sigstore-js: `certificateOIDs` verification constraints are silently dropped and never enforced
Collected exploitation and prediction evidence
Risk source coverageCISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.
No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.
cve-program · CVE-2026-48815
Publishedsigstore-js provides JavaScript libraries for interacting with Sigstore services. Prior to 4.1.1, the documented certificateOIDs option in sigstore.verify() is accepted by the public API but discarded before verification, so required certificate extension OIDs are never checked and applications relying on certificateOIDs to restrict which certificates may sign artifacts can accept unauthorized certificates. This issue is fixed in version 4.1.1.
- Source published
- 14 Jul 2026 20:27:16 UTC
- Source modified
- 15 Jul 2026 12:56:29 UTC
- Observed here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
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CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
nvd · CVE-2026-48815
Publishedsigstore-js provides JavaScript libraries for interacting with Sigstore services. Prior to 4.1.1, the documented certificateOIDs option in sigstore.verify() is accepted by the public API but discarded before verification, so required certificate extension OIDs are never checked and applications relying on certificateOIDs to restrict which certificates may sign artifacts can accept unauthorized certificates. This issue is fixed in version 4.1.1.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-347
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-07-14T21:17:01.370
lastModified: 2026-10-24T21:10:00.130
- Source published
- 14 Jul 2026 21:17:01 UTC
- Source modified
- 24 Oct 2026 21:10:00 UTC
- Observed here
- 25 Oct 2026 12:17:32 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
osv · GHSA-52v5-jr5w-gjxr
Published### Summary The documented `certificateOIDs` option in `sigstore.verify()` is accepted by the public API but discarded before verification, so required certificate extension OIDs are never checked. ### Details The public verify options include `certificateOIDs` and the documentation says those OID/value pairs “must be present in the certificate’s extension list.” The policy-construction path used by `sigstore.verify()` and `createVerifier()` only copies the SAN and issuer settings into the verification policy and completely ignores `certificateOIDs`. As a result, callers can believe they are constraining verification to certificates carrying specific Fulcio or workload-identifying OIDs, while the actual verifier never receives those constraints. Any bundle that satisfies the remaining checks is accepted even if the required OID extensions are absent or mismatched. This is reachable from supported usage through the documented `certificateOIDs` verify option. ### PoC ```javascript const { createVerificationPolicy } = require("sigstore/dist/config"); const policy = createVerificationPolicy({ certificateIssuer: "https://issuer.example", certificateIdentityEmail: "[email protected]", certificateOIDs: { "1.2.3.4": "required-value", }, }); console.log("certificateOIDs" in policy, JSON.stringify(policy)); // false {"subjectAlternativeName":"[email protected]","extensions":{"issuer":"https://issuer.example"}} ``` ### Impact Applications that rely on `certificateOIDs` to restrict which certificates may sign artifacts receive no such protection. Unauthorized certificates that should be rejected on extension policy can be accepted as long as they satisfy the remaining verification checks.
- Source published
- 1 Jul 2026 19:58:28 UTC
- Source modified
- 10 Sep 2026 03:50:12 UTC
- Observed here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Publisher rating · HIGH