens)
- Restrict Observer and Technician roles to fully trusted users until the patch is applied
### Credits
Fleet thanks @fuzzztf for responsibly reporting this issue.
### For more information
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory:
Send an email to [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected])
Join #fleet in [osquery Slack](https://join.slack.com/t/osquery/shared_invite/zt-h29zm0gk-s2DBtGUTW4CFel0f0IjTEw)
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Aug 26, 2026, 6:25:09 PM
dateUpdated: Aug 26, 2026, 6:49:37 PM
1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
WID-SEC-W-2026-2788: Fleet: Mehrere Schwachstellen
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-200
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-08-26T19:16:50.643
lastModified: 2026-09-09T21:09:13.080
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.