Network-AI: Empty default secret still authorizes all requests (Incomplete fix for CVE-2026-46701)

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Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. In versions 5.7.1 and earlier, the MCP SSE server allows unauthenticated cross-origin MCP tool invocation due to an empty default secret. This issue was partially addressed by CVE-2026-46701 in version 5.4.5 by closing the CORS flaw (with Access-Control-Allow-Origin now set only for localhost origins), but the empty-default-secret flaw described in the title remained: the SSE MCP server still defaulted to an empty secret, _isAuthorized() still returned true when the secret was empty, and a non-loopback bind only produced a warning. As a result, the server still ran fully unauthenticated by default. Any non-browser caller (for example, curl, SSRF, or a 0.0.0.0 bind) could invoke all 22 MCP tools (config_set, agent_spawn, blackboard_write, token_*) with no credentials. This issue was fixed in version 5.7.2.

Source published

17 Jun 2026 19:42:30 UTC

Source modified

18 Jun 2026 19:43:01 UTC

Observed here

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

Source terms

CVE Program Terms of Use

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CVSS 3.1 · 9.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. In versions 5.7.1 and earlier, the MCP SSE server allows unauthenticated cross-origin MCP tool invocation due to an empty default secret. This issue was partially addressed by CVE-2026-46701 in version 5.4.5 by closing the CORS flaw (with Access-Control-Allow-Origin now set only for localhost origins), but the empty-default-secret flaw described in the title remained: the SSE MCP server still defaulted to an empty secret, _isAuthorized() still returned true when the secret was empty, and a non-loopback bind only produced a warning. As a result, the server still ran fully unauthenticated by default. Any non-browser caller (for example, curl, SSRF, or a 0.0.0.0 bind) could invoke all 22 MCP tools (config_set, agent_spawn, blackboard_write, token_*) with no credentials. This issue was fixed in version 5.7.2.

Source published

Jun 17, 2026, 7:42:30 PM (timezone not stated)

Source modified

Jun 18, 2026, 7:43:01 PM (timezone not stated)

Observed here

7 Nov 2026 11:30:52 UTC

Source terms

ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

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EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 9.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. In versions 5.7.1 and earlier, the MCP SSE server allows unauthenticated cross-origin MCP tool invocation due to an empty default secret. This issue was partially addressed by CVE-2026-46701 in version 5.4.5 by closing the CORS flaw (with Access-Control-Allow-Origin now set only for localhost origins), but the empty-default-secret flaw described in the title remained: the SSE MCP server still defaulted to an empty secret, _isAuthorized() still returned true when the secret was empty, and a non-loopback bind only produced a warning. As a result, the server still ran fully unauthenticated by default. Any non-browser caller (for example, curl, SSRF, or a 0.0.0.0 bind) could invoke all 22 MCP tools (config_set, agent_spawn, blackboard_write, token_*) with no credentials. This issue was fixed in version 5.7.2.

Source published

17 Jun 2026 20:17:22 UTC

Source modified

25 Oct 2026 23:10:00 UTC

Observed here

27 Oct 2026 13:11:53 UTC

Source terms

NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

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CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 9.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

## Advisory / Disclosure # Network-AI — CVE-2026-46701 fix is incomplete: the "Empty Default Secret" unauth path survives **Target:** Jovancoding/Network-AI (npm `network-ai`), **latest v5.7.1** **Status:** the advisory ("Unauthenticated Cross-Origin MCP Tool Invocation via Empty Default Secret") named three flaws. The fix (5.4.5) closed the **CORS** flaw (`Access-Control-Allow-Origin` is now set only for localhost origins), but left the **empty-default-secret** flaw the title is about: the SSE MCP server still defaults to an empty secret, `_isAuthorized()` still returns `true` when the secret is empty, and a non-loopback bind only **warns**. So the server still runs **fully unauthenticated by default** — any non-browser caller (curl, SSRF, or a `0.0.0.0` bind) can invoke all 22 MCP tools (`config_set`, `agent_spawn`, `blackboard_write`, `token_*`) with no credentials. **Class:** CWE-306/CWE-862 Missing Authentication — incomplete fix. **Methodology:** M1 incomplete-fix audit (anchor = the 5.4.5 fix; sibling-walk on latest v5.7.1, executed). **Severity:** High (matches parent; the browser amplifier is removed, so exploitation now needs non-browser reach — SSRF or a non-loopback bind, which the fix only warns about). ## What the fix did and didn't do (verified on latest v5.7.1) | advisory flaw | latest v5.7.1 | |---|---| | wildcard CORS (`ACAO: *`) | **FIXED** — `lib/mcp-transport-sse.ts` sets `ACAO` only when `origin` matches `^https?://(localhost\|127\.0\.0\.1)(:\d+)?$` | | empty default secret | **NOT FIXED** — `bin/mcp-server.ts`: `secret: process.env['NETWORK_AI_MCP_SECRET'] ?? ''` | | `_isAuthorized` open on empty secret | **NOT FIXED** — `if (!this._opts.secret) return true;` | | require secret / refuse unauth bind | **NOT DONE** — `listen()` only `process.stderr.write('… WARNING …')` on non-loopback bind, then listens anyway | The advisory's remediation #1 ("Require a non-empty secret at startup … `process.exit(1)`") was not implemented. ## PoC (executed against the latest source, v5.7.1) — `poc/legend-networkai-empty-secret.ts` Instantiates the real `McpSseServer` from the latest `lib/` with a mock bridge and the **default (empty) secret**, then issues requests (run-log `poc/run-log.txt`): ``` POST /mcp no-auth, no-origin (curl/SSRF) -> HTTP 200, dispatched=true body: {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"result":{"executed":true,"tool":"config_set"}} POST /mcp Origin: evil.example.com -> ACAO=undefined (CORS half fixed) ``` The no-auth request passes `_isAuthorized` and reaches `handleRPC` (tool dispatched) — i.e. unauthenticated tool invocation persists on the latest release; only the browser-CORS read amplifier was removed. Run: from a v5.7.1 checkout, `npm i` then `npx ts-node --transpile-only poc/legend-networkai-empty-secret.ts`. ## Recommended fix Implement the advisory's remediation #1: refuse to start SSE mode with an empty secret (unless `--stdio`), and/or change `_isAuthorized` to fail closed (an empty configured secret should mean "deny", not "allow"). The CORS allowlist alone does not authenticate non-browser callers. ## Precondition / honesty With CORS now localhost-only, the drive-by *browser* attack is mitigated. The residual requires a non-browser path to the port: an SSRF on the host, or the operator binding to a non-loopback address (Docker/remote), which the fix only warns about. The empty secret remains the shipped default and `_isAuthorized` still authorizes it. ## Credits @Kai Aizen / @SnailSploit — https://snailsploit.com

Source published

19 Jun 2026 13:34:24 UTC

Source modified

8 Jul 2026 08:29:23 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

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CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Publisher rating · CRITICAL