Klever-Go KVM: Throttler slot leak in trie account-data sync causes epoch bootstrap / state sync DoS
Collected exploitation and prediction evidence
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No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.
cve-program · CVE-2026-49343
PublishedKlever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. In versions prior to 1.7.18, the account-data trie syncers are vulnerable to a resource-exhaustion flaw that leaks bounded throttler slots on error paths. In syncDataTrie() (in both userAccountsSyncer.go and kappAccountsSyncer.go), StartProcessing() reserves a slot from the NumGoRoutinesThrottler, but the corresponding EndProcessing() is only called on the success path and on the duplicate-root early return. As a result, any error from trie.NewTrie(), trie.NewTrieSyncer(), or trieSyncer.StartSyncing() (including the network-dependent timeout path) permanently consumes one slot for the lifetime of the throttler. An attacker who can repeatedly cause trie-node sync failures or timeouts during bootstrap can exhaust the bounded throttler, after which further account-data trie syncs stop making progress and SyncAccounts() returns a timeout. Because epoch bootstrap in syncUserAccountsState() and syncKappAccountsState() aborts on any such error, this causes bootstrap to fail, a core availability issue affecting fresh, restarting, or resyncing nodes and validators. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.18.
- Source published
- 7 Aug 2026 22:18:18 UTC
- Source modified
- 13 Aug 2026 18:40:16 UTC
- Observed here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
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CVSS 3.1 · 5.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
euvd · EUVD-2026-54716
PublishedKlever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. In versions prior to 1.7.18, the account-data trie syncers are vulnerable to a resource-exhaustion flaw that leaks bounded throttler slots on error paths. In syncDataTrie() (in both userAccountsSyncer.go and kappAccountsSyncer.go), StartProcessing() reserves a slot from the NumGoRoutinesThrottler, but the corresponding EndProcessing() is only called on the success path and on the duplicate-root early return. As a result, any error from trie.NewTrie(), trie.NewTrieSyncer(), or trieSyncer.StartSyncing() (including the network-dependent timeout path) permanently consumes one slot for the lifetime of the throttler. An attacker who can repeatedly cause trie-node sync failures or timeouts during bootstrap can exhaust the bounded throttler, after which further account-data trie syncs stop making progress and SyncAccounts() returns a timeout. Because epoch bootstrap in syncUserAccountsState() and syncKappAccountsState() aborts on any such error, this causes bootstrap to fail, a core availability issue affecting fresh, restarting, or resyncing nodes and validators. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.18.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Aug 7, 2026, 10:18:18 PM
dateUpdated: Aug 13, 2026, 6:40:16 PM
- Source published
- Aug 7, 2026, 10:18:18 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Aug 13, 2026, 6:40:16 PM (timezone not stated)
- Observed here
- 7 Nov 2026 11:31:31 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 5.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
nvd · CVE-2026-49343
PublishedKlever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. In versions prior to 1.7.18, the account-data trie syncers are vulnerable to a resource-exhaustion flaw that leaks bounded throttler slots on error paths. In syncDataTrie() (in both userAccountsSyncer.go and kappAccountsSyncer.go), StartProcessing() reserves a slot from the NumGoRoutinesThrottler, but the corresponding EndProcessing() is only called on the success path and on the duplicate-root early return. As a result, any error from trie.NewTrie(), trie.NewTrieSyncer(), or trieSyncer.StartSyncing() (including the network-dependent timeout path) permanently consumes one slot for the lifetime of the throttler. An attacker who can repeatedly cause trie-node sync failures or timeouts during bootstrap can exhaust the bounded throttler, after which further account-data trie syncs stop making progress and SyncAccounts() returns a timeout. Because epoch bootstrap in syncUserAccountsState() and syncKappAccountsState() aborts on any such error, this causes bootstrap to fail, a core availability issue affecting fresh, restarting, or resyncing nodes and validators. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.18.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-400 · CWE-772
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-08-07T23:17:04.450
lastModified: 2026-10-24T16:10:00.153
- Source published
- 7 Aug 2026 23:17:04 UTC
- Source modified
- 24 Oct 2026 16:10:00 UTC
- Observed here
- 25 Oct 2026 12:17:32 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 5.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
osv · GHSA-fw38-pc54-jvx9
Published## Summary The account-data trie syncers leak bounded throttler slots on error paths in `syncDataTrie()`. Each failed trie sync permanently consumes one slot from the `NumGoRoutinesThrottler`, and the slot is never returned unless the sync succeeds or the root hash was already present. I confirmed this on the current default branch `develop` at commit `9640d63` (observed on May 20, 2026). I also confirmed the bug with a runtime PoC using the real timeout path in `trieSyncer.StartSyncing()`: two timed-out sync attempts are enough to exhaust a throttler with capacity `2`. This affects the epoch bootstrap path because `syncUserAccountsState()` and `syncKappAccountsState()` create bounded throttlers and abort bootstrap immediately if the syncer returns an error. Once enough trie-root sync attempts fail, the syncer cannot make forward progress and bootstrap fails. ## Affected Components - `data/syncer/userAccountsSyncer.go` - `data/syncer/kappAccountsSyncer.go` - `data/trie/sync.go` - `core/throttler/numGoRoutinesThrottler.go` - `core/bootstrap/process.go` ## Affected Version Verified on: - `develop` HEAD `9640d63` Please check whether the same code is present in supported `1.7.x` releases. ## Suggested Severity High ## Vulnerability Details ### Root Cause Both account-data syncers call `StartProcessing()` before creating / starting the trie syncer, but they only call `EndProcessing()` on the success path and on the duplicate-root early return. `userAccountsSyncer.syncDataTrie()`: ```go func (u *userAccountsSyncer) syncDataTrie(rootHash []byte, ssh data.SyncStatisticsHandler, ctx context.Context) error { u.throttler.StartProcessing() u.syncerMutex.Lock() if _, ok := u.dataTries[string(rootHash)]; ok { u.syncerMutex.Unlock() u.throttler.EndProcessing() return nil } dataTrie, err := trie.NewTrie(...) if err != nil { u.syncerMutex.Unlock() return err } trieSyncer, err := trie.NewTrieSyncer(arg) if err != nil { u.syncerMutex.Unlock() return err } u.syncerMutex.Unlock() err = trieSyncer.StartSyncing(rootHash, ctx) if err != nil { return err } u.throttler.EndProcessing() return nil } The same bug exists in kappAccountsSyncer.syncDataTrie(). ``` ### Missing slot release paths After StartProcessing(), the following error paths return without EndProcessing(): 1. trie.NewTrie(...) returns an error 2. trie.NewTrieSyncer(...) returns an error 3. trieSyncer.StartSyncing(...) returns an error ### Why this matters NumGoRoutinesThrottler is a strict bounded counter: ``` func (ngrt *NumGoRoutinesThrottler) CanProcess() bool { valCounter := atomic.LoadInt32(&ngrt.counter) return valCounter < ngrt.max } func (ngrt *NumGoRoutinesThrottler) StartProcessing() { atomic.AddInt32(&ngrt.counter, 1) } func (ngrt *NumGoRoutinesThrottler) EndProcessing() { atomic.AddInt32(&ngrt.counter, -1) } Once leaked, a slot remains consumed for the lifetime of that throttler instance. The parent loops in both syncers wait for capacity before starting the next account-data trie sync: for !u.throttler.CanProcess() { select { case <-time.After(timeBetweenRetries): continue case <-ctx.Done(): return common.ErrTimeIsOut } } ``` So after enough failures, further roots stop progressing and the sync operation eventually returns time is out. ### Bootstrap impact Epoch bootstrap uses these syncers directly and aborts on any error: ``` err = e.syncUserAccountsState(e.epochStartMeta.Header.TrieRoot) if err != nil { return nil, nil, err } err = e.syncKappAccountsState(e.epochStartMeta.Header.KAppsTrieRoot) if err != nil { return nil, nil, err } ``` The throttlers for these paths are real bounded throttlers created from numConcurrentTrieSyncers. ## Proof of Concept I verified the bug with the real timeout path, not only with a canceled context. The PoC below uses: - a real NumGoRoutinesThrottler with capacity 2 - a real trieSyncer.StartSyncing() - an empty trie-node cache and a request handler that never supplies nodes - a short sync timeout (1s) so StartSyncing() returns trie.ErrTimeIsOut After the first failed sync, one slot remains leaked. After the second failed sync, the throttler is exhausted. ### PoC test ``` package syncer import ( "context" "testing" "time" commonmock "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/common/mock" corethrottler "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/throttler" "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data" "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data/trie" triestats "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data/trie/statistics" "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" ) func newBaseSyncerForTimeoutPOC(t *testing.T) *baseAccountsSyncer { t.Helper() storageManager, err := trie.NewTrieStorageManagerWithoutPruning(commonmock.NewMemDbMock()) require.NoError(t, err) return &baseAccountsSyncer{ hasher: commonmock.HasherMock{}, marshalizer: &commonmock.MarshalizerMock{}, trieSyncers: make(map[string]data.TrieSyncer), dataTries: make(map[string]data.Trie), trieStorageManager: storageManager, requestHandler: &commonmock.RequestHandlerStub{}, timeout: time.Second, cacher: commonmock.NewCacherStub(), maxTrieLevelInMemory: 5, name: "timeout-poc", maxHardCapForMissingNodes: 1, } } func TestPOC_UserAccountsSyncer_LeaksThrottlerSlotOnTrieTimeout(t *testing.T) { thr, err := corethrottler.NewNumGoRoutinesThrottler(2) require.NoError(t, err) s := &userAccountsSyncer{ baseAccountsSyncer: newBaseSyncerForTimeoutPOC(t), throttler: thr, } err = s.syncDataTrie([]byte("missing-root-1"), triestats.NewTrieSyncStatistics(), context.Background()) require.ErrorIs(t, err, trie.ErrTimeIsOut) require.True(t, thr.CanProcess()) err = s.syncDataTrie([]byte("missing-root-2"), triestats.NewTrieSyncStatistics(), context.Background()) require.ErrorIs(t, err, trie.ErrTimeIsOut) require.False(t, thr.CanProcess()) } func TestPOC_KappAccountsSyncer_LeaksThrottlerSlotOnTrieTimeout(t *testing.T) { thr, err := corethrottler.NewNumGoRoutinesThrottler(2) require.NoError(t, err) s := &kappAccountsSyncer{ baseAccountsSyncer: newBaseSyncerForTimeoutPOC(t), throttler: thr, } err = s.syncDataTrie([]byte("missing-root-1"), triestats.NewTrieSyncStatistics(), context.Background()) require.ErrorIs(t, err, trie.ErrTimeIsOut) require.True(t, thr.CanProcess()) err = s.syncDataTrie([]byte("missing-root-2"), triestats.NewTrieSyncStatistics(), context.Background()) require.ErrorIs(t, err, trie.ErrTimeIsOut) require.False(t, thr.CanProcess()) } ``` ### Command used ``` go test ./data/syncer -run 'TestPOC_(User|Kapp)AccountsSyncer_LeaksThrottlerSlotOnTrieTimeout' -count=1 ``` ### Result ``` ok github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data/syncer 4.005s ``` This confirms the leak with the real timeout path from trieSyncer.StartSyncing(). ## Impact An attacker who can repeatedly cause trie-node sync failures or timeouts during bootstrap can consume the bounded sync throttler until no capacity remains. Once enough slots are leaked: - additional account-data trie sync attempts stop making progress - the parent loop waits until context timeout - SyncAccounts() fails - epoch bootstrap fails This is a core node availability issue. It affects fresh/restarting nodes and validators that need to bootstrap or resync state. This is not a theoretical issue: - StartSyncing() performs network-dependent trie-node retrieval - it already has explicit timeout / failure paths - the leaked throttler slots are confirmed by runtime PoC ## Recommended Fix Release the slot with defer immediately after StartProcessing() and cancel the defer only if ownership is intentionally transferred, which is not the case here. Example fix pattern: ``` func (u *userAccountsSyncer) syncDataTrie(rootHash []byte, ssh data.SyncStatisticsHandler, ctx context.Context) error { u.throttler.StartProcessing() defer u.throttler.EndProcessing() u.syncerMutex.Lock() defer u.syncerMutex.Unlock() if _, ok := u.dataTries[string(rootHash)]; ok { return nil } dataTrie, err := trie.NewTrie(...) if err != nil { return err } trieSyncer, err := trie.NewTrieSyncer(arg) if err != nil { return err } u.trieSyncers[string(rootHash)] = trieSyncer return trieSyncer.StartSyncing(rootHash, ctx) } ``` The same pattern should be applied to: - data/syncer/userAccountsSyncer.go - data/syncer/kappAccountsSyncer.go ## References - data/syncer/userAccountsSyncer.go - data/syncer/kappAccountsSyncer.go - data/trie/sync.go - core/throttler/numGoRoutinesThrottler.go - core/bootstrap/process.go - SECURITY.md
- Source published
- 5 Jun 2026 16:40:40 UTC
- Source modified
- 25 Jun 2026 19:56:02 UTC
- Observed here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Publisher rating · MODERATE
osv · GO-2026-5379
PublishedKlever-Go KVM: Throttler slot leak in trie account-data sync causes epoch bootstrap / state sync DoS in github.com/klever-io/klever-go
- Source published
- 25 Jun 2026 18:43:19 UTC
- Source modified
- 25 Jun 2026 19:45:37 UTC
- Observed here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.